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Abstract
Probation is a well-established part of our criminal justice toolkit, but we know surprisingly little about the
circumstances under which it is effective. Attempts to increase supervision intensity for crime- and cost-saving
purposes have yielded mixed results at best. This dissertation examines the theory and scientific evidence on
the effectiveness of probation, and the impact of changing the intensity of probation sanctions on recidivism.
First, we conduct a rigorous search and synthesis of the existing literature on intensive probation programs.
We utilize meta-analysis to identify the circumstances under which such programs might be effective. We find
no evidence that probationers in these programs fare better than their counterparts under traditional
supervision. We call for further research into supervision approaches that emphasize behavioral management
over contact frequency and caseload size. Second, we employ a range of statistical procedures to examine the
viability of saving resources by reducing supervision for low-risk offenders. In a randomized controlled trial
comparing low-intensity probation to traditional practice, we find no evidence that reducing supervision
increases recidivism. We find that low-risk probationers are heterogeneous in their characteristics but
homogeneous in their propensity to reoffend. They appear to respond well regardless of the intensity of the
sanction. Finally, we use epidemiological methods to evaluate the low-risk prediction model used in the
experiment. We find that the model successfully identifies offenders who are unlikely to commit serious
offenses, and is therefore a useful tool for diverting probationers to low-intensity supervision. In turn, low-
intensity supervision is not associated with changes in offending severity. Chapters 2 and 3 both conclude that
low-intensity supervision is a safe strategy that works very well for a probation agency’s lowest-level offenders.
This dissertation contributes to knowledge by changing perceptions of the characteristics of offenders and
resource allocation in criminal justice supervision. We find that ‘more’ does not always mean ‘better,’ and there
is no need to distribute expensive services equally. In a given probation population, the majority of offenders
will respond well no matter how little supervision they receive, so it makes sense to focus our attention on the
minority that will not.
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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF SANCTION INTENSITY ON CRIMINAL CONDUCT: 
A RANDOMIZED LOW-INTENSITY PROBATION EXPERIMENT 
 
Charlotte Elizabeth Gill 
 
John MacDonald 
 
 Probation is a well-established part of our criminal justice toolkit, but we know 
surprisingly little about the circumstances under which it is effective.  Attempts to 
increase supervision intensity for crime- and cost-saving purposes have yielded mixed 
results at best.  This dissertation examines the theory and scientific evidence on the 
effectiveness of probation, and the impact of changing the intensity of probation 
sanctions on recidivism.  
 First, we conduct a rigorous search and synthesis of the existing literature on 
intensive probation programs.  We utilize meta-analysis to identify the circumstances 
under which such programs might be effective.  We find no evidence that probationers in 
these programs fare better than their counterparts under traditional supervision.  We call 
for further research into supervision approaches that emphasize behavioral management 
over contact frequency and caseload size.  Second, we employ a range of statistical 
procedures to examine the viability of saving resources by reducing supervision for low-
risk offenders.  In a randomized controlled trial comparing low-intensity probation to 
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traditional practice, we find no evidence that reducing supervision increases recidivism.  
We find that low-risk probationers are heterogeneous in their characteristics but 
homogeneous in their propensity to reoffend.  They appear to respond well regardless of 
the intensity of the sanction.  Finally, we use epidemiological methods to evaluate the 
low-risk prediction model used in the experiment.  We find that the model successfully 
identifies offenders who are unlikely to commit serious offenses, and is therefore a useful 
tool for diverting probationers to low-intensity supervision.  In turn, low-intensity 
supervision is not associated with changes in offending severity.  Chapters 2 and 3 both 
conclude that low-intensity supervision is a safe strategy that works very well for a 
probation agency’s lowest-level offenders. 
 This dissertation contributes to knowledge by changing perceptions of the 
characteristics of offenders and resource allocation in criminal justice supervision.  We 
find that ‘more’ does not always mean ‘better,’ and there is no need to distribute 
expensive services equally.  In a given probation population, the majority of offenders 
will respond well no matter how little supervision they receive, so it makes sense to focus 
our attention on the minority that will not. 
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PREFACE 
 This dissertation presents an examination of the impact of changing the intensity 
of the probation sanction on the recidivism of adjudicated probation clients.  Historically, 
research on probation supervision has revolved around the assumption that more 
intensive (increased) supervision is the best way to ensure public safety and prevent 
crime, while saving money relative to incarceration.  However, that assumption was not, 
for the most part, evidence-based.  Rigorous research has shown that intensive probation 
programs yield mixed results at best, and may be even less effective for the least serious 
offenders.  This dissertation addresses two broad questions: What scientific evidence is 
there for the effectiveness of probation supervision?  Does variation in its intensity affect 
crime outcomes?  The following three chapters represent three stand-alone papers 
looking at different aspects of these questions: a review of the existing evidence; a 
randomized controlled trial of low-intensity supervision; and a method for predicting 
low-risk offenders suitable for minimal supervision. 
 Chapter 1 reports the results of a rigorous search and synthesis of the existing 
literature on intensive supervision probation (ISP).  Although ISP is one of the most 
thoroughly tested criminal justice interventions, the evaluations have never been 
identified and synthesized in a methodologically rigorous way.  We examine forty-seven 
experimental and quasi-experimental studies conducted over the last fifty years using 
meta-analytic techniques to investigate whether and under what circumstances ISP might 
be effective.  We find no evidence that the mostly high-risk probationers on ISP fare any 
better than their counterparts who receive traditional supervision.  Increased supervision 
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intensity makes no difference to recidivism, and tends to increase the rate of technical 
violations (which can lead to returns to jail and further criminalization) due to the 
increased surveillance inherent in the process.  However, we find several more recent 
studies that show more promising reductions in recidivism.  These programs tend to focus 
more closely on the content of supervision, which remains a largely neglected aspect of 
probation, rather than contact frequency and caseload size.  We conclude that the 
assumption that “more is better” does not necessarily hold true, and that it is more 
important to ask what probation officers are expected to achieve during supervision. 
 Chapters 2 and 3 build on the findings from an experiment conducted with the 
Philadelphia Adult Probation and Parole Department (APPD), in which the agency 
restructured supervision activities along risk-based lines.  Sixty per cent of APPD’s 
caseload was filtered into reduced-intensity supervision based on a statistical prediction 
that they were at low risk of serious recidivism.  The removal of resources from some 
probationers has met with criticism, despite the longer-term goal of the project: to free up 
staff to work more closely with the dangerous offenders who increase the public’s fear of 
crime.  The goal of these chapters is to provide a rigorous evaluation of low-intensity 
supervision and the suitability of the prediction model, to ensure first that no serious 
offenders inadvertently receive too little supervision, and second that reduced supervision 
in itself is not criminogenic.  While Chapter 1 shows no evidence that increased 
supervision prevents serious offenders from committing crimes, it remains important to 
show that reduced supervision does not lead to unfavorable outcomes.  The policy cannot 
work as a resource-saving strategy if agencies view it as too politically risky.   
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 From a theoretical standpoint, Chapters 2 and 3 also provide an insight into the 
nature of low-risk offenders and the types of crime they commit.  Understandably, a great 
deal of attention is paid in the criminological literature to unpacking the characteristics of 
more serious offenders, but in developing low-intensity supervision the Philadelphia 
APPD hypothesized that the majority of its caseload could be classified as low risk.  If it 
is true that the majority of offenders pose little risk of serious recidivism, it is important 
to learn how they compare to the minority who pose a greater threat. 
 In Chapter 2 we utilize a range of statistical procedures to break down the main 
results of the low-intensity supervision experiment, in order to ensure that there are no 
circumstances under which reduced supervision increases recidivism.  We find no 
evidence that this was the case.  We use instrumental variables techniques to model the 
characteristics of low-risk offenders and their relationship to take-up and outcomes of 
low-intensity probation.  We find that low-risk offenders represent a much broader range 
of society than the traditional ‘young male’ offender.  However, they have an extremely 
low propensity to reoffend and appear to perform well regardless of the degree of 
supervision they receive.  Thus, we conclude that it is not necessary to treat all offenders 
equally when it comes to probation supervision.  Standards can be relaxed for most 
offenders to allow probation officers to spend more time with higher-risk clients, working 
to identify and address their needs.  For such a model to work in practice, a good 
prediction model is needed to identify who can safely be diverted to the low-intensity 
unit. 
 Chapter 3 examines whether the prediction model used in the low-intensity 
supervision experiment, which classifies offenders as low and non-low risk based on their 
xiv 
risk of committing just the most serious crimes, is an effective tool for the type of risk 
management strategy employed by Philadelphia APPD.  Using methods from the 
epidemiology field, we assess the sensitivity of the model to the patterns of offending 
severity exhibited in a sample of probationers.  We find that low-risk offenders have a 
very low propensity for serious offending, while those receiving a non-low risk 
prediction are much more likely to engage in these offense types.  The model appears to 
successfully recognize this over several different definitions of severity.  Furthermore, 
there is no change in offending severity when supervision is reduced for predicted low-
risk offenders.  We find further evidence of the homogeneity in this sample’s propensity 
to reoffend regardless of supervision intensity.  Predicted low-risk offenders with a 
history of serious offending respond just the same to reduced supervision as they do to 
regular supervision.  For those without a serious offending history, reduced supervision is 
even associated with reductions in recidivism compared to the status quo.  Thus, we 
conclude that low-intensity supervision is a safe and effective strategy that works 
particularly well for a probation agency’s lowest-level offenders. 
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CHAPTER 1. Is ‘More’ Really ‘Better’? The Impact of Intensive 
Probation Supervision on Recidivism. 
 
Introduction 
 Probation is one of the most frequently-used criminal sanctions in the United 
States (American Correctional Association, 2006).  At the end of 2008, nearly 5.1 million 
adults were on probation alone – 84 per cent of all adults under community supervision.  
In all, one in forty-five U.S. adults is on probation or parole.1  Although growth slowed 
slightly in 2008, the population under community supervision has been steadily rising for 
some time, increasing by more than half a million between 2000 and 2008 (Glaze & 
Bonczar, 2009). 
 Despite the extent of its use, probation has suffered from image problems, 
particularly a public perception that it is a ‘soft’ approach to crime for often serious 
offenders who are highly likely to recidivate.2  Subsequently, many probation agencies 
have struggled to access sufficient funding (Petersilia, 1997).  This highlights a clear 
need for probation agencies to identify supervision practices that are effective at reducing 
recidivism, and at the same time represent an efficient use of scarce resources.  Taxman 
(2002) notes that considerable research has been dedicated to programming and services 
that are often provided in conjunction with or on referral from probation, such as 
cognitive-behavioral therapy, drug courts, and skill-building programs (see also 
MacKenzie, 2006a; 2006b).  Yet comparatively little attention has been paid to the 
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impact of probation supervision itself on crime: the number of cases a probation officer 
handles, the frequency of contact between officer and client, and the nature of the 
interaction.  Supervision is perhaps considered an uninteresting part of the probation 
process, “in the background of other programming” and therefore “inconsequential to 
effectiveness” (Taxman, 2002, p. 179). 
 On the contrary, supervision is a crucial aspect of probation not only because it is 
the bedrock of programming, but also because in a chronically under-funded enterprise it 
may constitute the only interaction between client and agency.  In this regard it may 
directly impact the client’s future criminal behavior.  If a probation officer with a 
caseload of 150 clients has inadequate time to spend with each one, s/he may find it 
impossible to build an accurate picture of individuals’ needs in order to target 
programming most effectively.  Supervision levels vary widely, from weekly or twice-
weekly meetings for high-risk or delinquent probationers, to telephone reporting for those 
near the end of their sentences.  In some busy agencies ‘supervision’ may constitute 
nothing more than a mail-in contact detail confirmation card (Petersilia & Turner, 1993, 
p. 285).  It is not always clear whether supervision intensity is related to the client’s needs 
or risk, or whether it is simply determined by operational capabilities.   
 In this paper, we conduct a systematic search for literature on probation 
supervision intensity and synthesize the results using meta-analytic techniques to present 
the most current knowledge about the effect of changing intensity on probationers’ 
subsequent criminal conduct.  We find that the amount of supervision in itself does not 
appear to be associated with recidivism outcomes.  More supervision may in fact increase 
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probation violation rates because offenders are at greater risk of detection.  The literature 
on intensive probation also sheds very little light on the nature of effective practices. 
 
Background 
 Intensive supervision probation (ISP) is one aspect of probation that has received 
considerable research attention.  ISP programs usually consist of small caseloads and 
enhanced reporting requirements.  However, interest in the practice has evolved from a 
need to find punitive alternatives to imprisonment rather than a general desire to 
understand more about supervision practices.  As a result, there has been very little 
articulation of the theoretical basis for its hypothesized effectiveness beyond the 
assumption that ‘more is better.’  Indeed, Bennett (1988) described ISP as “a practice in 
search of a theory.” 
 Skeem and Manchak (2008) propose that probation supervision may follow one 
of three broad guiding philosophies: control/surveillance, treatment, or a hybrid of both.  
ISP programs developed over the last fifty years have fallen into all three of these 
categories, but the ‘classic’ model has been a surveillance strategy designed to keep track 
of serious offenders who would otherwise be incarcerated.  As such, ISP appears rooted 
in traditional theories of formal social control and deterrence.  Offenders are offered the 
opportunity to remain in the community on the understanding that they are being 
constantly monitored, and the consequence of failure is the loss of liberty.  Several 
qualitative studies have noted that most offenders express a preference for incarceration 
over intermediate sanctions like ISP (e.g., Crouch, 1993; Petersilia & Deschenes, 1994), 
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which perhaps suggests that ISP is a more unpleasant prospect than prison for adjudicated 
offenders and could therefore have a strong deterrent effect against future offending.  
MacKenzie and Brame (2001) suggested an alternative mechanism by which social 
controls operate through ISP.  They proposed that increased supervision intensity could 
lead to increased involvement in conventional and therapeutic activities, and found some 
support for that hypothesis through empirical testing.  Overall, ISP studies have usually 
focused on the field testing of programs and avoided any explication of the theoretical 
foundations of probation supervision. 
 Clear and Hardyman (1990) describe two waves of interest in ISP research: the 
first in the 1960s, and another in the mid-1980s.  More recently, a third wave of research 
has refined the application of increased supervision intensity, considering its relationship 
with carefully matched programming and treatment.  The earliest set of field studies of 
what may be characterized as ISP programs focused on the impact of reducing probation 
officers’ caseload sizes, and followed the ‘treatment’ philosophy.  At the time, the 
rehabilitative ideal prevailed in corrections, and it was believed that smaller caseloads 
allowed probation officers more time to help their clients (Petersilia & Turner, 1990).  
However, these initiatives appeared to make little impact on recidivism, and even 
increased probation failures and technical violations.  Clear and Hardyman (1990) 
suggest that one important reason for the lack of effectiveness of these initiatives was a 
lack of insight into how probation supervision activity could best serve the treatment 
goal.  Probation officers simply did not know how to use the additional time made 
available to them. 
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 The collapse of the rehabilitative ideal and the subsequent ‘nothing works’ 
paradigm of the 1970s, along with a sharp rise in crime, led to an exponential increase in 
prison growth (and the cost of corrections) that has persisted ever since (e.g., Ruth & 
Reitz, 2003).  The probation population was also growing at a similar pace, and probation 
officer caseloads were becoming too large to allow them to serve the increasing number 
of serious and high-need offenders being granted probation or parole (Petersilia & 
Turner, 1993).  By the 1980s there was renewed interest in ISP as part of a battery of 
‘intermediate sanctions’ that sought to alleviate prison overcrowding and save money, 
while maintaining the appearance of being tough on offenders who would otherwise have 
been incarcerated.  The focus was on surveillance and control of the offender through 
small caseloads, frequent contacts, increased drug testing, and mandatory employment.  
The new ISP was rooted in the classical theory of deterrence through swift, certain 
punishment, effected by close supervision (Petersilia & Turner, 1990). 
 Georgia was the first state in the U.S.A. to implement this new generation of ISP 
program.  Participants had very low recidivism rates, maintained employment, and paid 
probation fees that helped offset the cost of supervision.  The Georgia model was 
subsequently adopted elsewhere in the United States, with mixed results.  The Bureau of 
Justice Assistance (BJA) responded to the interest in and uncertainty about the Georgia 
model by funding a large, multi-site randomized controlled trial in the mid-1980s, which 
was evaluated by the RAND Corporation.  Twelve of the fourteen experiments compared 
ISP to routine supervision, while two compared ISP to incarceration.  By and large, the 
results of the evaluations were disappointing, again showing little impact on new crimes 
and an increase in technical violations compared to usual practice.  Furthermore, a 
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program intended to reduce the strain on the prison system actually resulted in more 
incarcerations, as increased surveillance and drug testing raised the likelihood of 
probation failure (Petersilia & Turner, 1993). 
 The inability of ISP to demonstrate potential as a crime prevention program under 
the scrutiny of a rigorous research design largely killed off interest in the 
surveillance/control model of probation supervision by the 1990s.  ISP was listed in the 
influential University of Maryland report to the United States Congress, Preventing 
Crime: What Works, What Doesn’t, What’s Promising, as a program that did not work 
(Sherman et al., 1997; MacKenzie, 2006b).  However, the ‘what works’ movement also 
led to an increased focus on the factors that influence successful programming.  Andrews, 
Bonta, and Hoge (1990) introduced what are now commonly described as the ‘principles 
of effective intervention’ (PEI), which posit that programs should be designed to be 
responsive to offenders’ specific risk and need levels (the risk-need-responsivity, or 
RNR, model: see also Taxman & Thanner, 2006).  The risk principle in particular 
suggests that more intensive supervision and treatment should be targeted at higher-risk 
offenders, an idea that is strongly supported by empirical research (see Lowenkamp, 
Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006, for a summary).  The PEI suggest that ISP might be more 
effective if, through increased contact and control, the probation officer were able to 
establish offenders’ risk and need levels and direct them into appropriate treatment. 
 Treatment provision was not a priority of the BJA/RAND-evaluated programs, 
and few participants received such services (Latessa et al., 1998).  However, results from 
some of the study sites indicated that intensive supervision combined with treatment 
might have a positive effect on crime, which led the evaluators to call for more research 
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into such interaction effects (Petersilia, Turner, & Deschenes, 1992a; Petersilia & Turner, 
1993).  Several more recent studies also suggest that ISP programs that adhere to the PEI 
and offer a balance of treatment and surveillance (the ‘hybrid’ philosophy) show promise 
in improving offender outcomes (e.g., Latessa et al., 1998; Paparozzi & Gendreau, 2005).  
A recent meta-analysis of a wide range of correctional interventions also supports the 
contention that modern treatment-focused ISPs are more effective at reducing recidivism 
than surveillance-based programs (Aos, Miller, & Drake, 2006).  MacKenzie (2006b), in 
a detailed update to the University of Maryland report, lists intensive supervision with a 
treatment component as a ‘promising’ strategy in corrections, which means that further 
rigorous research is needed but several studies have produced encouraging results. 
 Uncertainty about the effectiveness of ISP indicates a clear need for work to 
unpack the complex relationships between surveillance and treatment, probation officer 
and client.  Taxman (2008a) notes that efforts are now under way to effect organizational 
change in probation departments that will allow for greater rapport-building between 
officers and offenders, which is intended to lead to behavioral change.  She is currently 
leading experimental research into “proactive” and “seamless” criminal justice 
supervision and treatment programs that embody these new directions and have so far 
shown substantial reductions in recidivism for participants (Taxman, 2008b).  A recent 
randomized controlled trial in Hawaii indicated that intensive probation programs rooted 
in the classical deterrence tradition may be effective when a consistent, incentive-based 
structure is implemented.  The Hawaii HOPE program combined increased drug testing 
with swift, certain adjudication and shock incarceration for violations.  A novel aspect of 
the program was the handling of violations.  Non-compliant offenders continued their 
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supervision with probation officers trained in therapeutic techniques, and repeat violators 
were directed to treatment services as well as being punished (Hawken & Kleiman, 
2009). 
 Taken together, the research on ISP to date suggests a complex dynamic that goes 
beyond earlier assertions that the programs do not work.  Furthermore, even less is 
known about the converse of ISP: increasing caseloads and reducing contacts (‘low-
intensity’ supervision).  The PEI would suggest that ISP be reserved for the highest-risk 
offenders, with reduced surveillance and services for those at the lowest end of the risk-
need spectrum.  There is some speculation that increased caseloads can lead to harmful 
reductions in supervision, putting society at risk from offenders whose probation officers 
have too many clients to ensure that each one is not a threat to public safety (e.g.,Worrall 
et al., 2004;3 Lemert, 1993).  However, Glaser (1983) speculated that reduced frequency 
of contact would not adversely affect low-risk or low-need clients.  This suggestion is 
supported empirically, notably by a recent randomized experiment (Barnes et al., 
forthcoming; also Johnson, Austin, & Davies, 2003; Wilson, Naro, & Austin, 2007).  
Additionally, several studies have indicated that more intensive supervision can have 
unfavorable effects on the recidivism of low-risk offenders (Erwin, 1986; Hanley, 2006; 
Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006).  We still have much to learn about probation 
and parole supervision, and the circumstances under which its use is effective in reducing 
crime. 
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The Present Study 
 The overall aim of the present study is to undertake a comprehensive review and 
synthesis of the most rigorous research available on the effects of probation supervision 
intensity on recidivism.  The focus of the review is programs that include among their 
primary features a change in the ratio of probationers to probation officers (caseload 
size), frequency of contact between officers and clients, or other ‘frontline’ supervisory 
behavior, such as drug testing.  The effects of these changes are tested against a 
counterfactual of ‘supervision as usual’ – offenders who remained part of standard 
probation caseloads.  The primary outcome measure is recidivism, as measured by 
arrests, charges, or convictions.  We also examine the impact of probation intensity on 
technical violations. 
 As we have seen, there is conflicting evidence about the effectiveness of 
increasing the intensity of probation supervision.  It may depend on the specific 
philosophies and components of the programs and how they interact with supervision 
levels.  The risk and need levels, and other characteristics, of offenders who participated 
in ISP research studies may also impact the relative effectiveness of the programs.  We 
systematically code the characteristics of each program and sample to examine which, if 
any, of these characteristics moderate the overall effect of the change in intensity. 
 The specific research questions we address in this systematic review are: 
1. How does the degree of probation supervision intensity affect probationers’ 
subsequent offending and technical violations? 
2. To what extent does program philosophy (treatment, surveillance, or hybrid) 
influence the success or failure of changes in supervision intensity? 
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3. To what extent do the risk/need levels of program participants affect their response 
(in terms of reoffending and violations) to changes in supervision intensity? 
4. Which other program components or offender characteristics moderate the overall 
effect of supervision intensity on crime? 
 
Systematic Review Methodology 
Criteria for inclusion and exclusion of studies in the review 
Types of Interventions 
 Eligible studies will test the effect of a change in intensity of probation 
supervision on subsequent crime.  A change in intensity could be brought about by 
increasing or decreasing the ratio of clients to probation officers (changing caseload size); 
increasing or decreasing the frequency of contact between clients and their officers; or 
increasing or decreasing the frequency of other forms of supervisory control effected by 
probation officers, such as drug testing.4  Studies in which the primary purpose of the 
research design is to estimate the impact of these specific measures on recidivism and/or 
technical violations are considered.  Most studies have tested increases in intensity rather 
than decreases, but changes in both directions are eligible for inclusion in the review. 
 We impose a number of restrictions on program type in order to preserve 
comparability between what we already know will be a highly diverse set of studies.  
Some programs have examined the provision of supervision as part of a ‘team’ approach; 
for example, multi-agency collaboration between probation officers, police officers, and 
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treatment providers.  Evaluations of these programs are eligible as long as the probation 
officer is the primary supervisor.  This limitation allows us to maintain a degree of 
equivalence between treatment providers and settings, and between treatment and control 
group conditions.  For example, we included a study in which probation officers provided 
increased supervision by frequently visiting clients’ homes accompanied by a police 
officer (Piquero, 2003).  However, we excluded a study in which the only difference in 
supervision intensity between the treatment and control groups was that treatment group 
probationers were assigned police officers who made unannounced visits during their 
regular patrol shifts to monitor probation compliance (Giblin, 2002). 
 We also restrict our analysis to the study of adjudicated offenders sentenced to 
probation or granted parole.  Probation services may also be provided at the pretrial stage, 
or as part of diversion strategies for first-time juvenile arrestees or ‘pre-delinquent’ 
adolescents.  We hypothesize that there may be substantial differences in the offending 
propensities of participants in these programs compared to adjudicated offenders, 
particularly because offenders at the pretrial stage are not guaranteed to receive any 
conviction or sentence.  There is also no straightforward comparison condition to pretrial 
probation in the same way that ‘supervision as usual’ simply involves more or less of the 
same intervention. 
 
Types of studies 
 We attempt to maximize internal validity in our selection of studies by limiting 
the sample to studies meeting at least a ‘high’ Level 4 on the Maryland Scientific 
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Methods Scale (SMS: Farrington et al., 2006).  The SMS is a 5-point methodological 
rating scale, on which 1 indicates the least reliable research design (a one-group study 
with only post-intervention outcomes), and 5 represents the most rigorous design 
(random assignment of multiple units to treatment and comparison groups).  Level 3 
designs (non-comparable treatment and control units) are generally accepted as the 
‘minimum interpretable’ research design (Cook & Campbell, 1979).  Level 4 studies are 
quasi-experimental designs including multiple treatment and comparison units, pre- and 
post-program measures of offending behavior, and controls for potential bias from 
confounding factors through matching of treatment and comparison subjects or 
multivariate statistical controls.  We limit our analysis only to those studies that utilize 
strong quasi-experimental designs involving at least subject-level matching, or 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs).  We justify these strict inclusion criteria on the basis 
of a priori knowledge of a large body of the highest-quality research on ISP.  The 
BJA/RAND studies alone were the largest randomized experiment in corrections 
undertaken in the United States at the time (Petersilia & Turner, 1993, p. 292).  Thus, we 
expect to find sufficient numbers of experimental and quasi-experimental studies meeting 
our other eligibility criteria to permit a meta-analysis to be conducted. 
 The control condition must be regular probation or parole supervision 
(‘supervision as usual’).  This may vary widely between studies in terms of number and 
type of contacts, caseload size, and so on, as long as the control group participants are 
exposed to the regular practices of the probation agency.  The specific components of the 
control group are coded.  In some evaluations, ISP programs based on the ‘Georgia 
model’ were compared to the agency’s existing intensive supervision program, rather 
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than ‘routine’ probation (e.g., Ventura County, California: Petersilia & Turner, 1990).  
We consider these studies for inclusion as long as there are differences between the 
existing and experimental ISPs that meet the requirements set out in the previous section.  
Evaluations in which ISP is compared to incarceration or a different program (e.g., a boot 
camp) are excluded.  The aim of this review is to investigate the impact of changing 
probation/parole supervision intensity, so our baseline for assessing such change must be 
probation/parole supervision of a different intensity than that received by the treatment 
group. 
 
Types of Participants 
 We include both juvenile and adult probationers in the review.  Since probation 
agencies supervise a broad range of offenders, most studies will include mixed caseloads 
of male and female offenders with different risk and need levels and varying offending 
histories.  However, we expect that most participants will be the moderate to high-risk 
male offenders usually targeted in high-intensity probation programs.  Some 
experimental ISPs were directed at specific offending problems (e.g., focusing on drug-
involved offenders), while others accept a range of offender types.  Many probation and 
parole agencies do not have different policies for the supervision of probationers as 
compared to parolees, so studies may include mixed caseloads.  Specific details about all 
these variations are coded. 
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Types of Outcomes 
 Eligible studies measure recidivism in terms of new arrests and/or convictions. 
Technical violations of probation, such as absconding or failing a drug test, are also 
included as a separate outcome measure.  While technical violations do not inevitably 
result in a recorded arrest or charge for a new offense, they represent a failure to comply 
with probation conditions that could be affected by the intensity of supervision. 
 The use of technical violations as an outcome measure comes with the caveat that 
increased supervision intensity could increase the likelihood of a violation being detected 
through increased surveillance, rather than simply a failure to comply.  This caveat 
applies to new criminal cases too, but to a lesser extent.  New crimes are more likely to 
be detected by the police than by probation officers, so future arrests are less likely to be 
affected by the offender’s probation status.  This also makes arrest a preferable outcome 
measure to charges or convictions that come further along the criminal justice process 
and may be more affected by disclosure of prior sentences.  Of course, police officers in 
smaller beat areas probably know the repeat offenders too and will adjust their discretion 
to arrest accordingly.  All recidivism measures suffer from inherent limitations. 
 Offending measured by self-report is not excluded, but most ISP studies use 
official records.  This is a limitation of our research: it is well-known that official records 
can underestimate the prevalence of reoffending, and there may be confounding between 
the treatment and response that could be partly overcome by using self-reports.  
However, these data were simply not available to the extent needed to conduct a 
meaningful analysis. 
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Search strategy for identification of relevant studies 
 We used several strategies to conduct a comprehensive search for literature on 
probation intensity.  Our main source of information was the Internet.  References were 
found through keyword searches of online abstract databases and the websites of research 
organizations and government agencies (see Appendix A for lists of keywords and the 
databases and websites searched).  Specialist search engines like Google Scholar also 
provide a rich source of ‘grey literature.’5  We also consulted lists of references from 
existing reviews of probation supervision and intensity, and of randomized trials in 
general (Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Phipps et al., 1999; Taxman, 2002; Weisburd, 
Sherman, & Petrosino, 1990), and book and microfilm collections at the University of 
Pennsylvania library.  We supplemented the online searches with hand searches of key 
journals in the field.6  Every effort was made to locate unpublished material where 
possible.  Most agencies now make reports available online for review or download, 
meaning we were able to obtain most of our references very quickly.  However, many of 
the older reports that have not been digitally archived are harder to access.  The 
University of Pennsylvania’s Inter-Library Loan service proved useful in locating some 
of these studies.  Electronic references were downloaded to Zotero, a web-based program 
that captures, stores, and manages references.7  Eligibility of studies was assessed by 
reading titles and abstracts, and obtaining the full text of documents that appeared to be 
relevant. 
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Description of methods used in primary research 
 We located a wide range of evaluations testing a change in probation intensity.  
However, the BJA/RAND experiments from the 1980s (Petersilia & Turner, 1993) 
represent the ‘classic’ ISP model, and serve as a convenient illustration of a typical study 
design.  The BJA/RAND studies were a fourteen-site randomized controlled trial of 
largely surveillance/control-oriented ISP programs.  Two of the study sites compared ISP 
to incarceration (so were not eligible for inclusion in this review), while the remaining 
twelve contrasted ISP with supervision as usual (SAU) or existing intensive supervision 
models.  Enhancements of both probation and parole supervision were tested.  The exact 
nature of the program depended on the study site – each jurisdiction selected components 
of the Georgia ISP model for inclusion as it saw fit.  Key common features of all the 
evaluations included smaller caseloads of around 25-30 offenders per officer (usually 
compared to 100 or more in SAU), increased frequency of contact (usually at least once a 
week at first, gradually decreasing in phases), drug testing, and mandated employment. 
 Participants in the ISP evaluations had to be adults.  Their risk levels varied, but 
they were generally more serious offenders.  Petersilia and Turner (1993) state: “People 
placed on enhancement ISPs [as opposed to prison diversion or early release] are 
generally deemed too serious to be supervised on routine caseloads” (p. 292).  However, 
persons convicted of homicide, robbery, or sex crimes were excluded as a matter of 
policy from the experiment.  Participants were primarily males in their late twenties to 
early thirties, with extensive criminal records.  A substantial proportion of participants 
were drug dependent.  The study sites set their own eligibility criteria for participants 
beyond these initial requirements.  Participants were randomly assigned to treatment and 
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control conditions by RAND researchers.  The study sites implemented the 
randomization sequence. 
 Data collection occurred in several waves.  A baseline assessment of demographic 
characteristics and criminal history was conducted shortly after assignment.  Supervision 
details and services received were recorded at six and twelve months; and recidivism 
(proportion with new technical violations, arrests, convictions, and incarcerations) was 
recorded at twelve months.  Data on drug testing were collected monthly.  Cost data and 
calendars for assessing time at risk were also collected.  Each site obtained its own data, 
and procedures were checked for validity by RAND staff.  Recidivism data came from 
official records rather than self-reports. 
 
Criteria for determination of independent findings 
 Many ISP studies report data on multiple outcome measures, which cannot be 
considered independent treatment effects for the purposes of quantitative meta-analysis 
because they are taken from the same sample of participants.  In this review we do not 
attempt to pool outcome measures.  As described above, the different outcome measures 
can be affected in different ways by the offenders’ probation status.  We initially take the 
more conservative approach of handling different types of outcome measure separately.  
However, we combine arrests and convictions in some analyses.  In these cases, arrest 
outcomes take precedence over convictions so that multiple outcomes from the same 
study are not used.  We prioritize arrest because a successful conviction is dependent on 
many external factors and may not represent the most accurate picture of the offender’s 
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actual behavior.  We analyze technical violations separately because of the strong 
likelihood that they will be related to the treatment condition due to the increased 
surveillance inherent in ISP programs. 
 In the event that samples or outcomes are broken down by subgroups (e.g., new 
arrests are reported for the full sample and then broken out into drug, property, and 
violent crime arrests), we use the data for the full sample or outcome only.  Where 
enough studies provide results broken down by the same types of subgroups, we analyze 
those outcomes separately.  Some studies report only felony or misdemeanor arrests or 
convictions, but do not combine the two.  In these cases we prioritize felony offenses, 
given that ISP is generally used with more serious offenders. 
 A related threat to the independence of findings is the measurement of follow-up 
outcomes for the same sample at multiple time periods.  In such cases, the longest follow-
up period is preferred.  However, in some studies we obtained, sample sizes decreased 
significantly over time as cases were lost to follow-up.  In those cases we selected the 
follow-up period with the closest number of cases to the original sample size to minimize 
bias from attrition.   
 Where multiple reports are based on the same dataset or sample, we combine 
results where possible, counting the sample as one study.  The study containing the 
longest follow-up period and/or the most detail is considered the primary study, and other 
reports are used to supplement the data from the primary study where necessary.  We 
checked each coded document carefully to ensure that re-analyses of the same datasets 
were not inadvertently included with primary evaluation data from the same research 
project.  We do include several studies conducted in the same jurisdiction (usually no 
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smaller than the county level) where the dates of the study periods indicate that there is 
little risk of project or participant overlap.  Where multiple treatment groups are 
compared to a single control group (e.g., Haapanen & Britton, 2002), we select one 
treatment group only to maintain independence of control group samples.  The treatment 
group is selected at random to avoid bias in the overall effect size. 
 
Details of study coding categories 
 A systematic review can be thought of as a survey in which the respondents are 
studies rather than people.  Each retrieved report is ‘interviewed’ using a survey 
instrument (coding protocol) to obtain information relevant to our analysis.  The coding 
protocol developed for this study is reproduced in Appendix B.  It is designed to capture 
the hierarchical nature of evaluation data: a single study may report separate effect sizes 
for multiple outcome constructs for multiple samples in multiple treatment-comparison 
contrasts or study sites (‘modules’).  We recorded a range of methodological details about 
each study to assist in decision-making about eligibility and study quality.  A host of 
items capturing information about program, setting, and participant characteristics served 
as both determinants of eligibility and potential moderator variables.  We did not expect 
all these factors to influence outcomes and did not test each one to minimize the risk of 
finding results that were statistically significant merely by chance.  However, we also 
aimed to be as inclusive as possible so that potentially relevant information was not 
missed. 
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Treatment of qualitative research 
 Qualitative research studies are not included in the systematic review results, but 
relevant qualitative data are used to inform the background, framing, and analysis of our 
questions.  The broad definition of our search terms allows qualitative studies to be 
systematically identified in the literature searches. 
 
Analytic Strategy 
 Meta-analytic procedures are used to quantitatively combine effect size data from 
the eligible studies where appropriate (i.e., where two or more studies were available that 
measured a common outcome, such as arrests, and contained sufficient information to 
calculate an effect size).  Effect sizes for each outcome measure in the studies are 
encoded according to procedures outlined in Lipsey and Wilson’s (2001) guide to meta-
analysis.  The type of effect size chosen depends on the form of the original outcome 
measure.  Most evaluations of ISP include dichotomized measures of the prevalence of 
recidivism or technical violations (e.g., the proportion of offenders arrested/not arrested).  
This type of data is suitable for calculating odds ratios (OR).  The odds ratio compares 
two groups on the relative odds8 of an event (e.g., arrest) occurring (see Appendix C).  
The odds ratio is centered at 1, so OR=1 indicates no difference between the treatment 
and control groups on the outcome measure.  In our analyses, OR > 1 indicates a result 
that favors the control group (i.e. recidivism increases following assignment to intensive 
probation), and OR < 1 indicates a result that favors the treatment group (assignment to 
intensive probation is associated with reduced recidivism).  The events of interest here 
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(arrests, convictions, violations, etc.) are unfavorable and the intention of the change in 
supervision intensity is to reduce their prevalence.  Thus, a smaller effect size implies 
fewer events, which is the goal of the programs being tested.9 
 The synthesis of effect sizes in a meta-analysis also requires the calculation of a 
weight for each effect size.  Without the inclusion of the weight, each study’s effect size 
is assumed to contribute equally to the overall (mean) effect size.  This is unjustified 
because smaller studies have greater sampling error and should not contribute as much to 
the mean outcome as larger, relatively more reliable studies.  Lipsey and Wilson (2001, p. 
36) suggest that the optimal study weight is based on the inverse of the squared standard 
error of the effect size (called the ‘inverse variance weight’).  Formulas for calculating 
the standard error and inverse variance weight for the OR are presented in Appendix C. 
 Computations of effect sizes and inverse variance weights, and calculation of the 
mean effect sizes and corresponding confidence intervals and statistical tests, are 
performed using specialized meta-analysis macros written for STATA software (Wilson, 
2002).  We use RevMan software (Cochrane Collaboration, 2008) to construct forest 
plots for the graphical representation of meta-analysis results.  The forest plot shows the 
weighted mean effect size and associated 95 per cent confidence interval for each study.  
A square represents the point estimate of the effect size, the size of the square represents 
the study weight, and the lines on either side of the square are the confidence intervals.  
The mean effect size across all studies is displayed as a diamond, whose far left and right 
points represent the lower and upper bounds of that estimate’s confidence interval.  The 
plot is centered around 1, the point at which no difference is observed between treatment 
and control groups.  Point estimates to the left of center represent outcomes favoring the 
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treatment group, and those to the right favor the control group.  When the confidence 
intervals do not touch or cross the center line, the point estimate is statistically 
significant. 
 We assume a random effects model, rather than fixed effects, for all analyses (see 
Appendix C for details).  Fixed effects models in meta-analysis assume that the only 
random error in the distribution of effect sizes arises from within-study sampling error.  
We do not consider this to be theoretically justified in our analysis because of the 
considerable between-study differences (heterogeneity: see below) in program 
characteristics, settings, and populations.  Further, because we know we have not been 
able to capture all the available research on intensive probation programs, we can 
consider our set of studies a sub-sample of a larger ‘population’ of studies, with its own 
sampling error.  Both of these factors justify the use of the random effects model (Lipsey 
& Wilson, 2001, pp. 117-120).10 
 Meta-analytic methods are also used to investigate whether the overall mean 
effect size is moderated by other factors.  We are interested in the potential impact of 
certain program and offender characteristics on the variation in effect sizes across studies.  
Because all our moderator variables are categorical and we have a small set of a priori 
hypotheses about potential moderators, such as risk/need level and supervision 
philosophy, we use the meta-analytic analog to the analysis of variance (ANOVA) to test 
whether these factors might account for any variability in the observed effect sizes from 
each study (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, pp. 120-122).  We assess each categorical variable 
separately using this strategy.  Even though we include a substantial number of studies in 
this meta-analysis, cell frequencies became very small when they were broken out by 
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research design, outcomes, and different levels of each moderator variable.  Therefore, 
we focus only on bivariate comparisons on each moderator, and do not attempt to model 
outcomes any further.  This is a limitation of our moderator analysis: the results we 
present do not control for the presence of any additional moderators. 
 The analog to the ANOVA is based on the Q-statistic calculated as part of the 
main random effects model.  Q is the weighted sum-of-squares of each effect size around 
the grand mean.  It represents the extent to which differences between the effect sizes are 
statistically related to differences in moderators (a statistically significant Q-statistic 
indicates evidence of between-study heterogeneity).  We use the random effects analog to 
the ANOVA (also called a ‘mixed effects’ model), which assumes there is still 
unmeasured variability after moderators are modeled.  We justify this on the basis of our 
limited set of moderators, which are unlikely to explain all the variability between 
studies.11  The relevant formulas are presented in Appendix C.  These analyses are also 
performed using the STATA macros. 
 Due to the greater risk of bias in non-randomized studies, experimental and quasi-
experimental results are treated separately in all analyses.  Randomized experiments that 
indicate large baseline differences between participants on characteristics likely to be 
related to outcomes (such as prior offending history), or which experienced substantial 
attrition of participants or other implementation problems are analyzed with the quasi-
experiments.  The concern with such experiments is that the attrition may be caused by 
reasons related to the treatment and/or outcome; for example, higher-risk offenders may 
be more likely to abscond from probation and be subsequently lost to follow-up, thus 
offending outcomes for the remaining lower-risk offenders are biased. 
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Discussion of Results 
Systematic search results 
 We present detailed search results in Appendices A and D.  Appendix A includes 
a flowchart describing how the number of database ‘hits’ obtained through the systematic 
search translated into the 47 studies included in the final analysis.  Our search terms 
initially produced 30,591 hits.  Recall that we deliberately left the search terms broad to 
pick up background information as well as evaluations, so this number by no means 
reflects the total number of studies available.  It also includes a substantial number of 
duplicate hits both across and within databases.  We identified 528 references to potential 
evaluations of changes in probation intensity, of which 410 were put forward for more 
detailed title and abstract screening. 
 We identified 239 references requiring full coding, and obtained 81 per cent 
(n=194) of these.  Most of the studies we could not obtain were the tests of caseload size 
variation conducted by local government agencies (mostly the state of California) in the 
1950s and 1960s.  We do not feel that our results are greatly biased by these missing 
studies, because literature reviews of ISP have indicated that they found similar results to 
the research of the 1980s and early 1990s – ISP had no effect on recidivism and increased 
technical violations. 
 Of the 194 reports we coded in full, 21 were eligible for inclusion in the meta-
analysis, 102 were evaluations that did not meet our eligibility criteria (this number 
reflects some multiple reports of the same study), and the remainder were either relevant 
background literature or additional reports of eligible studies that were used as 
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supplements to the primary report.  We list the supplemental reports and ineligible studies 
(with reasons for exclusion) in Appendix D.12  Most of the excluded studies tested 
changes in probation intensity, but had no comparison group or unmatched controls.  A 
few involved high-quality research designs but the comparison groups did not include 
regular probationers (in most of these cases ISP was compared to incarceration).  Many 
of the 21 eligible reports contained data for multiple study sites that could be treated as 
separate evaluations for the purposes of the review.  For example, Petersilia and Turner 
(1990) reported on ISP experiments in three California counties.  Thus, our final sample 
contains 47 independent evaluations of probation intensity variation. 
 
Description of eligible studies 
 Of the 47 evaluations we include in our review, 38 were randomized trials and 9 
were either matched-pairs designs or RCTs that reported high attrition.  The unusually 
large number of RCTs for a systematic review of a criminal justice system intervention 
reflects the interest in obtaining rigorous data on the effectiveness of intermediate 
sanctions (largely funded by the U.S. government) as crime and the incarceration rate 
rose between the 1970s and 1990s.  All the evaluations tested increased probation 
intensity.13  We present specific details about each eligible study in Appendix D, and 
summarize their characteristics in Table 1.1.  Studies are listed in Appendix D first by 
research design (RCTs then quasi-experiments), then by the report date. 
 Table 1.1 shows that almost all of the studies were conducted in the United States 
(N = 42).  Five experimental studies were conducted in the United Kingdom, all of which 
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were evaluated in the same report (Folkard, Smith, & Smith, 1976).  More than half of 
the studies were reported in government or technical reports rather than traditional 
academic sources.  Almost all the studies were conducted in the 1990s or earlier.14 
 Almost all the ISP studies were enhanced probation or parole initiatives rather 
than prison diversion programs.  Reduced caseloads were the primary component of the 
test of increased intensity, although most studies also involved increased contact as a 
natural consequence of the smaller caseload, even if there was no set protocol for contact 
frequency.  In a few cases increased drug testing was the only difference in supervision 
intensity between the treatment and control groups (e.g., Haapanen & Britton, 2002; 
Hawken & Kleiman, 2009).  Following Skeem and Manchak’s (2008) model, we 
assessed the prevailing supervision philosophy as control/surveillance in approximately 
40 per cent of studies, treatment in 16 per cent of studies, and hybrid in 45 per cent.   
 Comparison groups in the eligible studies almost always experienced routine 
probation supervision.  A handful of programs compared ISP to existing, less restrictive 
ISPs.  “Routine probation” covered a myriad of conditions that were often not reported in 
great detail, but as much information as possible about what it comprised is recorded in 
the ‘Comparison’ column of the table in Appendix D.  It usually involved larger 
caseloads, less frequent contacts, and fewer services.  Most evaluations targeted general 
offender caseloads comprised mostly of probationers rather than parolees. 
 Because ISP is a general supervision strategy that can be implemented across the 
board in probation agencies, we found lots of variation in participant characteristics 
across studies.  For example, we do not analyze the racial composition of participants 
because this was highly dependent on the characteristics of the general population in the 
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agency’s jurisdiction.  Table 1.1 shows some limited participant characteristics that could 
be generalized across studies.  We found a mix of studies evaluating programs for either 
juvenile probationers, or youth (18 and over) and adults.  Study samples comprised 
mostly male offenders.  Only two studies examined ISP versus SAU in exclusively 
female caseloads.15  Most samples comprised high or mostly high risk offenders (as 
assessed by classification instruments or offending history), reflecting the fact that ISP 
has usually been used as a means of community supervision for more serious offenders 
who might otherwise have gone to prison.  Needs assessments were not frequently 
discussed so we do not present these results, but where needs assessments were carried 
out most ISP offenders were classified as high need for services, often based on drug and 
alcohol dependencies. 
 
Overall mean effects of probation supervision intensity on recidivism 
 Table 1.2 shows the results of the main analysis examining how probation 
supervision intensity is related to subsequent offending and technical violations.  Each 
row of the table, along with the estimated effect sizes for each included study, is visually 
represented in separate forest plots (Figures 1.1 to 1.7).  Across the 47 studies, we 
obtained a total of 213 different outcome measures.  The present study makes use of 
those that measure the prevalence of arrests, drug arrests, convictions, and technical 
violations.16 
 The results reported in Table 1.2 are consistent with what we already know about 
intensive supervision.  None of the mean effect sizes is statistically significant, and the 
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direction of effects is as we would expect given prior research.  In the RCTs, assignment 
to intensive supervision made no difference to the prevalence of rearrest or reconviction 
(mean OR for arrests = .93; p ≤ .72; mean OR for convictions = .98, p ≤ .80).  We also 
see no significant effect of ISP in the quasi-experiments, although note that the raw effect 
sizes (especially for convictions) show moderate reductions in recidivism associated with 
ISP and the small number of studies in these categories reduce the likelihood of a finding 
being statistically significant (mean OR for arrests = .83, p ≤ .10; mean OR for 
convictions = .60, p ≤ .10).  The forest plot for conviction outcomes (Figure 1.4) suggests 
that there is a lot of uncertainty in this model: the confidence interval around the mean 
effect size is clearly very large. 
 Our analyses also indicate an increase in technical violations associated with ISP.  
Across the RCTs, intensive supervision was associated with a 54 per cent increase in the 
odds of a technical violation (mean OR = 1.54, p ≤ .06).  A smaller, non-significant 
increase of 29 per cent was observed across the quasi-experiments (mean OR = 1.29, p ≤ 
.22) but is again based on a much smaller subset of studies.  Finally, we found no effect 
of ISP for the subset of studies reporting drug related effects (mean OR = 1.14, p ≤ .10).  
The mean effect sizes should be interpreted with caution given the very small number of 
events in some of the studies (see Figure 1.7). 
 Table 1.2 indicates substantial heterogeneity across studies in four of our seven 
analyses, as evidenced by the highly significant Q statistics (RCT arrests: Q = 61.55, p < 
.001; RCT technical violations: Q = 120.11, p < .001; quasi-experiment technical 
violations: Q = 18.91, p ≤ .004; quasi-experiment convictions: Q = 22.74, p < .001).  This 
indicates that there is more variability between studies than we would expect from the 
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sampling error within each study alone.  This suggests that other unique characteristics of 
each study, such as program and offender characteristics and study setting (all of which 
could also be confounded with each other), might explain the heterogeneity.  Thus, the 
overall effects of ISP on recidivism compared to SAU may be moderated by some of 
these explanatory variables. 
 
Moderator analyses 
 We focus only on arrests/convictions and technical violations for the experimental 
sample in these analyses.  We only have a maximum of 9 quasi-experiments, so 
frequently have insufficient observations in each category of the moderator variables to 
conduct a meaningful analysis.  We justify combining arrests and convictions for the 
recidivism analysis because it substantially increases our sample size (seventeen RCTs 
reported only conviction outcomes) and our main effects analysis showed that there was 
no difference in the effects of ISP on either arrests or convictions.  Furthermore, we did 
not observe significant heterogeneity across conviction outcomes, so we have no reason 
to believe that the effect of ISP on convictions could be moderated by other factors that 
are not related to arrest outcomes.  The overall mean effect size and Q-statistic for the 
combined RCT arrest/conviction studies were very similar to those for RCT arrests.17 
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To what extent does program philosophy influence the effect of changes in supervision 
intensity on recidivism? 
 Table 1.3 indicates no effect of program philosophy on recidivism (arrests and 
convictions) in the 38 RCTs included in the study, based on the meta-analytic analog to 
the ANOVA (QB = 1.73, p ≤ .421).  Most of the studies were of surveillance/treatment 
hybrid programs (N = 17).  In these programs, the odds of failure in the treatment group 
were marginally smaller than in the treatment group, but no real effect is observed (mean 
OR = .93, p ≤ .525).  Similar results were observed in the 15 surveillance-based programs 
(mean OR = .92, p ≤ .475).  Interestingly, offenders in treatment-based programs did 
have 20 per cent greater odds of recidivism than their counterparts in regular probation, 
but the effect size is not statistically significant, and its reliability is questionable because 
it is only based on 6 studies, 5 of which were conducted by the same evaluators (mean 
OR = 1.20, p ≤ .314).  Unfortunately, we were unable to build a good picture of the 
moderating effect of supervision philosophy on ISP and technical violations because 
none of the studies reporting technical violation outcomes followed a treatment-based 
model (Table 1.4).  As we would expect, technical violations were higher in both control-
based (N = 13) and hybrid (N = 3) programs.  For both program types the odds of a 
technical violation was about fifty per cent greater in the treatment groups than the 
control groups (mean OR for control-based: 1.55, p ≤ .091; mean OR for hybrid: 1.46, p 
≤ .481).  However, the statistical difference between these estimates is negligible (QB = 
.01, p ≤ .923) . 
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To what extent do the risk/need levels of program participants affect their response to 
changes in supervision intensity? 
 Based on the principles of effective intervention (PEI), we speculated that 
supervision may be more effective if more intensive programs are targeted at the highest 
risk/need offenders, and vice versa.  There are several impediments to assessing this 
question in great detail.  First, we could not examine whether low-intensity probation is 
effective for low-risk probationers across a range of studies.  Second, very few studies 
included needs assessments, and those that did lacked detail.  Thus, we decided not to use 
the need variable in our analysis.  Finally, many of the studies discussed the PEI or 
evaluated programs that had made an attempt to target higher-risk offenders, so we do not 
have much variation in our data.  We are only able to examine whether programs 
including either all or a majority of high-risk offenders were more or less likely to 
prevent reoffending than those including offenders of any risk level or not utilizing a risk 
assessment.  A further caveat related to this final point is that programs that did not 
formally assess participants for risk may still have had inclusion criteria that targeted 
more serious offenders. 
 The results in Table 1.3 may lend some support to this caveat.  There is no 
difference between programs that targeted higher-risk offenders and those that accepted 
any offender type (QB < .01, p ≤ .981), and neither risk category is associated with 
recidivism outcomes.  The odds ratio for studies involving higher risk offenders was .96 
(N = 11, p ≤ .798), and for all risk levels .97 (N = 27, p ≤ .735).  For technical violations, 
there is also very little variation in the odds of failure by risk level (QB = .04, p ≤ .836; 
high risk: N = 10, OR = 1.59, p ≤ .092; mixed risk: N = 6, OR = 1.45, p ≤ .292). 
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Which other components of programs or offender characteristics moderate the overall 
effect of supervision intensity on crime? 
 We examined a range of other potential moderators of the effect of supervision 
intensity on recidivism and technical violations, the results of which are listed in Tables 
1.3 and 1.4 respectively.  As before, our analyses are somewhat limited by the reduced 
cell frequencies when studies are broken out by each level of the moderator variables.  
We group our outcomes into three main categories: study characteristics, program 
characteristics, and sample characteristics.  The varied program characteristics are 
particularly important because of the range of different activities that constitutes ISP in 
each study. 
 Among selected study characteristics (Table 1.3), we found that only the type of 
publication was significantly associated with ISP recidivism outcomes (QB = 11.86, p ≤ 
.003).  Of course, the publication type does not directly influence the outcome of a study, 
but these results are important because they show that our other results are not affected 
by publication bias (for example, non-publication of unfavorable or null-effect results).  
In government reports, ISP did not have any effect on recidivism on average (N = 13, OR 
= 1.01, p ≤ .949), but among the other unpublished papers we found, the odds of 
recidivism were significantly reduced by ISP programs (N = 9, OR = .70, p ≤ .002), while 
in academic articles there was a marginally significant increase (N = 16, OR = 1.20, p ≤ 
.085).  If we had only examined the published literature we might have deduced that ISP 
does not work, and while these results are not exactly promising they do not lend 
themselves to such a drastic conclusion.  We could not reliably assess different study 
settings because almost all of the studies were conducted in the U.S., and the five that 
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were not were all conducted in the U.K. at the same time by the same evaluators, and 
reported in the same paper.   
 We see similar results for technical violations, although the smaller number of 
studies in this category affected the analyses we could run (Table 1.4).  We combined 
government and other unpublished reports to compare them with published academic 
articles.  Although the between-group difference was non-significant (QB = 2.31, p ≤ 
.129), there was a large, statistically significant increase in technical violations for ISP 
participants in published studies, compared to a slight increase in unpublished studies 
(published: N = 8, OR = 2.08, p ≤ .007; unpublished: N = 8, OR = 1.19, p ≤ .472).  We 
only had technical violation data for studies conducted in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
although studies from both decades had increased violations among ISP participants, the 
increase was larger and significant in the 1980s (N = 11, OR = 1.81, p ≤ .023; 1990s: N = 
4, OR = 1.22, p ≤ .631).  The between-group difference is non-significant (QB = .63, p ≤ 
.429).  Although the number of studies in the 1990s is very small, limiting the 
conclusions we can draw from these results, it may be the case that 1980s studies showed 
more technical violations because control/surveillance was the prevailing supervision 
philosophy in that era. 
 We examined the moderating effects of a limited set of sample characteristics on 
ISP outcomes.  We found no effect of age on the relationship between supervision 
intensity and recidivism (QB = .07, p ≤ .794; juveniles: N = 16, mean OR = .97, p ≤ .778; 
youth and adults: N = 20, OR = .93, p ≤ .465).  We could not assess the effects of age on 
technical violations because too few studies reported this outcome for juveniles.  We also 
found no effect for gender on either recidivism or violations (recidivism: QB = 1.59, p ≤ 
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.450; technical violations: QB < .01, p ≤ .987).  The odds of recidivism were 50 per cent 
greater among ISP participants in the all-female studies, but this was based on only two 
studies and was non-significant (mean OR = 1.50, p ≤ .299). 
 The additional program characteristics we examined were program type 
(enhanced probation/parole or prison diversion); the population (probationers, parolees, 
or both) and offense types (any offenses, or a specialized caseload such as drugs) targeted 
by the program, and some more specific effects of changes in intensity.  Again, small cell 
frequencies limit our ability to draw any firm conclusions from these analyses.  We found 
that the odds of recidivism were lower in prison diversion programs than probation 
enhancement programs (there were no technical violation data for prison diversion 
programs), but with only two studies aiming to divert offenders from prison it is not 
possible to say that this reduction was due to intensive supervision.  Not all of the studies 
we included accounted for time at risk in their reporting of outcomes, so it is possible that 
prison diversion programs appear more successful because participants had a higher 
likelihood of being reincarcerated and thus incapacitated (QB = 1.44, p ≤ .231; 
enhancement: N = 36, OR = .99, p ≤ .952; diversion: N = 2, OR = .69, p ≤ .207).  Few 
substantial differences were observed between target populations and offense types 
either, beyond what might be expected given the nature of the categories.  The odds of 
recidivism and violations were slightly higher among parolees compared to probationers 
and mixed caseloads, and among specialized caseloads compared to mixed offense types.  
Parolees may be more likely to reoffend than offenders who were sentenced to probation; 
and offenders who have been singled out for offense-specific caseloads (e.g., specialized 
supervision for drug offenders) have already been designated as posing a greater risk of 
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failing on a certain type of crime. Since many of the specialized caseloads were drugs-
focused, offenders may have been monitored more closely for substance abuse and 
violated for failing drug tests.  This could explain the significant difference in technical 
violations between specialized and general caseloads (QB = 3.95, p ≤ .047; specialized: N 
= 6, OR = 2.44, p ≤ .002; general: N = 10, OR = 1.19, p ≤ .430). 
 The final set of moderator variables we examined relate to the type and ‘dosage’ 
of supervision intensity, which are a key part of our inquiry.  We attempted to examine 
how the programs we studied attempted to increase intensity, and whether it is possible to 
draw any conclusions about what magnitude of increased intensity is necessary to really 
affect outcomes.  Too few studies reported enough information to assess the second 
question, so we examine this separately using only the studies that did report target 
caseload sizes and numbers of contacts and drug tests.   
 Tables 1.3 and 1.4 show the moderator analyses for the effects of intensity type on 
recidivism and technical violations respectively.  On recidivism, we see little effect of 
any of the three main types of intensity increases (reduced caseloads, increased contacts, 
and mandatory drug tests), either within treatment groups or compared to controls.  For 
technical violations, the raw effect sizes are considerably different between studies 
reporting and not reporting specific increases in intensity, but not in the direction 
expected.  Studies that did not report reduced caseloads or increased contact reported 
higher odds of violations in the treatment groups.  For increased drug testing, we also see 
significantly higher odds of violations in the treatment groups where drug tests were not a 
component of the program.  These results may need no further explanation than the fact 
that there are very few studies involved, so they may be highly skewed.  In both analyses, 
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it should be noted that those programs not reporting a particular type of increase (e.g., 
caseload size) will still have increased intensity in other ways.  Furthermore, studies 
assessing reduced caseloads will most likely also have involved more contacts simply 
because the probation officers had more time with their clients, even if increased contacts 
were not a stated component of the program.  Thus, we cannot say much about the effects 
of specific changes in intensity with these results. 
 We examined whether studies reporting increases in one or more components of 
intensity reported actual or planned ratios (e.g., planned caseload size in the treatment 
group compared to average caseloads on regular probation).  Due to the amount of 
variability and the fact that planned amounts of supervision did not always translate into 
practice, we simply dichotomized dosage variables according to whether or not the 
dosage was changed by more or less than 100 per cent in the treatment group compared 
to the control group.  Tables 1.5 and 1.6 show the results of this investigation for 
recidivism and technical violations respectively.  ‘High’ dosage programs are those in 
which the number of contacts or drug tests was more than 100 per cent greater than 
control group standards.  We were unable to include caseload size in the analysis because 
only one study reported a planned caseload difference of less than 100 per cent. 
 Table 1.5 shows that neither high nor low dosages of contacts or drug tests 
appeared to greatly affect recidivism compared to regular probation.  The results are 
similar for technical violations (Table 1.6).  While we observe some large effects for drug 
test dosage and violations, the number of studies is very small.  The finding for contact 
frequency and technical violations is unsurprising: the odds of failure for probationers in 
high contact ISPs compared to controls were higher than for those in low contact ISPs 
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compared to controls; however, there is no statistical difference between these groups (QB 
= .04, p ≤ .835; high: N = 11, OR = 1.67, p ≤ .06; low: N = 4, OR = 1.49, p ≤ .407). 
 
Conclusion 
 The aim of this study was to systematically review and synthesize the most 
rigorous available evidence on the effects of changing probation intensity on 
probationers’ criminal conduct.  We identified and coded 239 potential evaluations of 
increased intensity (intensive supervision probation or ISP), and assessed a total of 47 
individual treatment-comparison contrasts – 38 randomized trials and 9 quasi-
experiments – as eligible for inclusion in a meta-analysis. 
 Despite our comprehensive approach to identifying a body of research spanning 
over fifty years, we were unable to find any evidence to contradict prior reports that 
suggest ISP ‘does not work’ (e.g., Petersilia & Turner, 1993; Sherman et al., 1997; 
MacKenzie, 2006b).  Although in general the experience of ISP does not appear to 
substantially increase reoffending among participants, they do not appear to fare any 
better than their counterparts on regular probation for the extra supervision they receive.  
In addition, and again consistent with the prior research, we found that ISP was 
associated with an overall increase in technical violations across the studies we reviewed.  
In our examination of potential moderator variables, we found no policy-relevant 
program features that indicated any circumstances under which ISP may be more 
successful.  Our only significant finding that is not affected by small cell frequencies or 
substantial statistical uncertainty is that ISP appears more successful in programs written 
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up in unpublished reports than those in academic articles.  This only enables us to say 
that our findings account for potential publication bias. 
 We do not believe that our results should be taken as conclusive evidence that 
intensive probation supervision is a failed intervention.  There is clearly a great deal of 
variation in the types of programs studied that we could not capture with our limited set 
of moderator variables.  While the common components we were able to identify do not 
appear to have any great effect on recidivism, there are many more that we could not 
compare.  Although we were able to include more rigorous studies in our meta-analysis 
than many other systematic reviews in the social sciences, there are so many variations 
on the ISP theme that many more studies including the same components would be 
needed to draw any meaningful conclusions.  ISP effects may also be particularly 
sensitive to implementation issues.  All experimental programs may suffer from 
inadequate or problematic implementation in the field, but ISP may be especially 
susceptible because it involves changing the practices of an extant agency.  Even research 
funding (which may be limited compared with the general operating costs of a probation 
agency) might not be sufficient to enable officers to reach caseload or contact targets, or 
know what to do when they get there.  Indeed, some studies we reviewed did include the 
actual as well as intended caseload sizes and contact frequencies.  They usually showed 
that caseloads were generally slightly larger and contacts less frequent in reality than the 
numbers called for in the evaluation design, although it should be added that the planned 
ratios of intensity between the treatment and control groups were often similar because 
agencies also found it difficult to meet the contact and caseload size standards they set for 
regular probation. 
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 Several reviews have indicated that some ISP programs, particularly those 
involving a treatment component, show more favorable results (e.g., Aos, Miller, & 
Drake, 2006; MacKenzie, 2006b).  Our own analysis did not support this finding, but the 
individual point estimates in our forest graphs clearly show that some ISP programs were 
very successful.  This suggests that further exploration of programs and designs may be 
needed to fully understand the potential benefits of ISP. 
 Two recent successful ISP studies, the Maryland Proactive Community 
Supervision program (Taxman, Yancey, & Bilanin, 2006), and Hawaii’s HOPE (Hawken 
& Kleiman, 2009), appear very different on the surface, but share certain elements that 
might be the key to understanding the ‘optimal’ approach to intensive supervision.  The 
Maryland program focuses on service brokerage and individual case planning by the 
probation officers: in the broad philosophical scheme, it is more treatment-based, 
although it includes surveillance and enforcement components too.  In contrast, the 
Hawaii program is much more enforcement- and deterrence-focused.  Probationers are 
notified daily whether or not they have been selected for random drug testing, and failed 
drug tests are met with swiftly delivered sanctions: a brief period of imprisonment 
(usually a weekend), the duration of which increases in response to further violations.  
However, multiple violators are also directed to residential drug treatment.  Underlying 
both programs is a behavioral management model, which is articulated in the Maryland 
program and implicit in Hawaii’s approach.  The principles of behavioral management 
include incentive/sanction schemes; a focus on criminogenic factors that leads to tailored, 
rather than mandated, treatment and services; and offender accountability through 
behavioral contracts.  In Hawaii, for example, offenders who were sent to jail for 
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violations first went before a judge who reminded them of their responsibilities on 
probation in a manner that reinforced the desire of the whole criminal justice system to 
see offenders succeed rather than fail.  Criminal justice programming that emphasizes a 
combination of treatment and accountability, and incentive/sanction-based models, has 
shown promise in other settings, such as drug courts (Marlowe, 2003; MacKenzie, 
2006b).  Given the extent to which ISP programs have been directed toward drug-
involved offenders, it may be particularly informative to draw comparisons with drug 
offending research.  Gendreau, Goggin, and Fulton (2001) also lend more support to the 
general contention that such a balanced approach to offender supervision, emphasizing 
relationship-building, incentives, and adherence to the PEI, is effective. 
 One striking element of both programs just discussed is the lack of any emphasis 
of specific alterations to program intensity.  Whereas prior experiments have searched for 
optimal caseload sizes or mandated certain numbers of contacts or drug tests, these more 
recent studies seem to focus on the content of supervision and responses to violations.  
This is in contrast to the surveillance-based programs in which (at their most extreme), 
probation officers “go out in the field actively looking for violations” (Pearson, 1988).  
This begs the larger question: what do probation officers actually do when required to 
supervise offenders more closely?  The present study has not brought us much closer to 
answering that question than when Clear and Hardyman (1990) considered it twenty 
years ago.  A reduction in caseload size is not automatically accompanied by a guarantee 
that officers will actually be able to spend more time with their clients.  Fewer cases do 
not necessarily equate to more intensive treatment of probationers.  Indeed, for all the 
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research we uncovered on ISP, there is little qualitative inquiry into the nature of the 
probation officer-client interactions.   
 Bonta et al. (2008) are among the few researchers who attempted to get inside 
what they call the “black box” of supervision.  They discovered that the officers they 
studied spent “too much” time on enforcement rather than service delivery; did not 
account for the PEI or criminogenic need in their supervision strategies; and were not 
equipped with the necessary tools to effect behavioral change.  The elements Bonta et al. 
found lacking seem to match the characteristics we suggest may be the key to successful 
ISP programs.  Enforcement may well be easier, if not less time-consuming, than the 
service-oriented elements of supervision: identifying non-compliance may be more clear-
cut than identifying individualized needs and tailoring case plans accordingly. 
 We therefore call for more research into probation supervision in general, ideally 
combining quantitative and qualitative methods, to uncover exactly what characteristics 
and processes influence successful outcomes.  This review has shown that ‘more’ does 
not equal ‘better’ – in most cases intensive probation does not improve recidivism, and 
may even increase technical violations.  However, we cannot yet conclusively say 
whether more of the ‘right stuff’ is better, and to do that we first need a much greater 
understanding of what the ‘right stuff’ is. 
 
Notes
 
1 In the subsequent narrative we do not differentiate between probation and parole.  ‘Probation’ is used as 
shorthand for both unless otherwise stated.  In many agencies there is little difference in supervision 
practices for both probation and parole clients. 
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2  One U.S. estimate indicates that over 40 per cent of probationers and more than half of parolees do not 
complete their supervision terms successfully, and that parole violators account for nearly 35 per cent of 
admissions to state prisons (Solomon et al., 2008). 
3 Worrall et al. conducted a cross-sectional study that indicated an increase in property crime rates across 
the state of California as that state’s average probation caseloads increased.   
4 There are multiple ways in which supervision can be intensified, particularly in the light of advances in 
information technology.  Electronic monitoring, satellite tracking (GPS), and voice verification systems are 
popular methods for ‘passively’ managing offender caseloads.  Because such a wide range of automated 
systems are available, some of which have been the focus of systematic reviews in their own right (e.g., 
Renzema & Mayo-Wilson, 2005, on electronic monitoring), we do not include evaluations that focus solely 
on passive monitoring technology.  However, many intensive supervision programs use technology as part 
of a range of surveillance measures implemented alongside direct contact with probation officers, and these 
studies will be considered if the monitoring technology is not the only difference in intensity between 
treatment and comparison cases. 
5 Grey literature refers to studies that are not commercially published or available through traditional 
sources, such as technical reports and dissertations.  Failure to allow for the identification of grey literature 
in systematic searches can lead to publication bias, which occurs when the published or otherwise readily 
available literature is not representative of all studies.  This is a real possibility: for example, some authors 
and journal editors may be more inclined to submit or accept statistically significant findings, whereas 
studies that show no discernible effect may be written up for funding agencies but never published in peer-
reviewed academic journals (Rothstein & Hopewell, 2009). 
6 Important journals include: British Journal of Criminology; Crime & Delinquency; Crime & Justice; 
Criminology; Criminology & Public Policy; Federal Probation; Journal of Criminal Justice; Journal of 
Experimental Criminology; Journal of Offender Rehabilitation; Journal of Quantitative Criminology; 
Journal of Research in Crime & Delinquency; Justice Quarterly; Probation Journal. 
7 http://www.zotero.org. 
8 The odds of the event occurring are given by p/(1-p) (the probability of the event occurring divided by the 
probability of the event not occurring). 
9 Note that although we present our results as odds ratios, analyses are actually performed on the natural 
log of the OR, which is centered around 0 rather than 1 and has a standard error that is easier to calculate 
(Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, p. 54). 
10 Current thinking in meta-analytic methods states that the random effects model should always be used.  
Previously, fixed effects models were considered acceptable when the Q-statistic from the main effects 
analysis was non-significant, indicating homogeneity between effect sizes.  However, the assumptions of 
the random effects model are probably more defensible for many criminological applications.  The random 
effects model also converges on the fixed effects as the distribution becomes homogeneous (see Appendix 
C) (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, p. 120; David B. Wilson, personal communication, December 2009).  Most of 
our analyses displayed substantial heterogeneity.  We obtained both fixed and random effects estimates for 
the mean effect sizes and did not observe much difference between the two.  The random effects estimates 
were generally more conservative (results not shown). 
11 The mixed effects analog to the ANOVA has a lower risk of Type I error than the fixed effects, which 
assumes that differences are systematic and thus does not perform well when the distribution is very 
heterogeneous.  We employ a method of moments estimator of the random effects variance component.  
We also use this estimator for the main effects model (Appendix C; Lipsey & Wilson, 2001, pp. 124-5; 
Wilson, 2010, pp. 195-8).  This is the least biased estimator available in the current version of the STATA 
macro, but it is less efficient than the alternative maximum likelihood approach.  However, it is well-suited 
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to most applications, including sets of studies with relatively small sample sizes (Wilson, 2010, p. 196).  
We did not observe substantial differences in the results of our ANOVA tests depending on whether 
method of moments or maximum likelihood estimators were used (results not shown). 
12 Note that the excluded studies listed in Appendix D are only those that were coded in full and found to 
be ineligible.  Many studies gave sufficient information about the research design or nature of the 
comparison group in their titles and abstracts and as such did not make it past the initial screening stage. 
13 We know of two studies on decreased probation intensity (one RCT and one rigorous quasi-experiment) 
that have not yet been published.  We do not include them in the review because they are not comparable to 
the other evaluations, and are based on the same sample so cannot be compared to each other (Barnes et al., 
forthcoming; Berk et al., forthcoming). 
14 Although we identify individual studies according to the date of the report, the “research timeframe” 
measure in Table 1.1 reflects the actual year in which the research was conducted.  If a study spanned two 
decades it is classified according to the year in which the study period began. 
15 One was a program specifically designed for women (Guydish et al., 2008), and the other was an 
evaluation in which results were reported separately for male and female offenders in one of the study sites 
(Folkard, Smith, & Smith, 1976).  Data on gender composition were missing in 12 of the 47 studies, but we 
expect that they also reflect mixed, mostly male caseloads typical in any probation agency. 
16 Effect sizes excluded from this analysis were either continuous measures with insufficient data reported 
to calculate an effect size, or based on specific offense types that were either not available in enough 
studies, or were not theoretically relevant.  For example, we saw no basis for reporting outcomes for 
property offenses separately from all offense types as we had no reason to believe that ISP would affect 
property offenses differently.  Drug offense measures were the exception.  Because many of the ISP 
programs we examined were targeted specifically at drug-involved offenders or included increased drug 
testing among the control measures employed, we examined this outcome separately.  Eleven randomized 
trials reported separate data for arrests for drug-related crimes.  Twenty-eight studies (21 RCTs and 7 quasi 
experiments) reported arrest data for any offense type; 23 studies reported technical violations (16/7), and 
32 studies reported convictions (27/5). 
17 OR = .97 (p ≤ .645). Q = 72.80 (p < .001). 
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Tables 
Table 1.1: Characteristics of Included Studies 
 
 Proportion of studies with characteristic 
 RCTs (N=38) 
Quasi-Experiments 
(N=9) 
Total 
(N=47) 
Study Characteristics    
Type of publication    
 Academic publication 42.1 44.4 42.6 
 Government/technical report 34.2 44.4 36.2 
 Other unpublished 23.7 11.1 21.3 
Research timeframe    
 1970s and earlier 15.8 0.0 12.8 
 1980s 34.2 11.1 29.8 
 1990s 47.4 77.8 53.2 
 2000s 2.6 11.1 4.3 
Study conducted in USA 86.8 100.0 89.4 
Program Characteristics    
Program type    
 Enhanced probation/parole 94.7 88.9 93.6 
 Prison diversion 5.3 11.1 6.4 
Program involves caseload size 
reduction 89.5 88.9 89.4 
Program involves contact 
frequency increase 55.3 44.4 53.2 
Program involves drug test 
requirement increase 29.0 11.1 25.5 
Supervision philosophy    
 Control/surveillance 39.5 11.1 34.0 
 Treatment 15.8 11.1 14.9 
 Hybrid 44.7 77.8 51.1 
Control group received regular 
supervision 92.1 100.0 93.6 
Target population    
 All probationers 71.1 11.1 59.6 
 All parolees 13.2 55.6 21.3 
 Mixed 15.8 33.3 19.2 
Target offending typea    
 Any offenses 76.3 77.8 76.6 
 Specialized caseloads 23.7 11.1 21.3 
Continued 
Some sections do not add up to 100% due to rounding or missing data. 
a Data not reported in 1 study. 
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 Proportion of studies with characteristic 
 Experiments (N=38) 
Quasi-Experiments 
(N=9) 
Total 
(N=47) 
Sample Characteristics    
Age of sampleb    
 Juveniles 42.1 44.4 42.6 
 Youth and adults 52.6 55.6 53.2 
Gender c    
 All males 29.0 44.4 31.9 
 All females 5.3 0.0 4.3 
 Mixed 34.2 55.6 38.3 
Offender risk level    
 High/mostly high risk 71.1 77.8 72.3 
 Mixed risk levels/no assessment 29.0 22.2 27.7 
Outcome Characteristics    
Arrest outcomes reported 55.3 77.8 59.6 
Technical violation outcomes 
reported 42.1 77.8 48.9 
Conviction outcomes reported 71.1 55.6 68.1 
Other outcomes available 39.5 0.0 31.9 
Length of follow-up period    
 12 months or less 60.5 88.9 66.0 
 More than 12 months 39.5 11.1 34.0 
Some sections do not add up to 100% due to rounding or missing data. 
b Data not reported in 2 studies. 
c Data not reported in 12 studies. 
 
Table 1.2: Overall Mean Effect Sizes for Crime Outcomes 
 
 95% C.I. 
 
N Mean OR Lower Upper 
Q 
RCTs      
Arrests 21 .93 .74 1.17 61.55*** 
Convictions 27 .98 .85 1.13 20.38 
Technical violations 16 1.54 .99 2.39 120.11*** 
Drug arrests 11 1.18 .86 1.61 11.50 
Quasi-experiments      
Arrests 7 .83 .66 1.04 7.55 
Convictions 5 .60 .33 1.11 22.74*** 
Technical violations 7 1.29 .86 1.94 18.91** 
** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
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Table 1.3: Moderator Variable Effects (Arrest/Conviction, RCTs) 
 
  95% C.I. 
  
N QB Mean OR Lower Upper 
Study Characteristics      
Publication type      
 Academic publication 16 1.20 .98 1.48 
 Government/technical report 13 1.01 .78 1.30 
 Other unpublished 9 
11.86** 
.70** .55 .88 
Research timeframe      
 1970s and earlier 6 1.09 .77 1.55 
 1980s 13 1.00 .76 1.33 
 1990s and 2000s a 19 
.87 
.90 .72 1.13 
Location of study      
 USA 33 .93 .80 1.10 
 Non-USA 5 1.10 1.17 .79 1.74 
Program Characteristics      
Program type      
 Probation enhancement 36 .99 .84 1.17 
 Prison diversion 2 1.44 .69 .39 1.23 
Reduced caseload component      
 Yes 34 1.01 .87 1.17 
 No 4 3.42 .65 .41 1.01 
Increased contact component      
 Yes 21 1.01 .83 1.22 
 No 17 .49 .90 .71 1.15 
Increased drug testing component      
 Yes 11 .80 .62 1.04 
 No 27 2.76 1.05 .88 1.24 
Prevailing supervision philosophy      
 Control/surveillance 15 .92 .73 1.16 
 Treatment 6 1.20 .84 1.72 
 Hybrid 17 
1.73 
.93 .73 1.17 
Target population      
 Probationers 27 .92 .76 1.12 
 Parolees 5 1.07 .75 1.51 
 Mixed 6 
.65 
1.04 .69 1.56 
Target offense types      
 Any offending 29 .93 .78 1.10 
 Specialized caseloads 9 .92 1.10 .81 1.49 
Continued 
Mixed effects (method of moments) mean odds ratios  
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01. 
a Categories combined: only one study in 2000s, which had large effect favoring treatment group. 
47 
Continued from previous page 
  95% C.I. 
  
N QB Mean OR Lower Upper 
Sample Characteristics      
Age       
 Juveniles 16 .97 .76 1.23 
 Youth/adults 20 .07 .93 .75 1.14 
Gender       
 All males 11 .99 .75 1.30 
 All females 2 1.50 .70 3.21 
 Mixed 13 
1.59 
.89 .06 1.17 
Risk level      
 High/mostly high risk 11 .96 .73 1.27 
 Mixed risk levels 27 < .01 .97 .80 1.17 
Mixed effects (method of moments) mean odds ratios. 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
Table 1.4: Moderator Variable Effects (Technical Violations, RCTs) 
 
  95% C.I. 
  
N QB Mean OR Lower Upper 
Study Characteristics      
Publication Type      
 Academic publication 8 2.08** 1.22 3.54 
 Government/other 
unpublished report 8 
2.31 1.19 .74 1.94 
Research timeframea      
 1980s 11 1.81* 1.09 3.03 
 1990s 4 .63 1.22 .54 2.80 
Program Characteristics      
Reduced caseload component      
 Yes 14 1.49 .93 2.38 
 No 2 .17 2.04 .48 8.61 
Increased contact component      
 Yes 13 1.44 .89 2.34 
 No 3 .41 2.16 .70 6.67 
Increased drug testing component      
 Yes 9 1.19 .62 2.28 
 No 7 1.37 2.13* 1.02 4.45 
Prevailing supervision 
philosophyb   
   
 Control/surveillance 13 1.55 .93 2.58 
 Hybrid 3 .01 1.46 .51 4.24 
Target population      
 Probationers 7 1.66 .77 3.55 
 Parolees 4 1.72 .67 4.40 
 Mixed 5 
.31 
1.24 .50 3.08 
Target offense types      
 Any offending 10 1.19 .78 1.82 
 Specialized caseloads 6 3.95* 2.44** 1.38 4.32 
Sample Characteristics      
Gender      
 All males 5 1.54 .68 3.52 
 Mixed 11 < .01 1.53 .85 1.41 
Risk level      
 High/mostly high risk 10 1.59 .93 1.69 
 Mixed risk levels 6 .04 1.45 .73 2.89 
Mixed effects (method of moments) mean odds ratios. 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01. 
a No observations for 2000s. The single observation for 1970s and earlier (a study conducted in the 1950s) 
was dropped rather than being combined into another category due to potentially excessive influence from 
its large overall weight. 
b No observations for ‘Treatment.’ 
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Table 1.5: Effect of Intensity Variation (Arrest/Conviction, RCTs) 
 
 95% C.I. 
 
N QB Mean OR Lower Upper 
Contact frequency difference      
High 13 1.08 .87 1.35 
Low 4 .42 .91 .56 1.47 
Drug test frequency difference      
High  9 .81 .52 1.27 
Low 2 .30 1.28 .26 6.26 
Mixed effects (method of moments) mean odds ratios. 
Caseload size variation not included because only one study had low caseload variation. That study 
indicated large effect in favor of control group. 
 
 
Table 1.6: Effect of Intensity Variation (Technical Violations, RCTs) 
 
 95% C.I. 
 
N QB Mean OR Lower Upper 
Contact frequency difference      
High 11 1.67 .98 2.83 
Low 4 .04 1.49 .58 3.80 
Drug test frequency difference      
High  7 1.05 .80 1.38 
Low 2 2.03 2.07 .85 5.01 
Mixed effects (method of moments) mean odds ratios. 
Caseload size variation not included because only one study had low caseload variation. That study 
indicated large effect in favor of treatment group. 
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Figures 
Figure 1.1: Effect of Intensive Probation on Arrests (RCTs) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Effect of Intensive Probation on Arrests (Quasi-Experiments) 
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Figure 1.3: Effect of Intensive Probation on Convictions (RCTs) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4: Effect of Intensive Probation on Convictions (Quasi-Experiments) 
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Figure 1.5: Effect of Intensive Probation on Technical Violations (RCTs) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.6: Effect of Intensive Probation on Technical Violations (Quasi-Experiments) 
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Figure 1.7: Effect of Intensive Probation on Drug Arrests (RCTs) 
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CHAPTER 2. ‘Low-Intensity’ Probation: Is It a Viable Policy for Low-
Risk Offenders? 
 
Introduction 
 What works in probation supervision?  Researchers have been struggling with this 
question since the 1960s, yet the nature of supervision itself remains under-studied 
(Taxman, 2002; 2008a).  Much of the research that is available has focused on initiatives 
to step up the power of probation as a punitive sanction.  Such programs usually involve 
imposing strict, frequent reporting requirements on offenders, and providing supervision 
in small caseloads designed to increase surveillance as much as service provision.  These 
intensive supervision probation (ISP) regimes have generally proven unsuccessful.  For 
example, the field experiments with ISP in the 1980s showed null effects on crime and 
increases in technical violations (Petersilia & Turner, 1993).  Despite more recent efforts 
to link supervision to treatment and services showing some promise (Taxman, 2008b), 
probation appears to suffer from an identity crisis.  It was not originally intended for use 
with high-risk or serious offenders or as a punitive alternative to prison.  Historically, 
probation was a ‘second chance’ for low-level, often first time offenders who posed little 
threat of serious harm (Clear & Braga, 1995).  Yet, intensive probation has proved even 
more unsuccessful with low-risk offenders than their higher risk counterparts (Erwin, 
1986; Hanley, 2006; Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006).  Is this simply because 
ISP was not designed to target low-risk offenders, and the high levels of control and 
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scrutiny provoked defiant responses (Sherman, 1993) resulting in failure?  Or do failure 
rates increase for low-risk probationers under more intensive supervision because the 
increase in the overall probability of detection is compared to a lower baseline? 
 This paper considers whether an experiment designed to test the premise that low-
risk offenders can safely receive less intensive supervision than the ‘standard’ model of 
probation is sensitive to heterogeneity in the type of low-risk offender receiving 
treatment.  As the willingness to use probation for offenders eligible for prison persists, 
more resources will be needed to serve their needs and adequately protect the public.  If 
the low-risk, low-need offenders can be supervised more efficiently, probation officers 
will be freed up to focus on more serious cases.  This sensitivity analysis mounts a 
comprehensive ‘attack’ on the low-intensity supervision model to ensure there is no way 
in which a policy reducing supervision for a section of the criminal population could 
increase the threat of harm to society.  More broadly, we investigate the nature of low-
risk offenders and their propensity to reoffend.  The criminological literature has largely 
focused on the risk factors and characteristics of higher-level offenders, but these serious 
cases make up a much smaller proportion of the criminal population.  This paper 
examines the characteristics of low-level offenders and their relationship with treatment 
effects.  If the observed heterogeneity in the sample does not impact outcomes on low-
intensity supervision, it seems reasonable to conclude that low-intensity supervision is a 
viable policy option compared to ‘treatment as usual.’ 
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What Works in Probation Supervision? 
 Despite being one of the most widely-used criminal sanctions in the U.S.A., with 
one in forty-five adults on probation or parole (Glaze & Bonczar, 2009), much of the 
research on probation has failed to shed light on the characteristics of effective 
supervision practice.  Correctional research has mainly focused on programming and 
treatments provided in addition to criminal justice sanctions like probation orders.  In 
many probation agencies, standard practice is driven by resource constraints more than 
evidence-based strategies.  With caseloads often averaging 150 to 200 offenders per 
probation officer in a given agency, supervision levels vary from weekly or twice-weekly 
meetings for the highest-risk or delinquent probationers to telephone reporting for those 
towards the end of their sentences.  Some probationers simply mail in a card to confirm 
their current address (Petersilia & Turner, 1993).   
 Over the last thirty years, the use of probation has grown in response to (and as a 
result of) increasing prison populations.  In this climate, intensive supervision probation 
(ISP) emerged as a supervision strategy that was deemed punitive enough to be used with 
offenders who would otherwise have been incarcerated, yet cheaper than the cost of 
keeping someone in prison.  While few ISP programs are exactly alike, they usually 
involve a reduction in caseload size and increased frequency of contact with the 
probation officer, increased drug testing requirements and service provision or brokerage.   
 The first wave of research in the 1960s was generally described as the “search for 
the magic number” (Carter & Wilkins, 1976) because it involved experimentation with 
caseload size to find the optimal ratio of offenders to probation officers.  The rationale 
was that smaller caseloads would allow probation officers to spend more time helping 
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their clients (Petersilia & Turner, 1990).  However, these studies showed little difference 
in recidivism rates by caseload size, and technical violations increased for those offenders 
receiving more supervision (e.g., Neithercutt & Gottfredson, 1974; Banks et al., 1976; 
Carter & Wilkins, 1976).  The caseload variation strategy was deemed unsuccessful. 
 The re-emergence of ISP in the 1980s was largely independent of prior interest in 
the topic.  ISP at this time was at the forefront of an array of so-called ‘intermediate 
sanctions’ intended to provide a cost-effective but punitive alternative to incarceration.  
The focus of these programs was on crime deterrence through surveillance and control, 
which was effected through small caseloads and frequent face-to-face contacts and drug 
testing.  A study of this model in Georgia, U.S.A., in the early 1980s showed early 
promise (Erwin, 1986), and in 1986 the Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) funded the 
RAND Corporation to conduct a multi-site randomized controlled trial of the ‘new’ ISP 
in comparison to regular probation or incarceration (Petersilia & Turner, 1993).  Again, 
the results were disappointing: programs had little impact on recidivism, and technical 
violations and re-incarcerations increased due to increased surveillance.   
 Thus, intensive supervision probation appears to be an ineffective way to 
supervise offenders (Sherman et al., 1997; MacKenzie, 2006).  The early ISP models 
were designed on the assumption that probation supervision in itself is ‘good’ for 
offenders, so more of it must be better.  However, it appears that no theoretical basis for 
this assumption was ever articulated (Bennett, 1988).  Clear and Hardyman (1990) 
suggest that the early experiments in caseload size variation failed because of a lack of 
knowledge about how probation supervision could serve the ultimate goal of offender 
treatment.  Probation officers had more time to spend with clients, but did not know what 
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to do with it.  Furthermore, the more intensive strategies were not always targeted at the 
highest-risk offenders in the greatest need of treatment, a policy now known to be crucial 
to successful correctional programming (Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990).  There is no 
standard definition of ‘high’ or ‘low’ risk in the earlier studies, and the most serious 
offenders were often excluded.  For example, in the RAND studies, participants were 
generally more serious offenders, but risk levels varied (Petersilia & Turner, 1993).  
Offenders convicted of homicide, robbery, and sex offenses were excluded from the 
studies for safety reasons, even though it is not unusual for such offenders to appear in 
probation and parole caseloads.  In some cases, ISP was reasonably effective for high-
risk offenders but backfired for low-risk offenders (e.g., Erwin, 1986; Hanley, 2006; 
Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger, 2006). 
 More recent research on probation supervision has accounted for some of these 
problems, making careful assessments of risk and targeting supervision appropriately.  
For high-risk offenders, intensive supervision has shown more positive results when it 
includes a greater emphasis on treatment and service brokerage by probation officers in 
addition to small caseloads and frequent contact (e.g., Latessa et al., 1998; Paparozzi & 
Gendreau, 2005; Aos, Miller, & Drake, 2006; Taxman, 2008b).  Probation agencies have 
also begun experimenting with reducing the intensity of supervision for those offenders 
at the lowest risk of reoffending.  New York City’s probation department piloted an 
electronic kiosk reporting system for a considerable portion of its caseload that was 
considered to be low-risk.  These offenders checked in regularly using an ATM-style 
device, and could request or be compelled to see a probation officer if adverse 
circumstances arose.  Two-year rearrest rates for all crimes for low-risk probationers 
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declined from 31 per cent to 28 per cent after the kiosks were introduced, suggesting that 
it made little difference from traditional supervision for that population.  The system also 
freed up probation officers to supervise high-risk offenders more intensively.  Rearrest 
rates for high risk offenders subsequently decreased from 52 per cent to 47 per cent 
(Wilson, Naro, & Austin, 2007).  Another recent study in Oregon used a similar model, 
assigning low-risk offenders to a “casebank” caseload where they received minimal face-
to-face contact with their probation officer, again with the purpose of allowing high-risk 
offenders to receive intensive supervision (Johnson, Austin, & Davies, 2003).  Although 
the analysis did not separate results for low- and high-risk offenders, a pre-post analysis 
of crime rates among probationers on community supervision in the county indicated that 
overall crime rates decreased after the implementation of risk-based supervision. 
 The recent attempts at implementing low-intensity probation supervision are 
important steps in developing effective supervision practices across the board.  The latest 
research on intensive supervision has begun to unpack the relationship between 
surveillance, treatment, risk, and need.  It suggests that intensive supervision may be an 
effective strategy for dealing with high-risk offenders.  At the same time, probation 
departments remain chronically under-resourced.  Caseloads are large and money to 
employ new probation officers to downsize high-risk caseloads is rarely available.  Low-
intensity supervision could be a vital resource-saving strategy.  Allowing low-risk 
offenders to receive minimal supervision in a large caseload means that existing officers 
can be reallocated to concentrate on higher-risk clients who pose a greater public safety 
risk.  However, the ‘more is better’ approach that guided prior research suggests that 
reducing supervision, even to low-risk offenders, could increase their reoffending.  Prior 
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to the New York City and Oregon studies, large caseloads have always been portrayed as 
detrimental to crime prevention (e.g.,Worrall et al., 2004; Lemert, 1993). 
 
Theories of Probation 
 There are several logical theoretical mechanisms by which a policy of low-
intensity supervision for low-risk probationers could in fact offer a safe way to allocate 
resources more efficiently.  In order to understand how any probation practice might 
work, one must first consider the fundamental purpose of probation.  That discussion has 
not featured prominently in the literature on community corrections.  Probation today is 
usually recognized solely as a sanction.  Indeed, the popularity of intensive probation is 
largely due to its place at the forefront of intermediate sanctions for punishing more 
serious offenders without sending them to prison.  However, the roots of probation 
supervision lie in rehabilitation rather than retribution.  John Augustus, who is credited 
with the invention of probation in 1841, intended it as a diversion from court allowing 
defendants to prove their desire to reform prior to trial, underpinned by the threat of 
criminal sanctions if they failed (Petersilia, 1997).  He derived the term ‘probation’ from 
the Latin probare, meaning to prove or demonstrate.  Petersilia (ibid.) notes a shift in the 
probation officer’s role, starting in the mid-twentieth century, from social worker to the 
“eyes and ears of the local court” (p. 157).  There remains a tension between the social 
work and surveillance/control philosophies.  Thus, in considering the deterrent effect of 
sanctions, one must consider probation not only as a punishment designed to deter future 
crime, but as a ‘second chance’ to go straight and avoid harsher sanctions. 
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 A low-intensity probation model involving minimal contact with a probation 
officer allows low-risk offenders who do not pose a threat of serious future harm to 
rebuild their lives relatively unencumbered by probation office visits and programming.  
From a punishment perspective, such a low-level sanction is commensurate with their 
offending and the risk they pose to society.  From a rehabilitation perspective, it may be 
argued that low-risk offenders have less need for services and programs than their high-
risk counterparts, and thus need less attention from probation officers.  In these respects, 
the ‘carrot’ of low-intensity supervision, along with the ‘stick’ of being returned to 
increased supervision or jail for failure, may act as a deterrent to future offending.  The 
deterrence literature lends some support to this idea.  Studies of the perceived certainty 
and severity of punishment have indicated that individuals with greater experience of 
criminal offending perceive a lower risk of punishment than individuals with little or no 
experience (Paternoster et al., 1983; Nagin, 1998).  If we assume that low-risk offenders, 
in general, have less extensive criminal careers than higher-risk offenders, we could make 
the argument that low-risk offenders might be more likely to be deterred by the threat of 
losing the relative ‘freedom’ of low-intensity supervision if they reoffend.  Furthermore, 
one might argue that low-risk offenders will commit more crime if they receive more 
supervision than they need.  The perception that the sentence is disproportionate to their 
risk level and thus unfair may weaken offenders’ respect for the criminal justice system, 
leading to a defiant response expressed as an escalation of recidivism (Sherman, 1993).  
Thus, assignment to low-intensity supervision may help to ensure that low-risk offenders 
perceive the sanction as legitimate. 
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 Barnes et al. (forthcoming) have suggested that being placed on probation 
supervision could increase the risk of reoffending for low-risk offenders through deviant 
peer contagion (DPC).  Having antisocial and delinquent associates is one of the most 
important and consistently reported risk factors for crime (e.g., Andrews, 1989).  One 
proposed mechanism by which association with delinquent peers increases the risk of 
crime is through DPC: contact between offenders or at-risk juveniles who come together 
in group-based interventions and programs that leads to reinforcement and support of 
delinquent values (Dishion, McCord, & Poulin, 1999; Dishion & Dodge, 2006).  The fact 
that DPC (which is largely rooted in social psychology) has so many parallels in classic 
criminological theories of differential association and social learning, which focus on the 
relationship of crime with attachment to and behavior of antisocial peers (e.g., 
Sutherland, 1947; Akers, 1973; Agnew, 1991; Warr & Stafford, 1991), suggests that the 
concept could be extended to other environments in which offenders gather.  Barnes et al. 
(forthcoming) propose that the probation department could create a similar dynamic.  In 
the probation department they observed, offenders spent a great deal of time waiting in 
line together outside the office and talking to each other in waiting areas and elevators.  
Although the content of discussions between probationers in this environment has not 
been studied, it is reasonable to assume that at least part of the discussion focuses on the 
reason for their presence at the office and their opinions about the sanction. 
 The DPC literature suggests that lower-level delinquents are most susceptible to 
the influence of delinquent peers (Rosch, 2006; Lowenkamp, Latessa, & Holsinger, 
2006).  If DPC occurs in probation departments, it perhaps makes sense to focus first on 
limiting the exposure of low-risk offenders who do not currently pose a threat of serious 
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offending.  This can be achieved through a low-intensity supervision model in which the 
need for low-risk offenders to attend the probation department is minimal.  Of course, a 
caveat to using this reasoning to justify low-intensity supervision is that research on DPC 
and related criminological theories has largely focused on juveniles and it is not clear 
whether the same mechanisms operate for adults.  More importantly, we can limit 
exposure to other probationers at the probation office but it is not possible to control 
offenders’ access to delinquent networks in their home neighborhoods.  However, 
informal social controls may also operate there that do not exist in the probation waiting 
room – for example, family or a job opportunity – that allow offenders to engage in pro-
social activity without the encumbrance of regular probation visits.  Lowenkamp and 
Latessa (2004) note that such pro-social networks play an important role in explaining 
why some offenders remain at low risk for future criminal behavior.  Subjecting low-risk 
offenders to increased supervision may disrupt their positive social networks.  
 A further theoretical mechanism by which low-intensity probation may 
successfully operate is through the principles of effective intervention (PEI).  The PEI 
were introduced by Andrews, Bonta, and Hoge (1990) in response to the ‘nothing works’ 
attitude to correctional treatment that persisted in the 1970s and 1980s.  The PEI state that 
correctional treatment can in fact be effective when programs are designed to be 
responsive to offenders’ specific risk and need levels (the risk-need-responsivity, or 
RNR, model: see also Taxman & Thanner, 2006).  Thus, high intensity interventions are 
best reserved for high-risk, high-need offenders.  Although the principles seem obvious, 
Andrews (1989) explains that thinking prior to the elucidation of the PEI held that 
treatment did not work for high-risk offenders.  Andrews calls this the “social work 
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paradox.”  He suggests that ‘nothing works’ proponents did not consider the fact that 
high-risk offenders, by definition, will always reoffend more than low-risk offenders.  
They mistakenly took higher recidivism rates to mean that treatments were not effective, 
but rigorous research comparing intensive treatment to non-intensive programs actually 
shows that intensive treatment programs can help to reduce reoffending for high-risk 
offenders.  Low-risk offenders continue to reoffend at a lower rate than high-risk 
offenders in both intensive and non-intensive treatment, but studies frequently find that 
their recidivism increases when they are subjected to intensive programs.  Drawing on a 
wide body of Canadian research, Andrews (1989) concludes that “lower risk cases may 
be assigned safely to the least restrictive settings” (p. 15).  Since then, numerous meta-
analyses of correctional treatment have consistently shown that both treatment and 
supervision work better when the PEI (particularly the risk principle) are adhered to; that 
is, when a larger proportion of high-risk offenders are served.  More importantly for the 
present study, they have shown that low-risk offenders tend to have less favorable 
outcomes when they receive higher-intensity programming or supervision (see 
Lowenkamp & Latessa, 2004 for a summary of the research).  As we have seen, this 
finding is also borne out in studies of intensive probation (Erwin, 1986; Hanley, 2006). 
 While the idea of placing high-risk offenders in low-intensity supervision clearly 
seems inadvisable, the commonly-held notion that ‘more is better’ also means that the 
thought of reducing supervision of low-risk offenders is not intuitive to policymakers or 
researchers.  Nevertheless, we have presented several theories – deterrence/defiance, 
deviant peer contagion, and the principles of effective intervention – suggesting that 
assigning lower-level offenders less supervision may be more appropriate.  Low-intensity 
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probation allows deterrence to work because in terms of sanctions, the consequences of 
failure are much greater than they are under more intensive conditions.  The lower-
intensity sanction may also result in less stigma for the offender, which may lead to a 
defiant criminal response.  We also suggested that low-intensity probation, by reducing 
required attendance at the probation office, may reduce the likelihood that probationers 
will associate with more serious offenders and strengthen ties with pro-social networks 
closer to home.  Finally, we noted that the idea of low-intensity supervision is consistent 
with strongly-established principles of correctional treatment in which only those in the 
most need of services receive them. 
 
The Philadelphia APPD Low Risk Experiment 
 The Philadelphia APPD Low Risk Experiment was designed as a rigorous test of 
a policy of reducing the intensity of probation supervision for low-risk offenders.  The 
Philadelphia experiment is the first to test this proposition using a randomized controlled 
trial (RCT) design.  The following section describes the study design and main results.  
Additional details may be found in Barnes et al. (forthcoming). 
 
Background to the experiment 
 Philadelphia’s Adult Probation and Parole Department (APPD), like other 
probation departments in the U.S., grapples with the problem of increased caseloads and 
limited resources.  The average caseload of a Philadelphia probation officer is 150 to 200 
offenders (Berk et al., 2009).  Around 19 per cent of people arrested for fatal and non-
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fatal shootings in Philadelphia are under APPD supervision at the time of arrest (Ahlman 
et al., 2008).  Although the amount and intensity of supervision does vary across cases 
and some offenders are mandated (by judges or probation officers) to specialized units, 
there is little systematic variation in Philadelphia in the investment of resources according 
to risk.  Thus, in most cases, offenders are assumed to be at similar risk of serious 
reoffending at baseline, and judgments are modified according to information that 
becomes available later in the supervision process.1 
 Philadelphia’s APPD has around 50,000 clients under supervision at any time. 
Supervision is usually organized according to the sector of the city in which the offender 
lives, with a smaller number assigned to specialized units for certain types of offenders or 
needs (such as drug-involved or sex offenders).  Intake decisions are made by 
administrative staff based on court orders or the offender’s residence.  Within 
departmental standards and judicial constraints, supervision of offenders is highly 
discretionary.  Clients usually see their probation officer once a month, and receive 
routine drug tests at some visits, but the officer can increase or decrease the frequency of 
office visits as s/he sees fit.  Reporting frequency may be increased to weekly or 
biweekly as a result of noncompliance.  It may be reduced to as infrequently as once 
every three months toward the end of a successful term, or based on the officer’s 
judgment that the offender is not at high risk of recidivism.  For similar reasons, the 
officer may vary the type of supervision between office, telephone, and non-reporting. 
 Starting in 2005, APPD worked with the University of Pennsylvania to develop a 
new approach to supervision.  They aimed to allocate the highest risk offenders to more 
intensive supervision, with a small ratio of officers to clients so that more resources could 
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be put into assessing and addressing those clients’ needs.  In order to do so, the lowest 
risk offenders in the agency needed to be assigned to large caseloads with minimal 
supervision, so that officers would be freed up to work more closely with high-risk 
clients.  This represented a departure from the initial ‘one size fits all’ approach to 
supervision previously used by the agency (see Fig. 2.1).  A risk prediction model was 
developed to assess which offenders were at low and high risk of offending.  The Low 
Risk Experiment then randomly assigned offenders predicted to be low risk to a low-
intensity model of supervision (‘LIS’) or the normal model of supervision as described 
above (supervision as usual: ‘SAU’).  The results of the experiment indicated that LIS 
can safely be used with low-risk offenders without increasing the risk of serious 
recidivism.  APPD next plans to test the allocation of high-risk offenders to high-intensity 
or regular supervision. 
 
Forecasting model 
 The statistical model used to forecast the risk of serious offending is described in 
full in Berk et al. (2009).  Random forests methods were applied to a dataset of all 
probation and parole cases in Philadelphia between 2002 and 2004 to predict the risk of 
being charged with a new serious crime2 within two years of the probation or parole case 
start date.  The prediction was based only on the type of data that would be available to 
probation officers at intake.3  At the request of APPD, the model was designed to stratify 
61 per cent of cases as low risk, with the remainder either high risk (approximately 10 per 
cent) or neither low nor high (approximately 30 per cent) (Fig. 2.1).  APPD also deemed 
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the proportions of false positives and false negatives expected in the final model to be 
operationally acceptable.  The proportion of false positives (offenders erroneously 
identified as low risk) was set at 5 per cent, and the proportion of false negatives 
(offenders erroneously identified as high risk) was 20 per cent.  A higher false negative 
rate was accepted given the lesser public safety concerns around this type of error. 
 
Experimental design 
Selection of Cases 
 APPD selected the West and Northeast regional supervision units as the sites from 
which experimental participants would be drawn.  All cases active on probation in these 
two units on July 27, 2007 were extracted.  The random forests model was applied to 
each case to produce an individual risk assessment (some probationers had multiple 
cases) in the form of a ‘reliability score.’  The reliability score is a number between 0 and 
1.  Cases with a reliability score above 0.5 were designated as low risk.  From this 
assessment, 2,859 offenders were serving probation terms for low-risk offenses.  They 
were pre-screened for eligibility for the experiment.  Low-risk cases were excluded from 
the random assignment pool if any one of the following factors made them ineligible for 
low-intensity supervision: 
 The case was due to expire within thirty days of the extraction date. 
 The offender was placed under the supervision of a specialized unit by court order 
after the extraction date. 
 The offender was in an existing low-risk caseload.4 
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 The offender was potentially in direct violation of their probation (had been arrested 
for a new offense after the start of their term of supervision).5 
 The offender had multiple active probation cases, one or more of which was not 
classified as low-risk. 
 
Random Assignment 
 Following the exclusions, a final sample of 1,559 offenders was put forward for 
random assignment on October 1, 2007.  Note that almost half of the probationers with 
low-risk cases were excluded from the random assignment pool.  The most common 
reason for exclusion was having fewer than thirty days remaining on probation (see Fig. 
2.2).  APPD wanted to test a low-intensity caseload of 400 clients per officer, so the 
random assignment sequence was designed to allocate 800 offenders to the treatment 
(LIS) group, with 400 each in the West and Northeast regions.  The control (SAU) group 
consisted of 759 offenders (401 in the West and 358 in the Northeast).  A considerable 
number of the sample were later found to be ineligible for the experiment, some due to 
potential violations that occurred between the time of pre-screening and random 
assignment, and most others for reasons that arose later that made low-intensity 
supervision too difficult.6  A flowchart (Moher et al., 2001) showing exclusions and case 
flow through each stage of the project may be found in Fig. 2.2.  The experiment 
followed an ‘intention-to-treat’ analysis (Montori & Guyatt, 2001), so those offenders 
who were randomly assigned to LIS but subsequently excluded were analyzed in their 
assigned groups rather than according to the type of supervision they actually received. 
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Interventions and Follow-Up 
 Probation clients assigned to the treatment group (LIS) were placed in a caseload 
of four hundred.  Two probation officers handled the entire low-intensity caseload of 800 
offenders.  Clients received a considerably reduced level of supervision compared to the 
standard model described above.  The full supervision protocol, including details about 
contact frequency and type, may be found in Appendix E.  At their first visit with the 
low-intensity probation officer, treatment group subjects were informed that they were in 
a low-risk caseload and subject to these new reporting requirements.  They were told that 
they would be transferred back to standard supervision if they were arrested for a new 
crime.  Low-intensity officers were not expected to handle new offenses.  However, they 
were expected to deal with technical violations that did not result in an arrest or warrant 
(e.g., missed contacts).  In order to maintain low-intensity caseload sizes at 400, 
probationers who were transferred back to standard supervision were replaced by 
‘backfill’ cases.  These were offenders from the general caseload who had been predicted 
low-risk but were not initially randomly assigned.  These cases are not analyzed as part of 
the experiment, but they ensured the integrity of the low-intensity model by keeping 
caseloads too large for the officers to spend more time with their low-risk clients.7 
 The control group received SAU according to the description above.  While 
probation officers in this group had smaller caseloads and could in theory spend more 
time working to address offenders’ needs, in practice caseloads were still large enough 
that the content of meetings was essentially the same in both the treatment and control 
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groups.  However, control group offenders saw their probation officers more frequently.  
Control group offenders continued their regular appointments with their usual probation 
officer and were not informed of their low-risk prediction or experimental status. 
 Reoffending data, including charges for new offenses, technical violations, and 
wanted card issuances, were collected for each participant.  New charge data are 
available for the two years post-random assignment.  For the low-intensity model to be 
considered a success, failure rates in the treatment group had to be at least the same, if 
not lower, than in the control group.  As long as recidivism was not worse in the 
treatment group, the APPD deemed low-intensity supervision an acceptable policy. 
 
Main results 
 Barnes et al. (forthcoming) report experimental outcomes one year post-random 
assignment.  They note that treatment group cases received approximately 45 per cent 
fewer contacts than they had in the year prior to random assignment, while the amount of 
contact in the control group did not change.  Assuming control group offenders had a 
face-to-face meeting with their probation officers once a month, treatment group 
offenders were expected to receive one face-to-face contact for every six control group 
contacts, or one contact of any type (face-to-face or telephone) for every three control 
group contacts.  This standard was not quite met, but LIS participants still received a 
lower-intensity intervention.  They received about half the number of contacts as the 
control group overall.  In practice, some control group members met their probation 
officers less than once a month, and some treatment group members saw their probation 
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officers more often than the experimental protocol required.8  Nonetheless, as Barnes et 
al. note: “The two groups were clearly subjected to different numbers of contacts with 
their probation officers, and the experimental treatment appears to have been delivered as 
designed in strategy, if not in dosage.” 
 No significant differences in new offending were found between the treatment 
and control groups after one year.  Sixteen per cent of the treatment group and 15 per cent 
of the control group were charged with a new offense of any type (p ≤ .593).  Similarly, 
15 per cent of treatment group offenders and 16.5 per cent of the control group were 
incarcerated during the same time period (p ≤ .426).  Overall, it appeared that low-
intensity probation did not lead to more crime compared to supervision as usual, and is a 
safe strategy for restructuring probation supervision according to APPD’s plans. 
 
Sensitivity analysis of main results 
 The idea of reducing the amount of resources made available to low-risk 
offenders may be controversial to policymakers and the public, however logical it may 
seem to concentrate probation efforts on the higher end of the risk spectrum.  Distinctions 
are rarely drawn between high- and low-risk offenders in popular dialogue.  Although 
murderers and sex offenders usually arouse stronger emotions than low-level thieves or 
drug offenders, the idea that some people who are involved with the criminal justice 
system at any level may ‘get away with’ minimal supervision may offend the public’s 
sense of fairness.  Unequal distribution of resources may also make policymakers uneasy, 
despite being a somewhat obvious money-saving proposition.  Sherman (2007, p. 303) 
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notes that concentrating on the ‘power few’9 may at the same time be considered 
“perfectly rational and morally reprehensible.”  Although only a small proportion of 
probation clients are at the highest risk of involvement in serious crime (as offenders or 
victims), why should those deemed to be at low risk of serious reoffending be denied the 
same level of attention from a probation officer if they need it?  Not only could low-risk 
offenders be denied help and services they still need, but they may still pose a serious 
threat in the future.  As one anonymous Philadelphia probation officer told a local 
newspaper after the restructuring of Philadelphia APPD: “Anybody is capable of 
anything.  You can’t just assume [low-risk offenders] won’t pose a problem.”  Another 
stated: “We don’t want to give people a chance to go out and commit more crimes” 
(Gambacorta, 2009). 
 These concerns cannot be discounted if Philadelphia’s model of low-intensity 
supervision is to become a viable policy beyond the RCT.  However rigorous the 
experimental design, the main outcomes may mask subtle variations in effects.  Different 
conceptualizations of the outcome measure, differential treatment take-up, and 
differential subgroup effects may all affect our conclusions about the efficacy of the 
policy.  This paper examines the extent to which different outcome measures and 
heterogeneity in offender characteristics explain any differences in recidivism outcomes 
in the sample of probationers assigned to LIS, compared to the control group who 
received ‘SAU.’  Our analysis also extends the main results discussed above by 
increasing the follow-up period to two years post-random assignment, to examine 
whether the null findings are sensitive to a longer follow-up period. 
 The specific research questions addressed in this paper are: 
74 
1. Does the effect of LIS on recidivism (new charged offenses) differ if we consider 
recidivism frequency as well as participation? 
2. Does assignment to LIS affect the time to failure? 
3. Does differential treatment take-up affect the probability of recidivism? 
4. Do the effects of LIS differ across offender subgroups?  
5. Do the outcomes for the above research questions hold across specific offense types? 
 
Analytic Strategy 
Offending participation versus frequency 
 A common concern in criminal career research is the distinction between 
offending participation and offending frequency.  Participation refers to whether or not a 
person was involved in criminal behavior (a dichotomous outcome), while frequency 
refers to the number of crimes committed within a certain period of time.  These two 
conceptualizations of crime outcomes are open to different interpretations.  As Blumstein 
et al. (1988) note in the context of lifetime offending: “Participation distinguishes active 
offenders from non-offenders within a population; frequency is a reflection of the degree 
of individual criminal activity by those who are active offenders” (p. 4).  Thus, an 
experimental intervention could produce differential effects on outcomes depending on 
how the outcome is measured before and after treatment. 
 Ideally, we want an intervention that reduces participation and frequency of 
recidivism, resulting in some offenders desisting from crime completely and those that do 
not at least reoffending less often.  However, in practice we may see an impact on one but 
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not the other.  For example, the results of a set of experiments carried out in the United 
Kingdom to test the effect of face-to-face restorative justice on recidivism showed no 
change in the number of offenders who participated in crime after the program compared 
to before.  However, those offenders committed 27 per cent fewer crimes on average than 
they did prior to the program (Shapland et al., 2008).  Looking at participation alone, one 
might conclude that restorative justice was no more effective than regular court 
processing.  However, society still benefits if fewer crimes are committed overall.  
Conversely, the success of the low-intensity supervision strategy might be doubtful if the 
lack of difference between groups in the proportion of offenders participating in crime 
masked an increase in the frequency of offending for the LIS group compared to those 
receiving SAU.  Measures of participation and frequency also produce different policy-
relevant estimates of the treatment effect.  In the present experiment, the participation 
measure gives the more accurate effect of assignment to LIS versus SAU, since LIS 
offenders are returned to SAU after their first new offense.  However, if we continue to 
follow experimental participants after they complete or fail LIS, the number of offenses 
they commit in the longer term offers an indication of whether spending any amount of 
time in LIS has a deterrent effect on subsequent criminal behavior. 
 We assess the effect of the experimental treatment on participation and frequency 
using regression models designed for binary and count data.  We construct a binary logit 
model for participation.  Frequency of offending is analyzed according to a Poisson 
regression model and several of its variants.  When there is evidence of over-dispersion – 
excess variation not captured by the Poisson distribution – a negative binomial regression 
model is examined.  Because a substantial proportion of our sample did not reoffend at 
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all, resulting in a large number of zero counts in our data, we explore whether zero-
inflated Poisson or negative binomial models fit the data better.10  Zero-inflated models 
correct for the large share of zero observations by allowing the zeros to be predicted by 
two different theoretical processes (e.g., Sarkisian, 2009): the “always zeros” (offenders 
who will never reoffend, regardless of changes in other conditions); and the “possible 
zeros” (those who might have reoffended but did not do so during the follow-up period).  
We present the results of several diagnostic tests used to assess the appropriateness of 
each model.  All the models control for baseline offender characteristics, and account for 
time at risk according to the time during which offenders were not in jail one year pre- 
and one year post-random assignment.  These features are described in detail below. 
 
Time to failure and survival analysis 
 An alternative approach to assessing experimental outcomes is to look at the time 
to failure (time to first offense) rather than simple proportions or counts of new offenses.  
An experimental intervention may affect time to failure as well as, or even independently 
of, its effect on participation and frequency.  In a probation agency, an understanding of 
how quickly probationers tend to recidivate after the probation term begins may be 
important for the allocation of supervision resources.  Whether we analyze participation 
or frequency, we can only say that the treatment group was more or less likely to offend 
than the control group.  We lose important information about the timing of events, and 
cannot account for the participants who did not reoffend.  As Allison (1984) notes: “One 
might suspect … that someone arrested immediately after release [from prison] had a 
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higher propensity toward criminal activity than someone arrested 11 months later” (p. 
11).  Survival (event history) analysis techniques overcome the problems of truncation 
and omitting the time element by incorporating special regression techniques that allow 
for the censoring of cases.  If low-intensity supervision had no effect on participation or 
frequency compared to SAU, but survival analysis revealed that low-intensity 
participants were likely to fail more quickly than the control group, it may still be 
necessary to re-evaluate the policy to avoid turning the low-risk unit into a ‘revolving 
door’ that sends participants right back into the criminal justice system. 
 We use the Kaplan-Meier (KM) method to compare the average risk of failure 
over time for the treatment and control groups.  The KM survival estimator gives the 
estimated probability of the offender surviving to the end of each time interval for which 
failure events are calculated.  In the present analysis, we measure time to failure in days 
post-random assignment.  We then construct a Cox proportional hazards regression 
model to explore the risk of failure depending on experimental status and other 
covariates.  The Cox model also allows us to control for post-random assignment time at 
risk.  The proportional hazards model is a semi-parametric model, meaning that it does 
not impose a specific shape for the hazard function, or probability of failure over time  
(although we assume that each individual’s hazard is proportional to those of others).  
This allows a greater degree of flexibility than parametric models for time, which require 
us to choose a particular distribution for the hazard function.  Our choice of covariates 
and methods for accounting for time at risk are described in detail below. 
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Differential treatment take-up and subgroup effects 
 Treatment take-up (who actually receives the treatment, regardless of random 
assignment) and subgroup effects are two different but related issues that could affect the 
impact of LIS on recidivism.  Very few experiments conducted in ‘real world’ settings 
operate perfectly (Berk, 2005).  Characteristics or circumstances of the offender, 
probation officer, or agency (as well as errors and individual overrides or ethical 
concerns) could prevent the delivery of the treatment to those assigned to receive it, or 
lead to control group members receiving the treatment (‘crossover’).  Both situations 
affect the conclusions we are able to draw about experimental outcomes.  Similarly, it is 
conceivable that these characteristics may also interact with treatment, leading to 
differential outcomes that could masked by the average effect for the full sample.  For 
example, a treatment could prove to be more effective for women than it is for men. 
 As described above, the analyses of both the main first year results of this 
experiment and the other research questions presented here are based on the randomly 
assigned treatment condition (ITT) rather than the treatment actually delivered (TAD).  
ITT is the preferred method of analysis of the two, because it reduces the possibility of 
bias resulting from differences in treatment compliance.  For example, we know that 
some treatment group members did not receive LIS because they were later found to be 
wanted for absconding.  Their noncompliance may place them at higher risk of 
reoffending than other LIS participants.  Excluding them from the analysis of the 
treatment group outcomes could introduce an upward bias in the effectiveness of LIS.  
The ITT approach avoids this bias by retaining these offenders in the treatment group.  
As such, ITT provides a better estimate of the policy of LIS, because in the real world 
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some probationers will be eligible for LIS but will not receive it because they abscond or 
for some other reason.  However, the ITT approach involves an unavoidable trade-off 
between this and a test of the actual effectiveness of the treatment.  Because most 
experiments will include some degree of non-delivery and/or crossover, any treatment 
effect will be attenuated (Angrist, 2006).  In this experiment it is very likely that non-
delivery of treatment affected the outcome: 17.8 per cent of probationers assigned to LIS 
did not receive it (see above and Fig. 2.2).  Crossover poses a smaller problem, but does 
exist: 3.2 per cent (N = 24) of the control group were assigned to LIS at some time.  It is 
not known why the crossover occurred, but it is possible that offender characteristics 
could be associated with the non-delivery.  Factors like gender, race, age, and prior 
offending history may well be linked to reasons for non-delivery such as absconding or 
transfer to a specialized caseload for more intensive supervision. 
 A powerful technique for modeling heterogeneity in treatment effects created by 
treatment non-delivery and differential subgroup effects is the instrumental variables (IV) 
method (e.g., Angrist, 2006; Angrist & Pischke, 2009).  IV methods can help to 
overcome the attenuation of the treatment effect involved in ITT analysis by using 
assigned treatment (ITT) as an instrument for predicting actual treatment take-up.  
Predicted take-up, rather than assigned treatment or treatment delivered, is then used as 
the experimental status variable in the crime outcome model.  This is different from – and 
avoids the bias of – estimating the effect of treatment delivered.  In more formal terms, it 
reflects the local average treatment effect (LATE), which is the treatment effect for 
“compliers” – those who receive the treatment to which they were randomly assigned – 
rather than the average effect on all treated individuals (ATET), who may be compliers or 
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control group members who received the treatment anyway (Angrist, 2006, pp. 30-31).  
Thus, we get as close as possible to estimating the actual effect of the treatment.  The risk 
of bias in the basic treatment as delivered approach is minimized in the IV model because 
treatment as assigned (ITT) is incorporated in the prediction of treatment take-up.  Due to 
the random assignment, treatment status is independent of observable features of the 
cases.  Furthermore, by including interaction terms between assigned treatment and 
selected offender characteristics (subgroups) as instruments in the IV model, we can also 
account for their potential indirect impact on treatment take-up and use the resulting 
estimates to examine differential effects of subgroup membership on recidivism for LIS 
compliers. 
 The subgroups we explore include age, sex, race, socioeconomic status (based on 
neighborhood-level data for the offender’s recorded address), prior offending record, and 
probation region (West or Northeast).  We include region as a subgroup because only two 
probation officers, one from each regional unit, handled low-risk cases, whereas a much 
broader range of officers was represented in the control group.  With such a limited 
number of low-intensity supervision officers, it is likely that each officer’s personality 
and willingness or ability to follow the experimental protocol could have affected the 
operation of the low-intensity model.  Unfortunately, the quality of additional data on 
important crime risk and protective factors like marital status, employment, and drug, 
alcohol, medical, and psychological issues is poor.  Reporting by probation officers of 
these details is inconsistent.  Thus, we are unable to explore these additional factors. 
 IV methods are applied using two-stage least-squares regression (2SLS), which is 
related to ordinary least-squares regression (OLS) and incorporates simultaneous 
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equations.  The first stage equation uses the instrument variables to predict treatment 
take-up (the endogenous variable): 
! 
T
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where 
! 
T
^
 is the endogenous variable (predicted treatment take-up), 
! 
"0  is the intercept, 
! 
"TA  is the instrument for assigned treatment, the interactions between 
! 
"TA  and the 
subgroup variables are the additional instruments, and 
! 
"TAR  is a control (exogenous) 
variable for post-RA time at risk.  Note that only the interactions and not the main effects 
variables for our subgroups are used as instruments.  We hypothesize that race, gender, 
etc. predict treatment take-up through their association with treatment assignment.  In the 
second stage equation, we replace the instruments with the predicted treatment take-up 
from the first stage (
! 
"
T
^ ) to predict the crime outcome Y: 
! 
Y = "0 + "T^ + "TAR + "REGION + "GENDER + "RACE + "AGE + "SES + "PRIORS  
The main effects for the subgroups remain in the second stage model as controls for any 
direct variation in outcomes by subgroup.  Another important part of the 2SLS approach 
is the estimation of the ‘reduced form,’ which is simply the OLS estimate of the ITT 
effect of the instrument and exogenous covariates on crime.  Angrist (2006) notes that it 
is acceptable to use OLS even if the outcome variable is dichotomous. 
 The coefficient for 
! 
"
T
^  tells us the actual effect of treatment received, or local 
average treatment effect (LATE) on the probability of reoffending.  It can be compared 
with the coefficient for assigned treatment in the reduced form model (or the outcomes 
from our logistic participation model, as described above) to assess whether the estimated 
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effect of LIS on recidivism is different when treatment actually received is predicted 
rather than treatment assigned.  We can then use the predicted values from the 2SLS 
model to assign an individual probability of reoffending for each subject, and compare 
the mean probability of reoffending at different levels of each subgroup for those who 
received LIS. 
 Although 17.8 per cent (N = 142) of the 800 offenders assigned to LIS are known 
to have been excluded from the treatment, only 16.8 per cent (N = 134) are recorded in 
our data as such.  Since we cannot tell which offenders constitute the remaining eight 
non-treated cases, we simply analyze them as if they received the treatment.  We do not 
expect this to be a substantial limitation of this analysis, since cases with missing data 
represent just 1 per cent of the treatment group and 0.5 per cent of the entire study 
sample.  Another limitation of our treatment take-up prediction is that it does not account 
for the actual dosage of contacts received, which varied from the experimental protocol in 
some cases.  However, we are able to estimate outcomes for those offenders who were 
assigned to the LIS caseload and were likely to have seen the LIS officer at least once 
during the course of the experiment. 
 
Model construction 
 All the models we estimate include the same covariates and controls for time at 
risk, both pre- and post-random assignment.  The covariates we include are gender (male 
= 1), race (white vs. non-white),11 the offender’s age on the date of random assignment, a 
basic indicator of socioeconomic status (SES),12 probation region (West = 1), and the 
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offender’s monthly offending rate in the year pre-random assignment.  The monthly 
offending rate was calculated by dividing the number of offenses for which the offender 
was charged that took place in the year prior to random assignment by the number of 
months during that year that the offender was able to offend (i.e., was not in jail).  Our 
dataset contained dummy variables showing whether or not the offender was in jail 
during each month in that time period.  We checked for multicollinearity between the 
race and SES variables by obtaining the correlation coefficient for the two variables, 
which was 0.44.  Although this is a fairly large coefficient, we also obtained the variance 
inflation factors, which were all between 1 and 1.5 – well within the conventional 
threshold for assessing multicollinearity.  
 We account for time at risk post-random assignment slightly differently in each 
model.  In count models, the logged number of months at risk post-random assignment is 
included as the exposure or offset variable, allowing us to estimate the incidence rate 
ratios for person-months of follow-up time for the LIS versus SAU groups.  In the binary 
and two-stage least squares models, we include the number of months at risk as a control 
variable.13  We lacked detailed information about time at risk, which is an important 
limitation of our analysis.14  
 The format of our jail time data causes the most problems for assessing time at 
risk in the survival analysis model.  As previously explained, survival analysis techniques 
allow us to assess whether experimental participants were offenders or non-offenders on 
a daily basis.  Because we are only interested in the time to first offense, offenders who 
fail are removed from the risk set because they are no longer at risk of that first failure.  
However, offenders who are in jail cannot offend, so the days on which they are 
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incarcerated must also be removed from the risk set – their risk of failure on those days is 
zero.  This would be straightforward if we knew the exact dates of entry and exit from jail 
as well as the exact offense dates, but our dataset only includes monthly jail status 
indicators.  When the jail variable is measured at less frequent time intervals than the 
failure event, a possible solution is to treat jail as a time-varying covariate (TVC) and 
interpolate jail data for each day.  For example, if the monthly jail indicator for January 
2008 shows that the offender was in jail during that month, we code each day from 
January 1 to January 31 as a day in jail.  Cox regression allows for this approach using 
‘episode splitting,’ which involves creating a separate observation for each person-day up 
to the day of failure or censoring.  It is also possible to work around the potential problem 
of overlapping jail and failure dates created by the interpolation (e.g., when the original 
dataset indicates that the offender was in jail in February 2008, but he offends on 
February 23) by simply dropping the month of jail time in which the offense took place.  
Thus, the offender in this example is coded as being out of jail during February. 
 An obstacle to using the episode-splitting approach in the present application is 
that the method is usually used in cases in which it is possible to observe either level of 
the TVC on the failure date.  For example, if our TVC were employment status, the 
offender could be either employed or unemployed on the offense date.  However, we 
forced the offender to be out of jail on the failure day because it did not make sense 
theoretically to allow for the overlap.  Thus, our jail indicator variable is always coded 0 
when our failure variable is coded 1.  This results in perfect collinearity between the 
covariate and the failure event, which prevents us from estimating parameters for the jail 
variable using the Cox model.  We could still have dropped jail days out of the risk set 
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(albeit based on our interpolated dates rather than accurate ones), but to maintain 
consistency this would require us to ignore failures that overlapped with jail time.  Since 
this would have meant ignoring one-third of our failure outcomes (111 of 335 failures 
overlapped with interpolated jail days), we compromised by including the twelve original 
monthly indicator variables in our model to control for each post-RA month in jail.  This 
is another important caveat in interpreting the results.  
 
Outcome data and measures 
 Our main outcomes of interest in the present analyses are the prevalence and 
frequency of any offense committed within two years after the date of random 
assignment and resulting in a formal charge.  Our pre-RA measures of crime are also 
based on charged offenses occurring in the year before the RA date.  To answer our final 
research question, we examine these outcomes using specific data on drug and violent 
offenses.  We select violent and drug offending as secondary outcomes of interest 
because they may be most interesting to policymakers15. 
 One considerable limitation of our crime outcomes is that they only reflect 
charges as an adult for offenses in Philadelphia, as we only had access to local adult 
criminal justice system databases.  While almost all of the participants reside in 
Philadelphia, the city’s proximity and ease of access to surrounding counties and state 
lines mean that the local data almost certainly underestimate the number of charged 
offenses recorded for these offenders.  In addition, we do not have juvenile data available 
to give a full picture of offenders’ lifetime criminal involvement.  While most of the 
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offenders in our sample are older (see Table 2.1), we would expect to see the majority of 
their criminal offending taking place during their teenage years, so the lack of data on 
charges filed under the age of eighteen is a substantial omission.  However, data are 
available where the offender was charged as an adult, even if the offense was committed 
while s/he was under eighteen. 
 Some of the covariates and control variables we include in our model are likely to 
be confounded with crime outcomes.  For example, it is well-established that younger 
offenders commit more crime than older offenders.  Months in jail post-random 
assignment may also be associated with crime outcomes, as those who spend more time 
in jail are likely to be more serious offenders, so will be at greater risk of reoffending 
while at liberty.  For reference we present the conditional distributions of these two 
variables with the likelihood of committing a new charged offense in Appendix G.  
Neither of these issues poses a substantial threat to the validity of the data because the 
covariates are not additionally confounded with the treatment instrument. 
Sample characteristics 
 We assess our four research questions using the full experimental sample of 1,559 
offenders (800 LIS treatment and 759 SAU control).  They were followed up from the 
date of random assignment, October 1, 2007, for two years to September 30, 2009.  Of 
the 800 offenders randomly assigned to LIS, 94.5 per cent (N = 756) actually received the 
treatment and 5.5 per cent (N = 44) did not.  Of the 759 SAU offenders, 3.2 per cent (N = 
24) were inadvertently placed on low-intensity supervision.  Offenders are analyzed 
according to assigned treatment except in our instrumental variables model, as discussed 
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above.  The random assignment sequence was designed so that the West and Northeast 
LIS groups each contained 400 offenders.  The control group contained slightly more 
cases from the West than the Northeast (52.8 per cent of the control group was from the 
West regional unit). 
 Table 2.1 shows basic demographic and offending history characteristics for the 
two groups.  There are no statistically significant differences between the treatment and 
control groups on any measure, indicating successful random assignment.  The sample is 
predominantly male (67.0%), nonwhite (60.1%), and on average 41 years old at the time 
of random assignment.  The majority (91.8%) of offenders lived in zip code areas with an 
average household income of $20,000 or more.  As we might expect from a sample 
already predicted to be low-risk, prior offending rates are low.  Approximately 12 per 
cent (N = 193) members of the sample were incarcerated at any time post-random 
assignment, for an average of 1.1 months.  Members of both groups committed 1.3 
offenses per month at risk on average in the year prior to random assignment, with much 
lower rates for violent and drug offending.  Post-RA, the marginal first year difference 
between the treatment and control groups reported above disappears by year two.  
Control group members tended to engage in violent recidivism more than the treatment 
group in the first year post-RA (4.1% vs. 2.9%), but by the second year the gap has begun 
to close (5.4% vs. 4.5%).  Treatment and control group participants committed new drug 
offenses in similar proportions in the first year post-RA (treatment: 6.4% vs. control: 
6.5%), but slightly more of the control group had failed by the second year (control: 
10.1% vs. treatment: 8.9%).  In all, 21.5 per cent (N = 335) of the 1,559 offenders in the 
sample committed a new offense of any kind two years post-RA.  Among the 335 
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recidivists in the sample, 77 committed violent offenses and 148 committed drug 
offenses.  The violent and drug offender samples are not independent: some engaged in 
both types of offending during the follow-up period. 
 
Results 
 Table 2.2 shows the odds ratios (OR) from the logistic regression model for the 
effect of assigned treatment on offending participation two years post-random 
assignment.  The results indicate that when other offender characteristics are controlled, 
there is no notable difference in the odds of recidivism between the LIS and SAU groups 
(OR = 1.05, p ≤ .707).  Several other offender characteristics appear to have a greater 
impact on the odds of a new offense regardless of treatment status.  Each additional year 
of age at random assignment is associated with a 2 per cent decline in the odds of 
recidivism (OR = .98, p ≤ .002).  SES is consistently associated with significantly 
reduced odds of reoffending: between 40 and 75 per cent compared to the lowest SES 
group.  Each additional month in jail post-RA is associated with a 29 per cent increase in 
the odds of a new offense (OR = 1.29, p < .001).  This could suggest that offenders who 
spent more time in jail were likely to be at higher risk of reoffending while on the 
streets.16  We tested an additional model that included a squared term for post-RA jail 
time, to account for nonlinearity, such that increased jail time could eventually lead to a 
decline in reoffending by curtailing time at risk.  This term was dropped as it did not 
reach statistical significance,17 perhaps because we did not have jail data for the second 
year.  Probationers in the West probation region had 40 per cent lower odds of 
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reoffending than probationers in the Northeast (OR = .60, p ≤ .002).  This is most likely 
due to some significant demographic differences between the two regional samples, 
rather than any effect of the treatment.18 
 Table 2.3 shows the count model outcomes for frequency of reoffending.  We 
used a zero-inflated negative binomial model to produce the coefficients.  We display the 
incidence rate ratios (IRR) for the number of new offenses in the sample across the total 
time at risk.  Following the strategy explained above, the zero-inflated negative binomial 
model was selected following tests of its fit against the actual observed criminal 
offending frequencies versus those fitted from the Poisson and negative binomial 
regression models.19  
 The full model estimates presented in Table 2.3 indicate that assignment to LIS 
supervision, controlling for other factors, is associated with a small, non-significant 
reduction in the number of offenses committed post-random assignment (IRR = .89, p ≤ 
.489).  Other offender characteristics had a greater effect on offending frequency, 
regardless of treatment assignment.  Gender, which had no effect in the participation 
model, appeared to be an important factor in explaining offending frequency.  The rate of 
offending for men was twice that of women (IRR = 2.03, p < .001).  Increased age was 
again associated with declining offending rates (IRR = .98, p ≤ .009), and was also an 
important predictor of non-offending in the inflated model.  Interestingly, although 
membership of the West region group was associated with a lower odds of committing 
any new offense in the logistic model, and also predicts non-offending in the inflated 
model, those probationers in the West who did offend committed considerably more 
offenses than recidivists in the Northeast, although this was not statistically significant 
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(IRR = 1.41, p ≤ .107).  SES did not predict frequency of recidivism, but increasing status 
was significantly associated with non-offending.  
 Figure 2.3 shows the Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for the treatment and 
control groups.  The Kaplan-Meier survival estimate is the probability of not offending 
on a daily basis.  The most striking feature of the graph is that the probability of failure is 
very low for all low-risk offenders.  Figure 2.3 is a visual representation of the figures 
reported above: approximately 21 per cent of the sample had failed after two years.  The 
survivor functions for the treatment and control groups look extremely similar.  This is 
confirmed by the log-rank test for equality of survivor functions, which indicates that the 
probability of survival in the two groups is identical (χ2 (1 d.f.) = .00, p ≤ .996). 
 We extend this basic comparison by modeling time to first failure with controls 
for additional covariates using Cox proportional hazards regression.20  Table 2.4 presents 
the results of the regression model in terms of hazard ratios (HR).  The hazard is the risk 
of failure over time, and thus is equivalent to the incidence rate ratio.  The model 
confirms that there is no difference in hazards between the treatment and control groups 
(HR = 1.03, p ≤ .777).  As we saw in the results for prevalence and frequency outcomes, 
other factors appear to have a greater influence on the risk of failure regardless of 
treatment assignment.  Being in the West probation region is associated with a 36 per 
cent lower risk of failure over time than being in the Northeast, as we would expect from 
the result of our logistic model (HR = .64, p ≤ .001).  Older and higher SES offenders 
were also at a significantly lower risk of failure over time. 
 As we have seen, Cox regression does not require us to make assumptions about 
the shape of the hazard or survivor functions.  However, it is possible to graph the 
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‘typical’ survivor function for the model.  Figure 2.4 shows the covariate-adjusted 
comparative survivor functions for the treatment and control groups.  In this graph, the 
continuous covariates are held at their means and categorical covariates are set to the 
modal category.  Thus, the ‘typical’ offender is male, nonwhite, about 41 years old, 
supervised in the West region, lives in a zip code area with an average household income 
between $20,000 and $29,999, and was not incarcerated post-random assignment.  The 
graph shows no difference in the comparative survivor functions for the average 
treatment group offender compared to the average control group offender, confirming 
earlier findings.  The ‘typical’ offender has a slightly lower risk of failure over time than 
the uncontrolled sample average.  Only around 15 per cent had failed after two years. 
 The results of the instrumental variables model used to explore whether 
differential treatment take-up impacts the effect of LIS are presented in Table 2.5.  The 
first part of the table shows the results of the reduced form OLS regression, from which 
we obtain the probability of offending by assigned treatment, and the first stage of the 
2SLS regression, where assigned treatment and its interaction with offender 
characteristics are used to predict treatment take-up.  The second part of the table shows 
the outcomes from the second stage regression, which shows the actual effect of 
treatment on those who comply with random assignment. 
 The first result to note is that the reduced form (ITT) model is largely consistent 
with our earlier findings about the impact of assigned treatment and other covariates.  
There are slight differences because we include interaction terms in this model to adjust 
for heterogeneity in treatment assignment, but we still see little impact of LIS on the 
probability of recidivism.  SES, region, and months in jail were again related to the 
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probability of failure regardless of group assignment.  The second stage model shows no 
difference in recidivism for those who actually received the treatment, controlling for 
time at risk (b = .009, p ≤ .686).  The results from the reduced form also show no 
significant interaction effects between observable case features and treatment assignment, 
suggesting that differences in the main null finding are not driven by differences in who 
was assigned treatment. 
 We used the fitted values obtained from the IV model presented in Table 2.5 to 
assess subgroup differences in outcomes among those actually receiving the assigned LIS 
treatment (N = 690).  Table 2.6 shows the mean probability of failure for each level of 
each subgroup.  We observe significant differences in the probability of failure across all 
the subgroups except race.  Consistent with the findings from the ITT models, the 
probability of offending in the West was lower than that in the Northeast for LIS 
compliers (17.8% vs. 22.3%; p < .001).  We included region as a subgroup because only 
one officer from each regional unit supervised all the low-risk offenders.  Thus, we 
hypothesized that the officers’ personalities and ability to follow the experimental 
protocol might affect outcomes.  Although we cannot rule out the possibility that the 
difference is due to other unobserved factors, as discussed above, this finding provides 
some evidence in support of that hypothesis.  The regional difference continues to appear 
when we examine only those offenders who were actually exposed to the LIS officers, 
controlling for several other factors that may have affected treatment take-up and 
recidivism.  Gender had a significant impact on the probability of failure, with males 
more likely to reoffend than females (20.7% vs. 18.3%, p ≤ .036).  We see a significant 
decreasing probability of recidivism with increasing age (probability range: 16.2% - 
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24.1%; p ≤ .001).  Offenders in the lowest SES category were most likely to reoffend, 
and those in the highest category least likely; there was little difference between the 
central groups (probability range: 10.8% - 25.1%; overall p < .001).  The offender’s rate 
of offending in the year before random assignment also predicts treatment failure.  
Interestingly, those who had not offended in the preceding year were more likely to fail 
than those with up to or more than one offense per month at risk (20.9% vs. 16.8% and 
17.3% respectively; p ≤ .026).  We explore this finding in the discussion section. 
 We now examine the offense-specific models for violent and drug recidivism.  
Table 2.7 shows the logistic regression model for the prevalence of new charged violent 
offenses in the two-year follow-up period.  Assignment to the treatment group was 
associated with a non-significant reduction in the odds of violent reoffending compared 
with the treatment group (OR = .89, p ≤ .644).  As was the case in the full reoffending 
model, West probation region, increased age, and increased SES were associated with 
significant reductions in the odds of recidivism, while post-RA jail time was associated 
with increased reoffending.21  In addition, we see substantial effects of gender and prior 
offending history on the prevalence of violent recidivism, which was not apparent in the 
full offending model.  The odds of a new violent offense were 3.5 times higher for males 
than females (OR = 3.53, p < .001), and offenders who had committed at least one violent 
offense during the months they were at risk one year pre-RA had 2.5 times the odds of a 
violent offense as those who had not.  Recall that the sample probability of committing a 
violent offense was very small (less than 5%; N = 77), which may affect the size of the 
test statistics for these estimates. 
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 The count model outcomes for violent reoffending are presented in Table 2.8.  
Again, a zero-inflated negative binomial model proved to be the best fit for our data.22  
Assignment to LIS supervision, controlling for other factors, is associated with a small, 
non-significant decline in offending over the two-year follow up period than assignment 
to the control group (IRR = .83, p ≤ .453).  The only significant predictor in the full 
model is the pre-RA violent offending rate, which is associated with a large decline in the 
rate of violent reoffending (IRR = .34, p ≤ .047).  This is surprising because violent 
offending history was strongly associated with an increase in the prevalence of violent 
recidivism.  Similarly, gender, which was also associated with increased prevalence of 
reoffending, is associated with a decline in offending frequency.  Income and probation 
region, which were associated with reductions in overall offending, are associated with 
increased frequency of violent offending  However, it is likely that these results are 
skewed by the very small number of offenders charged with violent offenses post-RA, 
and the wide variation in the number of charged offenses.  Most of the 77 violent 
offenders were charged with between one and three crimes, but the count ranges up to 52. 
 Figure 2.5 shows the comparative Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for violent 
offenses in the treatment and control groups.  The graph supports the estimates from the 
prevalence and count models.  It appears that the probability of failure is slightly higher 
in the control group, and that they fail more quickly than the treatment group (although 
note that the scale on the y-axis magnifies the size of the gap between the two lines).  The 
log-rank test indicates no significant difference between the time to failure across the two 
groups (χ2 (1 d.f.) = .69, p ≤ .405).  Similarly, when controlling for other covariates in a 
Cox regression model, we see no difference between the treatment and control groups 
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(HR = .91, p ≤ .686: Table 2.9 and Figure 2.623).  As we saw in the logistic regression 
model, males had a significantly higher risk of failure than females (HR = 3.24, p ≤ .001), 
and offenders with prior violent offenses in the year pre-RA were at greater risk of failure 
than those without (HR = 2.35, p ≤ .02).  SES and age were also associated with declines 
in the risk of failure. 
 Note that we only use one variable to control for time at risk post-RA in this 
model, compared with the twelve monthly indicator variables included in the full 
offending model.  The dummy indicators were dropped from this model because of 
problems that were likely caused by the very small proportion of failures in this sample.  
In the first few months of the first year follow-up period, the numbers of eventually 
failing offenders who were in jail did not vary at all.  The resulting multicollinearity 
between each of these monthly variables prevented us from being able to estimate their 
parameters.  However, the single jail indicator violates the proportional hazards 
assumption for this model (see Appendix H for the results of the diagnostic tests).  This is 
to be expected, because we are treating jail stays as time-constant in our model, when 
they clearly vary with time.  We account for this nonproportionality by constructing a 
new model that allows jail to vary with time by including a jail*time interaction term.  
The results of this model are presented in Table 2.10.  We present the unexponentiated 
coefficients for this model because the interaction term makes more sense on that scale.  
However, if we obtained the hazard ratios for the other covariates we would see that the 
addition of the interaction term barely makes a difference to our original estimates 
overall.  For example, the coefficient of -.092 for treatment group assignment converts to 
a hazard ratio of .91 – identical to the estimate from the first model.  The p-value for this 
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estimate is also practically identical: .691 compared to .686.  Thus, our two alternative 
controls for time at risk do not appear to impact our estimates of the risk of committing a 
violent offense over time. 
 Table 2.11 shows the results of the IV regression for violent offending.  
Consistent with earlier findings, the reduced form (ITT) model shows a slight, non-
significant reduction in the probability of violent recidivism for offenders assigned to LIS 
(b = -.073, p ≤ .239).  Gender, income, and months in jail are also significantly associated 
with the outcome.  However, as in the model for all offense types, the small effect of 
treatment disappears completely for those who actually received it (b = - .007, p ≤ .586). 
 The subgroup effects for violent offending (Table 2.12) are similar to those for all 
offenses.  The overall probability of offending is small across all the subgroups.  Region, 
gender, age, and SES are all significantly associated with outcomes for LIS compliers, 
and race is not.  The prior offending rate (which is dichotomized into no offending vs. 
any offending for violent and drug offending due to very low offending rates) does not 
quite reach statistical significance, but the results are in the opposite direction from those 
observed in the all offenses model.  Those with no prior violent offenses were less likely 
to reoffend compared to those with one or more charge (3.7% vs. 6.1%, p ≤ .073). 
 The outcomes of the logistic regression model for prevalence of drug offending 
are presented in Table 2.13.  The results are very similar to the preceding analyses.  
Treatment group assignment has almost no effect on reoffending (OR = .92, p ≤ .644).  
West region, age, and increasing SES are again associated with decreased odds of 
reoffending, and males had twice the odds of females of committing a new drug offense.  
On this occasion, we also found that an additional squared jail time term was significant 
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(p ≤ .008),24 and it was retained in this model.  It would appear that for drug offending, 
more time in jail may lead to a reduced likelihood of reoffending to some degree.  Since 
we only have one year of jail data, it could be the case that the odds of drug offending 
decline as jail time increases, but increase again when all offenders are ‘returned to the 
risk set’ in the second year.  However, because our outcome data extend beyond the 
range of the jail data, these coefficients should be interpreted with caution. 
 We used a zero-inflated negative binomial model to assess the frequency of drug 
offending (Table 2.14).25  Although it does not reach statistical significance, there is a 
notable 22 per cent decline in the drug reoffending rate for the treatment group compared 
to the control group (IRR = .78, p ≤ .169).  Increased age was also associated with a 
decline in the rate of drug offending of 2 per cent per additional year (IRR = .98, p ≤ 
.045).  As before, males reoffended at a higher rate than females and increased SES was 
associated with reduced reoffending, but these relationships were not as strong as in 
previous models.  
 The Kaplan-Meier survival estimates for drug offending are shown in Figure 2.7.  
The pattern of survival probability is very similar to the patterns for overall and violent 
offending, with the control group at slightly greater risk of failure by the end of the two-
year follow-up period (log-rank test for equality: χ2 (1 d.f.) = .72, p ≤ .395). Table 2.15 
and Figure 2.8 present the hazard ratios and graphical representation of the estimated 
survivor functions from the Cox regression model.26  Again, no difference is evident in 
the risk of failure over time between the treatment and control groups (HR = .93, p ≤ 
.673).  Gender is again associated with a significantly higher risk of failure, with males at 
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twice the risk of females (HR = 1.96, p ≤ .001), and age and increasing SES is associated 
with a lower risk over time. 
 The IV regression results for drug offending are presented in Table 2.16.  Again, 
there is a slight reduction in the probability of drug offending associated with LIS 
assignment and take-up, but its impact is extremely small and becomes even smaller 
among those who actually receive the treatment, controlling for time at risk (ITT: 3.5% 
reduction, p ≤ .680; second stage: 1% reduction, p ≤ .550).  As before, age and increased 
SES were associated with a reduced risk of reoffending in the ITT model.  Those in the 
highest SES category were 10 per cent less likely to commit a new drugs offense than 
those in the lowest category, regardless of treatment assignment. 
 Contrary to other models, we see no effect of probation region or prior offending 
history on recidivism for drug offenses among LIS compliers (Table 2.17).  The only 
significant differences we observe are by gender, age, and SES.  Males had a 9.5 per cent 
probability of reoffending compared to 4.5 per cent for females (p < .001) when actually 
supervised in the LIS caseload.  There is a linear relationship between increased age and 
SES and a reduced probability of recidivism. 
 
Discussion 
 Our first research question assessed whether the impact of LIS changes if we 
consider offending participation (the proportion of offenders with a new offense) 
compared to frequency (the number of offenses committed by the offenders who fail).  
Overall, there was no difference at all in the prevalence of new charges between the 
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treatment and control groups after two years.  When we controlled for other factors that 
could affect reoffending, such as offenders’ demographic characteristics, criminal 
histories, and time at risk for reoffending, assignment to LIS was associated with no 
differences in the odds of recidivism.  On the other hand, age, SES, and gender were 
strongly associated with both the probability and number of new offenses. 
 Although no difference in the prevalence of new offenses was observed, it is still 
possible that the frequency of offending could be affected by the experimental 
supervision strategy.  In particular, in an analysis where our controls for post-random 
assignment time at risk are relatively weak (see above), any impact on offending 
frequency might be telling because the proportion of offenders failing will be attenuated 
by the fact that some did not have the opportunity to do so because of incarceration.  Of 
course, time in jail restricts the number of offenses that could be committed too, but it 
allows us to examine whether those who had the opportunity to offend and received LIS 
did so at a higher rate than those assigned to regular supervision.  Further, offending 
frequency is more informative about the longer-term effects of treatment than prevalence, 
which measures the more immediate impact of LIS.  However, in our analysis we found 
little difference in offending frequency between groups.  Some of the effect sizes were 
moderate, but did not reach statistical significance. 
 Our third alternative outcome measure was time to failure.  We examined whether 
assignment to LIS might have caused offenders to commit a new offense more or less 
quickly than their control group counterparts.  A potential danger of reducing supervision 
is that offenders may then be on a ‘free rein’ to engage in offending, whereas those under 
closer scrutiny may have an incentive to wait until their period of supervision comes to 
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an end.  On the other hand, research on intensive supervision programs has indicated that 
increased supervision may result in increased detection of new offenses or violations.  
We found no differences in the time to failure for LIS and control offenders, regardless of 
whether or not other covariates were controlled.  In reality, the probability of offending in 
both groups of low-risk offenders was so low that any differences that might have existed 
are probably too minor to detect.  Our survival analyses confirmed that the average low-
risk offender has a very low probability of failure over time.  A limitation of our entire 
analysis that is particularly important here and has already been discussed at length is that 
we were not able to account for offenders’ time on the streets and ability to reoffend on a 
daily basis. 
 We found no evidence that the substantial non-delivery of treatment affected the 
results we find elsewhere in our analysis.  We predicted actual treatment take-up based 
on assigned treatment and its interactions with offender characteristics that might predict 
non-delivery.  The effect of the treatment for ‘compliers’ who were randomly assigned to 
and actually received LIS was even closer to zero than it was in our ITT-based analyses.  
This provides further support for LIS as an appropriate strategy for dealing with low-risk 
offenders.  Many of those who did not receive the treatment as assigned were likely to 
have been higher risk offenders.  The majority were excluded because of factors that 
occurred before random assignment but were not discovered until afterwards, such as 
noncompliance, absconding, or placement in intensive treatment-based caseloads before 
random assignment.  These offenders may have been more likely to offend regardless of 
the type of supervision they received, and their inclusion in the ITT analyses may have 
led to the slightly higher prevalence of offending we saw in the treatment group. 
101 
 Our final analysis, which examined subgroup effects for those actually receiving 
the treatment, did show some substantial differences between LIS and SAU.  Age, 
gender, SES, and to a lesser extent prior offending history were significantly associated 
with outcomes for general and specific crime types.  Overall, it appeared that low-risk 
offenders, despite considerable heterogeneity in characteristics compared to the 
traditional image of the young, male offender that appears in the criminological literature, 
were homogeneous in their propensity to reoffend.  However, when we predicted 
outcomes according to offender characteristics, we saw that the offenders with the 
highest probability of recidivism were those who look more similar to that ‘traditional’ 
offender.  Young males from low-income neighborhoods were close to or above the 
sample average in their likelihood of reoffending, while the less traditional offenders 
were generally well below it.  Our sample, on average, was ‘non-traditional,’ being older 
and containing a broad mix of gender, SES and other characteristics.  Thus, we may 
conclude that there is such a thing as a typical low-risk offender, who looks different 
from the norm.  The propensity to reoffend is homogeneous within this offender 
subpopulation.  The low-risk prediction model may also identify offenders who have had 
little contact with the criminal justice system, or younger offenders who have so far only 
engaged in low-level offending, but exhibit some of the risk factors usually associated 
with more extensive criminal careers.  Procedures could be built into the low-intensity 
supervision model to subject these offenders to somewhat more monitoring than ‘typical’ 
low-risk cases (perhaps more frequent check-ins by telephone than the experimental 
protocol requires).  Focusing some more attention on the more traditional offenders in 
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low-intensity supervision would improve the likelihood of picking up the false positives, 
but resources would still have been conserved if the risk prediction proved accurate. 
 Two other notable findings from this analysis were the differential effects by 
probation region, and the finding that offenders without any offending history in the 
previous year were more likely to fail than those without.  The latter can be easily 
explained.  This variable was a rate calculated by dividing the number of offenses by the 
number of months in the year in which the offender was out of jail and able to reoffend.  
Thus, those who spent the entire year in prison have a rate of zero, as do offenders who 
were at liberty the whole time but did not engage in criminal behavior.  Offenders who 
spent more time in jail are more likely to be serious offenders with a higher risk of failure 
once free.  It is difficult to tell whether the difference in supervision styles between the 
two probation officers really drove the difference in recidivism outcomes between the 
two regions, but reduced recidivism in the West was consistently observed.  Since the 
officers were required to have minimal contact with their clients, it seems unlikely that 
their personalities would have made a great deal of difference to offenders’ behavior.  
Thus, unobserved factors most likely operated here.  We discussed above some of the 
differences in offender characteristics between the two regions.  It is also possible that 
more offenders from the West region were incarcerated (or incarcerated for longer 
periods) during the follow-up period than those in the Northeast. 
 A major limitation of our subgroup analysis was a lack of available information 
about offenders.  The subgroups we studied – gender, race, SES, age, and offending 
history – are theoretically some of the most important covariates with offending, but there 
is no reason why they would specifically impact the performance of low-risk offenders 
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on low-intensity supervision.  There are many other factors that could be more relevant to 
this association, especially given the possible theoretical foundations for low-intensity 
probation set out above.  Do low-risk offenders perform better under a lack of 
supervision if they have the support of a spouse, or the structure of employment?  How 
do drug, alcohol, or mental health issues interact with reduced supervision and more 
limited opportunities for intervention?  We can hypothesize that the lives of low-risk 
probationers may be less chaotic than those of more hardened offenders, such that factors 
related to stability like marriage and employment could have a more profound impact on 
their success or failure.  On the other hand, we would expect to see differences by gender 
and past behavior in almost any sample subject to any intervention. 
 We also examined whether our results held for more specific offense types.  
Although the offenders in this sample were predicted to be low risk and reoffended at a 
very low rate, the range of offenses they committed ranged from bad checks to homicide.  
We selected two fairly common offense types that may be of interest to policymakers, 
especially in the context of a supposedly low-risk caseload: violence and drugs.  Largely, 
our results did not diverge from those found for all offenses (although these offenses are 
a subset of the latter outcome measure, so this is to be expected to some extent).  There 
were no differences between groups based on time to failure or treatment delivered for 
either offense type, and the same subgroup differences were observed, although there was 
slightly more homogeneity in recidivism propensity across drug offender subgroups. 
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Conclusion 
 The aim of this paper was to examine the viability of giving low-risk probationers 
less supervision compared to usual probation standards, in order to reallocate resources 
toward the highest risk offenders.  We explored whether the characteristics of low-level 
offenders and the types of outcome measures selected in the analysis of the first 
randomized controlled trial of low-intensity supervision (LIS) affected the impact of LIS 
on recidivism.  Overall, we found no evidence against the hypothesis that reducing 
supervision for the lowest-risk offenders is an efficient strategy. 
 The credibility of probation and parole supervision as a safe and effective strategy 
for dealing with offenders in the community is under threat from a poor image driven by 
a severe lack of resources and some high-profile failures.  Although most probation 
agencies do use some form of risk assessment or triage process to steer higher-risk 
offenders into smaller, more intensive caseloads, real-world constraints may mean that 
even these caseloads operate at full capacity.  This leaves probation officers with little 
time or ability to provide appropriate services.  The Philadelphia Adult Probation and 
Parole Department (APPD) was one agency that experienced these difficulties first-hand, 
and worked with the University of Pennsylvania to conduct an experimental analysis of a 
new strategy for assessing risk as the basis for channeling offenders into appropriate 
supervision.  The first stage of the restructuring of supervision, on which the present 
study is focused, involved directing offenders at the lowest risk of serious reoffending 
into large caseloads, in which they received few probation contacts.  This strategy was 
intended to free scarce staffing resources to be used for reducing caseloads and increasing 
APPD’s ability to provide suitable surveillance and services at the highest end of the risk 
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spectrum.  However, this strategy is politically risky.  Arguably, even the lowest risk 
offenders are still adjudicated criminals who pose a threat to society and should not be 
left effectively unsupervised.  One could also claim that the needs of probationers should 
not be ignored by an agency supposedly put in place to serve them, simply on the basis of 
a decision that those probationers are unlikely to reoffend. 
 The consideration of a policy of LIS also raises the broader theoretical question: 
what is the nature of low-risk offending?  Little research has been produced on this 
question to date.  Philadelphia’s statistical prediction model proceeded from the basic 
argument that any offender unlikely to commit a serious crime within two years of their 
probation start date should be considered ‘low-risk.’  The present analyses use the model-
generated sample to explore further the general characteristics of low-risk offenders, and 
whether heterogeneity among the sample affects LIS take-up and outcomes. 
 We were unable to find any evidence that reducing probation supervision for low-
risk offenders causes harm.  After two years, the probability of failure was identical in 
both the LIS and regular supervision groups.  There was no indication that LIS clients 
failed more quickly than their counterparts on regular supervision.  We used a rigorous 
analytic strategy to examine the impact of treatment on those who actually received it, 
avoiding the bias associated with simpler methods by accounting for factors potentially 
related to non-delivery and maintaining the integrity of random assignment.  Although 
we found significant differences in the likelihood of reoffending by subgroups, overall 
reoffending rates were low and there was no indication that the main effects analysis 
masked any major backfire effect of LIS.  Our findings held up across specific offense 
types as well as for all charged offenses. 
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 We found that low-risk offenders are a relatively heterogeneous group compared 
to the ‘typical’ image of the young male offender.  Low-risk offenders appear to 
encompass a much broader spectrum of society in terms of gender, race, age, social 
circumstances and offending profiles.  We found no evidence that this heterogeneity has 
any impact on which offenders actually received the treatment.  The homogeneity in low-
risk offenders’ propensity to reoffend is interesting from both theoretical and policy 
perspectives, because it suggests that the relationship of crime risk factors to the 
likelihood of reoffending may be considerably weakened when the risk of a future serious 
offense is low.  This may be a much more important theoretical basis for the effectiveness 
of LIS than any of the possible mechanisms we considered at the outset of this paper.  
The finding is also important for the operation of a probation agency because it implies 
that specific case attributes do not affect probation performance for a large proportion of 
the population.  Differential attributes only appear to come into play for the majority of 
this group at the risk prediction stage.  After that, the propensity of low-risk probationers 
to offend is going to be the same regardless of the level of supervision they receive, with 
just a few modifications required for early-career or more ‘traditional’ clients who may 
still be on an upward trajectory of offending.  Overall, this seems to be a very powerful 
justification for the use of LIS instead of ‘supervision as usual.’ 
 Thus, we conclude that low-intensity probation supervision, coupled with a 
rigorous method for predicting the risk of serious offending, is a defensible model for 
effective probation operations.  It remains to be seen whether the other arm of APPD’s 
restructuring strategy – providing increased supervision and services to the most serious 
offenders in small caseloads – proves successful, but we have ascertained that it can be 
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done within existing departmental constraints by reducing supervision for those already 
deemed unlikely to fail.  This experiment clearly demonstrates that there is no need to 
distribute valuable resources equally to all types of offender.  Struggling probation 
agencies should ask whether it remains necessary to provide more supervision when it 
makes so little difference to the offending outcomes of what will likely be a large 
proportion of their total caseload.  Whichever way one looks at it, probation supervision 
for low-risk offenders is clearly one area where ‘more,’ in the usual care sense, does not 
inevitably mean ‘better.’ 
 
Notes
 
1 All operational information about the Philadelphia APPD presented in this paper was gathered through 
conversations with APPD staff and University of Pennsylvania research staff, and in-person visits to the 
APPD offices. 
2 In this experiment, murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and sexual offenses were 
deemed ‘serious.’ 
3 Intake information includes the offender’s personal and residential characteristics, and information about 
the instant offense and prior criminal history. 
4 Prior to the implementation of the Low Risk Experiment, Philadelphia APPD already had several low-risk 
caseloads within the regional units.  Offenders were assigned to them based on the judgment of their 
probation officer rather than a standardized prediction model.  However, because they had already 
experienced a systematic lower-intensity model of probation compared to standard practice that was too 
similar to the experimental design, they were excluded from the Low Risk Experiment. 
5 Offenders with potential direct violations were excluded because the workload of preparing new cases for 
court was deemed too onerous for a probation officer with such a large caseload.  All offenders assigned to 
low-intensity probation were returned to standard supervision if they were arrested for a new offense during 
the experimental period. 
6 A major exclusion criterion that had not been considered at the time of random assignment was the FIR 
(Forensic Intensive Recovery) condition.  FIR offenders are supervised in regional caseloads but are 
required to attend an intensive drug treatment program.  The supervision of their participation in the 
program was too involved for low-intensity probation officers to handle in their large caseloads.  Pre-
screening also revealed that a considerable number of offenders were either on absconder warrants or had 
not been in contact with their probation officer for more than 90 days (which is grounds for obtaining a 
warrant).  Again, because these offenders were in violation of their probation and more work would be 
required to process them, they were not transferred to low-intensity supervision. 
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7 LIS participants who were transferred back to standard supervision as a result of a violation were 
analyzed as randomly assigned. 
8 There was a transitional period after random assignment during which some treatment group participants 
were still attending appointments that were scheduled before random assignment.  In addition, one of the 
low-intensity probation officers was somewhat resistant to the idea of reducing supervision and continued 
to schedule monthly visits.  This was discovered about two months into the experiment, and with further 
training the officer began to schedule visits according to the protocol. 
9 The ‘power few,’ as described by popular author Malcolm Gladwell (see Sherman, 2007) is a 
phenomenon found throughout social research.  It is the small fraction of a population to which a 
disproportionate amount of a certain resource or condition may be attributed.  In criminological research it 
is often noted that a small proportion of offenders or places produce a substantial amount of the total crime 
(e.g., Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 1989; Weisburd et al, 2004).  Within a probation agency, a small 
proportion of probationers are at the greatest risk for committing most of the serious offending among the 
agency’s clients (see Fig. 2.1). 
10 Regular Poisson or negative binomial models may underpredict zeros and overpredict larger numbers, 
which is problematic when the majority of the data are zeros. 
11 Problems in the coding of the race variable in our dataset forced us to use this dichotomy rather than a 
more detailed categorical variable for race.  The race indicator variable was populated with data from two 
different sources, with one source selected as the default.  However, serious discrepancies arose because 
the categories of race in the two original sources were substantially different. 
12 Information about SES at the individual offender level was not available.  However, 2000 Census data 
were obtained for each offender’s recorded zip code.  We used the Census measure of average household 
income for the offender’s zip code as an estimate of SES.  This was coded as a categorical variable with 
four levels: less than $20,000 (used as the reference category in our models); $20,000-$29,999; $30,000-
$39,999; and $40,000 or more. 
13 We recognize that the jail time variables included in our models may be endogenous; that is, the effect of 
jail time on the odds of recidivism may in fact represent a causal effect of the recidivism outcome on the 
jail variable.  We are unable to separate post-random assignment jail time resulting from pre- and post-RA 
offending.  Thus, while we present the models with jail time controls included, we also ran each model 
without those variables and include the results in Appendix F.  Appendix F shows that the inclusion of the 
terms did not substantially bias our findings. 
14 Our only data on the timing of jail stays are contained in monthly dummies for whether or not the 
offender was in jail in that month.  A further limitation is that these variables are only available for the first 
year post-random assignment.  Thus, while we control for post-RA time at risk as far as possible, it is 
important to remember in the analysis that the second year of follow-up data is analyzed as if none of the 
sample spent time in jail.  While this does not greatly affect the participation-based outcome measures, it 
does mean that our post-random assignment offending frequency estimates may be overstated and the 
survival analysis models overstate the number of person-days at risk (some offenders who would have been 
incarcerated in the second year are treated as if they had a nonzero probability of offending for the entire 
year). 
15 Where these offense-specific outcomes are used, the covariate for monthly pre-RA offending rate used in 
our models is also based on these specific offense types, rather than all offending. 
16 On the other hand, given the possibility of endogeneity, it could also suggest that offenders who commit 
more than one offense post-random assignment spend more time in jail. 
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17 OR = .98, p ≤ .08.  A likelihood ratio test comparing the models with and without the squared terms also 
indicated that the inclusion of the squared term did not improve model fit: LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 3.16, p ≤ .08. 
18 Probationers from the West were significantly older than those in the Northeast, and significantly more 
likely to be nonwhite and of lower SES. We examined several combinations of interaction terms between 
region and these offender characteristics, and found that West region offenders at the $20,000-$29,999 SES 
level were significantly less likely to reoffend (b = –1.84, p ≤ .023).  When this interaction is controlled, the 
probability of recidivism is higher in the West than the Northeast, but the association is non-significant (OR 
= 2.91, p ≤ .172).  
19 The likelihood ratio test comparing the negative binomial and Poisson models was highly significant, 
suggesting that the negative binomial model fits the data better (LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 6913.3, p < .001).  The 
likelihood ratio test comparing zero-inflated negative binomial versus zero-inflated Poisson also supports 
the use of the former model (LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 1930.81, p < .0001). The Vuong test statistic  comparing the 
zero-inflated and standard negative binomial models is positive and highly significant (z = 7.04, p < .0001), 
again suggesting that the zero-inflated negative binomial model is the most appropriate. 
20 The key assumption of Cox regression is that the hazard function for each individual follows the same 
form, although we do not impose any shape for the form.  We used scaled Schoenfeld residuals to examine 
proportionality.  The detailed results of this test are presented in Appendix G.  Non-significant coefficients 
indicate that the proportional hazards assumption is satisfied.  For this model, our assumption appears to be 
justified.  One of the control variables for jail time appeared to be nonproportional, but this is not a 
substantial cause for concern. 
21 We again tested a squared jail time term in this model, which was not statistically significant and did not 
improve model fit (OR = .99, p ≤ .630; LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = .23, p ≤ .634. 
22 Likelihood ratio test for Poisson vs. negative binomial: LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 2946.78, p < .001.  Likelihood 
ratio test for zero-inflated Poisson vs. zero-inflated negative binomial: LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 304.47, p < .0001.  
Vuong test for zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 5.68, p < .0001. 
23 Covariates in Figures 2.6 and 2.8 are held at the same values as they were for Figure 2.4. 
24 Likelihood ratio test comparing models with and without squared term: LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 6.62, p ≤ .010. 
25 Likelihood ratio test for Poisson vs. negative binomial: LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 1041.73, p < .001.  Likelihood 
ratio test for zero-inflated Poisson vs. zero-inflated negative binomial: LR χ2 (1 d.f.) = 90.93, p < .0001.  
Vuong test for zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 5.62, p < .0001. 
26 See Appendix G for test of the assumptions of proportional hazards.  We proceeded with the 
proportional hazards model despite some evidence for nonproportionality in one of the monthly jail 
indicator variables. 
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Tables 
Table 2.1: Sample Characteristics 
 
 Treatment (N=800) Control (N=759) 
% West region 50.0 52.8 
% Male 66.5 67.6 
% White 41.8 37.9 
Mean age at RA date 40.78 40.58 
Average household income in ZIP   
  % less than $20,000 7.6 8.8 
  % $20,000 - $29,999 37.9 41.2 
  % $30,000 - $39,999 33.9 31.6 
  % $40,000 or more 20.6 18.3 
Mean monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (any charged offense) .13 .13 
Mean monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged violent offenses) .02 .02 
Mean monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged drug offenses) .03 .04 
Mean number of months in jail 1 
year post-RA 1.1 1.1 
% with any charged offense 1 year 
post-RA 16.0 15.0 
% with any charged offense 2 years 
post-RA 21.5 21.5 
% with charged violent offense 1 
year post-RA 2.9 4.1 
% with charged violent offense 2 
years post-RA 4.5 5.4 
% with charged drug offense 1 year 
post-RA 6.4 6.5 
% with charged drug offense 2 years 
post-RA 8.9 10.1 
No significant differences between groups at p ≤ .05 (χ2 for proportions & 2-tailed t for means). 
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Table 2.2: Prevalence of Recidivism (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up) 
 
Logistic Regression Number of observations = 1,559 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 (10 d.f.) = 252.43 
 Pr > χ2 = .000 
Log likelihood = -685.013 Pseudo R2 = .156 
Term Odds Ratio S.E. z p 
Treatment group 1.05 .145 .38 .707 
West probation region .60 .098 -3.15 .002 
Male 1.24 .185 1.44 .151 
White 1.00 .171 -.03 .978 
Age at RA .98 .007 -3.03 .002 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .60 .147 -2.08 .037 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .52 .135 -2.54 .011 
Income $40,000 or more .25 .076 -4.56 .000 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (any charged offense) .98 .132 -.15 .882 
Months in jail post-RA 1.29 .025 13.06 .000 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 for goodness-of-fit (8 d.f., 10 groups) = 9.84, p ≤ .276 
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Table 2.3: Frequency of Recidivism (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up) 
 
Zero-Inflated Negative Number of observations = 1,559 
Binomial Regression Nonzero observations = 335 
 Zero observations = 1,224 
Inflation model = logit Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 29.77 
Log likelihood= -1700.398 Pr > χ2 = .001 
Full Model Incidence Rate Ratio S.E. z p 
Treatment group .89 .148 -.69 .489 
West probation region 1.41 .296 1.61 .107 
Male 2.03 .365 3.93 .000 
White 1.14 .227 .64 .521 
Age at RA .98 .009 -2.62 .009 
Income $20,000-$29,999 1.53 .464 1.41 .160 
Income $30,000-$39,999 1.35 .464 .86 .388 
Income $40,000 or more 1.11 .435 .26 .798 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (any charged offense) .99 .196 -.06 .951 
Log of post-RA months at risk [offset] 
Inflated Model b S.E. z p 
Treatment group -.067 .152 -.44 .658 
West probation region .494 .187 2.64 .008 
Male -.104 .171 -.61 .542 
White .003 .191 .01 .989 
Age at RA .020 .008 2.62 .009 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .569 .307 1.85 .064 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .795 .331 2.38 .018 
Income $40,000 or more 1.478 .371 3.98 .000 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (any charged offense) .199 .186 1.07 .287 
Constant -4.027 .510 -7.90 .000 
Log of post-RA months at risk [offset] 
Ln(Alpha) .779 .162 4.82 .000 
Alpha 2.179 .352   
Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 7.04, p < .001 
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Table 2.4: Time to Failure (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up) 
 
Cox Regression Number of subjects = 1,559 
(Breslow Method for Ties) Number of failures = 335 
 Time at risk (person-days) = 976,440 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 (21 d.f.) = 298.04 
Log likelihood = -2275.151 Pr > χ2 = .000 
Term Hazard Ratio S. E. z p 
Treatment group 1.03 .116 .28 .777 
West probation region .64 .087 -3.30 .001 
Male 1.24 .152 1.76 .078 
White 1.04 .146 .27 .790 
Age at RA .98 .006 -3.03 .002 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .60 .118 -2.59 .010 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .49 .103 -3.42 .001 
Income $40,000 or more .29 .071 -5.01 .000 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (any charged offense) .99 .119 -.09 .929 
In jail Oct 2007 3.76 1.915 2.61 .009 
In jail Nov 2007 .60 .522 -.59 .556 
In jail Dec 2007 .77 .947 -.21 .833 
In jail Jan 2008 1.76 1.938 .52 .605 
In jail Feb 2008 .35 .390 -.94 .346 
In jail Mar 2008 3.79 4.263 1.18 .236 
In jail Apr 2008 2.37 1.381 1.49 .137 
In jail May 2008 .83 .397 -.38 .701 
In jail Jun 2008 1.04 .559 .07 .945 
In jail Jul 2008 1.46 .686 .80 .422 
In jail Aug 2008 .68 .273 -.95 .340 
In jail Sep 2008 1.08 .348 .24 .812 
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Table 2.5: Instrumental Variables Model: Prevalence of Recidivism (All Offenses, 2-
Year Follow-Up) 
 
 First Stage Treatment Take-Up 
Reduced Form (ITT) 
Post-RA Any Off. 
 Observations = 1,559 Observations = 1,559 
 R2 = .663 R2 = .193 
 Adjusted R2 = .659 Adjusted R2 = .183 
Instruments b (S.E.) b (S.E.) 
Assigned LIS .812 (.088)*** -.047 (.113) 
Assigned LIS*West -.075 (.035)* -.007 (.045) 
Assigned LIS*Male .014 (.032) -.004 (.040) 
Assigned LIS*White -.024 (.037) .029 (.048) 
Assigned LIS*Age -.000 (.001) -.001 (.002) 
Assigned LIS*Income20 .026 (.057) .111 (.073) 
Assigned LIS*Income30 .086 (.060) .095 (.077) 
Assigned LIS*Income40 .028 (.066) .122 (.085) 
Assigned LIS*Prior offending -.030 (.027)* .032 (.035) 
Exogenous   
Months in jail post-RA -.014 (.002)*** . 052 (.003)*** 
West probation region .055 (.025)* -.068 (.032)* 
Male .009 (.023) .031 (.029) 
White .009 (.027) -.017 (.034) 
Age at RA .001 (.001) -.002 (.001) 
Income $20,000-$29,999 -.002 (.039) -.126 (.050)* 
Income $30,000-$39,999 -.013 (.042) -.139 (.054)** 
Income $40,000 or more -.002 (.047) -.245 (.060)*** 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (any offense) -.012 (.022) -.024 (.028) 
Constant -.025 (.064) .408 (.081)*** 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Second-Stage Instrumental Number of observations = 1,559 
Variables Regression Wald χ2 (10 d.f.) = 364.12 
 Pr > χ2 = .000 
Any New Charged Offense R2 = .189 
Term b S. E. Z p 
Predicted Treatment Take-up .009 .023 .40 .686 
Months in jail post-RA .052 .003 17.50 .000 
Constant .383 .057 6.76 .000 
Controlling for region, gender, race, age, SES and offending history. 
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Table 2.6: Treatment Effects by Subgroup (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up) 
 
Subgroup N Mean Pr. of Failure t/F
† p 
Northeast 339 .223 Region 
West 351 .178 
3.85 .000 
Male 464 .214 Gender Female 226 .172 -3.29 .001 
White 283 .203 Race Nonwhite 407 .198 -.47 .641 
Under 25 34 .241 
25-34 182 .237 
35-44 176 .187 
45-54 236 .186 
Age at 
RA 
55 + 62 .162 
4.92 .001 
< $20,000 52 .251 
$20,000-$29,999 261 .218 
$30,000-$39,999 239 .223 Income 
$40,000 + 138 .108 
22.91 .000 
No offending 550 .209 
Up to 1 125 .168 
Offending 
rate per 
month at 
risk 1 
year pre-
RA More than 1 15 .173 
3.67 .026 
† 2-sample t-test or one-way ANOVA (F-test). 
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Table 2.7: Prevalence of Recidivism (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up) 
 
Logistic Regression Number of observations = 1,559 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 (10 d.f.) = 118.40 
 Pr > χ2 = .000 
Log likelihood = -247.480 Pseudo R2 = .193 
Term Odds Ratio S.E. z p 
Treatment group .89 .225 -.46 .644 
West probation region .53 .167 -2.00 .045 
Male 3.53 1.263 3.52 .000 
White .93 .297 -.23 .820 
Age at RA .97 .013 -2.13 .033 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .46 .195 -1.83 .067 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .32 .152 -2.41 .016 
Income $40,000 or more .18 .099 -3.10 .002 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged violent off.) 2.61 1.139 2.20 .028 
Months in jail post-RA 1.26 .030 9.47 .000 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 for goodness-of-fit (8 d.f., 10 groups) = 5.82, p ≤ .668 
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Table 2.8: Frequency of Recidivism (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up) 
 
Zero-Inflated Negative Number of observations = 1,559 
Binomial Regression Nonzero observations = 77 
 Zero observations = 1,482 
Inflation model = logit Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 7.08 
Log likelihood = -499.228 Pr > χ2 = .629 
Full Model Incidence Rate Ratio S.E. z p 
Treatment group .83 .205 -.75 .453 
West probation region 1.18 .389 .49 .624 
Male .87 .336 -.35 .724 
White .99 .331 -.04 .966 
Age at RA .98 .016 -1.08 .280 
Income $20,000-$29,999 1.53 .717 .90 .366 
Income $30,000-$39,999 1.24 .767 .34 .731 
Income $40,000 or more 1.13 .767 .18 .857 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged violent off.) .34 .185 -1.98 .047 
Log of post-RA months at risk [offset] 
Inflated Model b S.E. z p 
Treatment group .109 .243 .45 .654 
West probation region .444 .293 1.52 .130 
Male -1.335 .350 -3.81 .000 
White -.031 .301 -.10 .917 
Age at RA .032 .013 2.53 .011 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .522 .415 1.26 .209 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .923 .459 2.01 .044 
Income $40,000 or more 1.530 .547 2.80 .005 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged violent off.) -1.469 .814 -1.80 .071 
Constant -1.441 .732 -1.97 .049 
Log of post-RA months at risk [offset] 
Ln(Alpha) -.089 .268 -.33 .740 
Alpha .915 .245   
Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 5.68, p < .001. 
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Table 2.9: Time to Failure (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up) 
 
Cox Regression Number of subjects = 1,559 
(Breslow Method for Ties) Number of failures = 77 
 Time at risk (person-days) = 1,103,248 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 (10 d.f.) = 105.11 
Log likelihood = -511.625 Pr > χ2 = .000 
Term Hazard Ratio S. E. z p 
Treatment group .91 .211 -.40 .686 
West probation region .65 .180 -1.55 .122 
Male 3.24 1.108 3.44 .001 
White .97 .279 -.09 .927 
Age at RA .97 .012 -2.25 .024 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .45 .175 -2.05 .040 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .36 .153 -2.41 .016 
Income $40,000 or more .22 .113 -2.94 .003 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged violent off.) 2.35 .864 2.33 .020 
In jail 1 year post-RA 7.81 1.839 8.73 .000 
 
Table 2.10: Time to Failure with Jail-Time Interaction (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow-
Up) 
 
Cox Regression Number of subjects = 1,559 
(Breslow Method for Ties) Number of failures = 77 
 Time at risk (person-days) = 1,103,248 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 (11 d.f.) = 112.10 
Log likelihood = -508.130 Pr > χ2 = .000 
Term b S. E. z p 
Treatment group -.092 .231 -.40 .691 
West probation region -.425 .277 -1.53 .126 
Male 1.173 .342 3.43 .001 
White -.025 .287 -.09 .932 
Age at RA -.027 .012 -2.23 .025 
Income $20,000-$29,999 -.791 .391 -2.02 .043 
Income $30,000-$39,999 -1.013 .425 -2.38 .017 
Income $40,000 or more -1.513 .518 -2.92 .003 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged violent off.) .859 .366 2.35 .019 
In jail 1 year post-RA 3.017 .455 6.64 .000 
Jail*time -.004 .001 -2.51 .012 
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Table 2.11: Instrumental Variables Model: Prevalence of Recidivism (Violent Offenses, 
2-Year Follow-Up) 
 
 First Stage 
Treatment Take-Up 
Reduced Form (ITT) 
Post-RA Violent Off. 
 Observations = 1,559 Observations = 1,559 
 R2 = .661 R2 = .117 
 Adjusted R2 = .658 Adjusted R2 = .107 
Instruments b (S.E.) b (S.E.) 
Assigned LIS .808 (.088)*** -.073 (.062) 
Assigned LIS*West -.075 (.035)* .005 (.025) 
Assigned LIS*Male .013 (.032) .009 (.022) 
Assigned LIS*White -.021 (.037) .048 (.026) 
Assigned LIS*Age -.000 (.001) .000 (.001) 
Assigned LIS*Income20 .025 (.057) .078 (.040) 
Assigned LIS*Income30 .083 (.060) .060 (.043) 
Assigned LIS*Income40 .021 (.066) .053 (.047) 
Assigned LIS*Prior offending -.004 (.099) -.104 (.070) 
Exogenous   
Months in jail post-RA -.013 (.002)*** .021 (.002)*** 
West probation region .056 (.025)* -.028 (.017) 
Male .010 (.023) .037 (.016)* 
White .009 (.027) -.028 (.019) 
Age at RA .001 (.001) -.001 (.001) 
Income $20,000-$29,999 -.001 (.039) -.066 (.028)* 
Income $30,000-$39,999 -.014 (.042) -.070 (.030)* 
Income $40,000 or more -.002 (.047) -.085 (.033)** 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (violent offense) -.069 (.082) .133 (.058)* 
Constant -.029 (.063) .131 (.045)** 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Second-Stage Instrumental Number of observations = 1,559 
Variables Regression Wald χ2 (10 d.f.) = 192.81 
 Pr > χ2 = .000 
New Charged Violent Off. R2 = .110 
Term b S. E z p 
Predicted treatment take-up -.007 .013 -.54 .586 
Months in jail post-RA .020 .002 12.27 .000 
Constant .010 .031 3.19 .001 
Controlling for region, gender, race, age, SES and offending history. 
 
120 
Table 2.12: Treatment Effect by Subgroups (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up) 
 
Subgroup N Mean Pr. of Failure t/F
† p 
Northeast 339 .045 Region 
West 351 .030 
3.09 .002 
Male 464 .053 Gender Female 226 .006 -9.76 .000 
White 283 .038 Race Nonwhite 407 .038 .01 .989 
Under 25 34 .048 
25-34 182 .050 
35-44 176 .032 
45-54 236 .034 
Age at 
RA 
55 + 62 .025 
3.38 .009 
< $20,000 52 .059 
$20,000-$29,999 261 .044 
$30,000-$39,999 239 .042 Income 
$40,000 + 138 .011 
12.13 .000 
No violent 
offending 667 .037 
Offending 
rate per 
month at 
risk 1 
year pre-
RA 
Violent 
offending 23 .061 
-1.79 .073 
† 2-sample t-test or one-way ANOVA (F-test). 
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Table 2.13: Prevalence of Recidivism (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up) 
 
Logistic Regression Number of observations = 1,559 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 (11 d.f.) = 125.97 
 Pr > χ2 = .000 
Log likelihood = -426.233 Pseudo R2 = .129 
Term Odds Ratio S.E. z p 
Treatment group .92 .169 -.46 .644 
West probation region .88 .195 -.59 .554 
Male 1.93 .420 3.00 .003 
White 1.18 .275 .72 .473 
Age at RA .97 .009 -3.13 .002 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .49 .154 -2.27 .023 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .43 .147 -2.47 .013 
Income $40,000 or more .27 .108 -3.29 .001 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged drug off.) 1.55 .694 .99 .324 
Months in jail post-RA 1.58 .165 4.42 .000 
Months in jail post-
RA(squared) .98 .009 -2.65 .008 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 for goodness-of-fit (8 d.f., 10 groups) = 4.96, p ≤ .762 
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Table 2.14: Frequency of Recidivism (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up) 
 
Zero-Inflated Negative  Number of observations = 1,559 
Binomial Regression Nonzero observations = 148 
 Zero observations = 1,411 
Inflation model = logit Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 15.07 
Log likelihood = -736.235 Pr > χ2 = .089 
Full Model Incidence Rate Ratio S.E. z p 
Treatment group .78 .143 -1.38 .169 
West probation region 1.42 .311 1.60 .111 
Male 1.53 .379 1.72 .086 
White .90 .212 -.45 .655 
Age at RA .98 .009 -2.01 .045 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .99 .315 -.02 .981 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .91 .325 -.27 .785 
Income $40,000 or more .57 .244 -1.31 .189 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged drug off.) 1.10 .668 .16 .873 
Log of post-RA months at risk [offset] 
Inflated Model b S.E. z p 
Treatment group .032 .192 .16 .870 
West probation region .148 .230 .64 .520 
Male -.589 .236 -2.49 .013 
White -.242 .243 -.99 .320 
Age at RA .029 .010 2.92 .004 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .512 .326 1.57 .116 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .716 .357 2.01 .045 
Income $40,000 or more 1.071 .427 2.51 .012 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged drug off.) -.009 .545 -.02 .987 
Constant -2.477 .563 -4.40 .000 
Log of post-RA months at risk [offset] 
Ln(Alpha) -.473 .331 -1.43 .153 
Alpha .623 .206   
Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 5.62, p < .001 
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Table 2.15: Time to Failure (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up) 
 
Cox Regression Number of subjects = 1,559 
(Breslow Method for Ties) Number of failures = 148 
 Time at risk (person-days) = 1,071,848 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 (21 d.f.) = 142.68 
Log likelihood = -1009.539 Pr > χ2 = .000 
Term Hazard Ratio S. E. z p 
Treatment group .93 .157 -.42 .673 
West probation region .87 .178 -.70 .483 
Male 1.96 .399 3.32 .001 
White 1.14 .243 .63 .529 
Age at RA .97 .009 -3.40 .001 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .44 .127 -2.85 .004 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .40 .122 -3.01 .003 
Income $40,000 or more .26 .093 -3.77 .000 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged drug off.) 1.46 .595 .93 .353 
In jail Oct 2007 2.42 2.445 .88 .382 
In jail Nov 2007 1.13 1.599 .08 .934 
In jail Dec 2007 1.94 2.750 .47 .641 
In jail Jan 2008 .22 .308 -1.08 .282 
In jail Feb 2008 2.33 3.319 .60 .552 
In jail Mar 2008 1.72 2.130 .44 .661 
In jail Apr 2008 2.03 1.640 .88 .378 
In jail May 2008 .99 .628 -.01 .991 
In jail Jun 2008 .55 .428 -.76 .445 
In jail Jul 2008 2.84 1.930 1.54 .124 
In jail Aug 2008 .48 .257 -1.37 .171 
In jail Sep 2008 .86 .395 -.33 .744 
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Table 2.16: Instrumental Variables Model: Prevalence of Recidivism (Drug Offenses, 2-
Year Follow-Up) 
 
 First Stage 
Treatment Take-Up 
Reduced Form (ITT) 
Post-RA Drug Off. 
 Observations = 1,559 Observations = 1,559 
 R2 = .662 R2 = .103 
 Adjusted R2 = .658 Adjusted R2 = .093 
Instruments b (S.E.) b (S.E.) 
Assigned LIS .803 (.088)*** -.035 (.085) 
Assigned LIS*West -.077 (.035)* .009 (.034) 
Assigned LIS*Male .011 (.032) .037 (.030) 
Assigned LIS*White -.021 (.037) .015 (.036) 
Assigned LIS*Age -.000 (.001) .000 (.001) 
Assigned LIS*Income20 .024 (.057) .018 (.055) 
Assigned LIS*Income30 .082 (.060) -.008 (.058) 
Assigned LIS*Income40 .021 (.066) .013 (.064) 
Assigned LIS*Prior offending .193 (.092)* .022 (.089) 
Exogenous   
Months in jail post-RA -.013 (.002)*** .026 (.002)*** 
West probation region .056 (.025)* -.017 (.024) 
Male .009 (.023) .028 (.022) 
White .010 (.027) .004 (.026) 
Age at RA .001 (.001) -.002 (.001)* 
Income $20,000-$29,999 -.001 (.040) -.063 (.038) 
Income $30,000-$39,999 -.013 (.042) -.060 (.040) 
Income $40,000 or more -.002 (.047) -.104 (.045)* 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (drug offense) -.025 (.054) .023 (.052) 
Constant -.028 (.063) .205 (.061)*** 
 
Second-Stage Instrumental Number of observations = 1,559 
Variables Regression Wald χ2 (10 d.f.) = 176.88 
 Pr > χ2 = .000 
New Charged Drug Offense R2 = .102 
Term b S. E z p 
Predicted treatment take-up -.010 .018 -.60 .550 
Months in jail post-RA .026 .002 11.67 .000 
Constant .191 .043 4.50 .000 
Controlling for region, gender, race, age, SES and offending history. 
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Table 2.17: Treatment Effects by Subgroups (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up) 
 
Subgroup N Mean Pr. of Failure t/F
† p 
Northeast 339 .083 Region 
West 351 .074 
1.42 .156 
Male 464 .095 Gender Female 226 .045 -7.97 .000 
White 283 .083 Race Nonwhite 407 .076 -1.11 .268 
Under 25 34 .110 
25-34 182 .104 
35-44 176 .071 
45-54 236 .068 
Age at 
RA 
55 + 62 .048 
9.86 .000 
< $20,000 52 .116 
$20,000-$29,999 261 .083 
$30,000-$39,999 239 .085 Income 
$40,000 + 138 .045 
12.87 .000 
No drug 
offending 607 .079 
Offending 
rate per 
month at 
risk 1 
year pre-
RA 
Drug offending 83 .078 
.133 .894 
† 2-sample t-test or one-way ANOVA (F-test). 
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Figures 
Figure 2.1: Risk-Based Allocation Strategies in the Philadelphia APPD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Case Flow Chart for the Philadelphia APPD Low Risk Experiment 
(Diagram provided by Lindsay Ahlman, Philadelphia APPD) 
High risk – 10% 
Low risk – 60% 
Respond to and treat all 
offenders the same, 
modify with clinical 
predictions 
Respond to and treat all 
offenders based on actuarial risk 
of a new serious offense 
   
    
 
Assessed for eligibility: 7,830 
All cases under active supervision in 
West and Northeast, 27-Jul-2007 
Excluded from random assignment: 6,271 
Pre-screening on 28-Aug-2007 
 
Missing unique ID no.: 431 
Missing reliability score: 576 
Not predicted low risk: 3,964 
Low risk exclusions: 1,300 
 Existing low-risk caseload: 177 
 Mixed low and non-low cases: 95 
 Potential direct violation: 320 
 < 30 days remaining on probation: 565 
 Transferred to specialized caseload by  
  date of pre-screening: 143 
Enrollment 
Random Assignment: 1,559 
1-Oct-2007 
Adapted from Barnes et al., forthcoming. 
Treatment Group: 800 
Transferred to low-intensity caseload  
3-Oct-2007 
 
Received allocated intervention: 658 
Did not receive allocated intervention: 142 
 Transfer to specialized caseload: 4 
 No open probation cases: 10 
 Abscond/no contact 90+ days: 47 
 Require Spanish-speaking officer: 2 
 FIR condition: 58 
 Potential direct violation: 16 
 Transfer out of county: 2 
 Deceased: 2 
 Held back by director due to poor 
  casework: 1 
Control Group: 759 
 
Received allocated intervention: 639 
Did not receive allocated intervention: 120 
 Transfer to specialized caseload: 8 
 No open probation cases: 10 
 Abscond/no contact 90+ days: 40 
 Require Spanish-speaking officer: 2 
 FIR condition: 50 
 Potential direct violation: 10 
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Figure 2.3: Survival Time for LIS Experiment Participants, by Assigned Treatment (All 
Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up) 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Cox Proportional Hazards Survivor Function by Assigned Treatment (All 
Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up) 
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Figure 2.5: Survival Time for LIS Experiment Participants, by Assigned Treatment 
(Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up) 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Cox Proportional Hazards Survivor Function (Violent Offenses, 2-Year 
Follow-Up) 
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Figure 2.7: Survival Time for LIS Experiment Participants, by Assigned Treatment (Drug 
Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up) 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Cox Proportional Hazards Survivor Function (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow-
Up) 
 
 
130 
CHAPTER 3. Risk Prediction for Effective Offender Management: 
Patterns of Offending Severity among Probationers. 
 
Introduction 
 Probation in the early twentieth century was generally used as a disposition for 
first-time or minor offenders, while felons and recidivists tended to receive parole after 
incarceration.  By mid-century, the use of probation expanded as interest in rehabilitation 
and community corrections increased (Clear & Braga, 1995).  The backlash against 
community sentences and the pervasive retributive attitude to punishment since the 1970s 
has continued to pressurize probation agencies, as many struggle to deal with supervising 
parolees on their release from prison alongside offenders on more intensive probation 
programs.  Furthermore, probation is now frequently used in addition to, rather than in 
place of, a jail or prison sentence (Ruth & Reitz, 2003).  The complementary use of 
probation and prison may increase the number of serious offenders who come under the 
supervision of probation agencies, placing a strain on their limited resources.  Figures 
from Philadelphia’s Adult Probation and Parole Department (APPD) indicate the extent 
of the problem: in 2006, over 22 per cent of murder arrestees and 16 per cent of homicide 
victims in the city were under community supervision (Berk et al., 2009, p. 192). 
 Sherman (2007, p. 843) has argued that in the absence of short-term solutions to 
funding problems, probation agencies should focus their efforts on these most serious 
cases, “perform[ing] triage on their caseload to concentrate scarce resources on homicide 
prevention” at the expense of closely supervising offenders who pose little threat of harm 
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to society.  This is the ultimate purpose behind the Philadelphia APPD Low Risk 
Experiment, which aims to identify and divert the lowest-level offenders in the agency 
into a large caseload with reduced (‘low-intensity’) supervision to allow probation 
officers to work more closely with serious offenders. 
 The implementation of a low-intensity model of probation supervision for low-
risk offenders is dependent on the development of a reliable method of predicting the risk 
of serious recidivism.  First and foremost, such a method must ensure that individuals at 
the highest risk of committing a serious crime do not receive less supervision than they 
need.  However, if less severe offenders are included, probation officers will continue to 
be overwhelmed.  Furthermore, research has suggested that probation supervision that is 
too ‘intense’ (in terms of frequency of contact and time spent with probation officers) 
may increase recidivism among offenders at the lowest risk level (e.g., Erwin, 1986; 
Hanley, 2006).  Assigning low-risk offenders to excessively intensive programs might 
provoke defiant reactions (Sherman, 1993), reinforce delinquent attitudes and behavior, 
and disrupt pro-social networks and opportunities such as family ties and employment by 
requiring too much intervention from the criminal justice system.  All of these factors 
may have unfavorable effects on future offending (Lowenkamp & Latessa, 2004).  
Following Sherman’s (2007) proposition, then, the definition of ‘serious’ must 
incorporate only those crimes that represent the greatest threat to public safety. 
 The aim of this paper is to provide an in-depth analysis of the risk prediction and 
supervision strategies described above.  We examine actual serious recidivism outcomes 
for a sample of probationers predicted by the statistical model used in the Philadelphia 
experiment to be at low risk of committing the most serious crimes.  We examine the 
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sensitivity of the selected threshold for determining ‘low risk’ according to the model by 
contrasting the serious reoffending outcomes of offenders predicted to be low risk to 
those of offenders not predicted to be low risk.  We also examine the model’s sensitivity 
to different definitions of offending severity beyond the original substantive definitions it 
was designed to predict.  Finally, we examine whether the intensity of supervision affects 
the relationship between past and future serious offending by comparing low risk 
experimental participants randomly assigned to low intensity supervision with those 
subject to standard reporting requirements. 
 
Risk Prediction in Offender Management 
 The prediction and assessment of risk is a long-standing concern of 
criminological theory and research.  While it may not be possible (or indeed ethical) to 
precisely predict and act against those who will commit crimes in the future, the policy 
and practice implications of understanding the risk factors of crime and how they relate to 
offender management and crime prevention are obvious. 
 The history of risk prediction in criminal justice dates back at least to the first half 
of the twentieth century, when criminologists such as Burgess (1928) and the Gluecks 
(1950) developed simple predictive models based on checklists of risk and protective 
factors.  Burgess, for example, combined unweighted predictors considered by expert 
opinion to be related to parole outcomes.  More recently, risk prediction has been refined 
by extensive research on the factors that contribute favorably or unfavorably to offending 
behavior, many of which are now strongly confirmed by numerous studies and meta-
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analyses (see e.g., Andrews, 1989; Farrington, 1998; Lipsey & Derzon, 1998).  Risk 
factors for crime may be classified as static (characteristics that do not change or change 
in only one direction, such as age or age at first arrest), or dynamic (measurements of 
change in the offender, such as attitudes and employment) (Bonta, 2002). 
 The prediction of risk based on such variables falls into two distinct categories: 
clinical and actuarial/statistical.  Clinical prediction is based on subjective human 
judgment and experience, informal consideration, and discussions with others.  Statistical 
risk prediction is formal, objective, structured, quantitative, and grounded in theory, 
research and empiricism (Grove & Meehl, 1996; Bonta, 2002; Gottfredson & Moriarty, 
2006).  Clinical prediction is frequently used in criminal justice agencies, although 
statistical methods have also been introduced, largely from the psychology/psychometric 
disciplines.  The statistical methods used by probation and other criminal justice agencies 
are generally inventories based on cognitive, emotional, and social development.  Some 
widely-used and well-validated examples are the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-
R); the Level of Service Inventory-Revised (LSI-R), which is frequently used for risk 
management in probation settings; and the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide (VRAG) 
(Bonta, 2002); and the Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS), which was 
developed for probation risk management in the United Kingdom (Howard et al., 2009). 
 Although the measurement and prediction of risk has always been a crucial part of 
criminological theory and practice, risk has been brought to the forefront of crime 
prevention programming with the development of the ‘principles of effective 
intervention’ (PEI: Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990).  The PEI set out the optimal 
circumstances and considerations for providing effective correctional treatment.  
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Programs should be designed to adhere to three core principles: risk, need, and 
responsivity.  The principles are interlinked: programs must be responsive to offenders’ 
specific risk factors and needs.  The risk principle is the most widely researched and 
validated of the PEI.  Its key implication is that high-intensity interventions should be 
reserved for high risk, high need offenders.  Thus, the risk principle corresponds to an 
earlier paradigm for correctional treatment set out in the criminological literature: the 
principle of the ‘least restrictive alternative’ (Rubin, 1975), which posits that punishment 
should be as unobtrusive as possible – no more than the minimum level needed to 
manage offenders’ behavior. 
 The risk principle clearly highlights a need to develop effective and reliable risk 
prediction instruments in order to identify low- and high-risk offenders and direct them to 
appropriate sentences, supervision, and treatment.  This is important not only in ensuring 
that offenders receive suitable services, but also in developing effective resource 
management in criminal justice agencies.  Probation and parole agencies are a classic 
example of an environment in which good risk assessment is crucial.  The growing use of 
probation and parole in the last two decades (e.g., Glaze & Bonczar, 2009), coupled with 
a crisis in funding (Petersilia, 1997), has led to large caseloads and limited ability of 
probation officers to supervise offenders appropriately.  In Philadelphia, average 
caseloads can be as large as 150 to 200 clients to one officer (Berk et al., 2009).  This is 
not unusual, or particularly new: similar standard caseload sizes were reported in the 
California probation agencies included in the RAND Corporation’s intensive probation 
experiments in the 1980s (Petersilia & Turner, 1990).  In the absence of short-term 
solutions to funding difficulties, risk assessment is needed to identify the most serious 
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offenders and focus the most intensive supervision on them, rather than treating them in 
the same way as low-risk offenders (Sherman, 2007).  Berk et al. (2009) argue that both 
false positives (offenders incorrectly predicted to be low-risk) and false negatives 
(offenders incorrectly predicted to be high-risk) are detrimental to the effective operation 
of the criminal justice system, as well as public safety.  False negatives drive up prison 
populations, leading to overcrowding and financial pressures as well as the social 
consequences for offenders, their families and communities.  False positives lead to tragic 
crimes (such as the fatal shootings of several Philadelphia police officers in 2008 by 
paroled felons that lead to a moratorium on parole releases in Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania 
Fraternal Order of Police, 2008) and undermine public and political confidence in the 
criminal justice system.  Thus, reliable risk prediction is vital for ensuring that as many 
offenders as possible are correctly classified and managed. 
 There is considerable evidence that statistical risk prediction is superior to clinical 
methods in criminal justice (see Grove & Meehl, 1996 for a detailed review; also Van 
Voorhis & Brown, 1997; Lowenkamp, Holsinger, & Latessa, 2001).  For example, one 
study of violent recidivism among mentally ill offenders indicated predictive correlation 
coefficients of .09 for clinical predictions and .30 for statistical predictions.  Similarly, 
for sex offender recidivism, the correlation coefficient was .10 for clinical predictions and 
.46 for statistical instruments (reported in Bonta, 2002).  Gottfredson and Moriarty (2006) 
cite numerous studies supporting their contention that statistical predictions outperform 
clinical predictions in almost all situations involving human decision-making.  They 
argue that humans do not use information reliably: in particular, we are poor at 
considering base rates, easily influenced by spurious causation, and do not systematically 
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weight information in an appropriate manner.  Furthermore, clinical prediction is not 
standardized.  Bonta (1996) notes that clinical decision rules are not easily observable or 
replicable. 
 This is not to say that clinical predictions are not useful, nor that statistical 
prediction methods are without flaws.  Statistical predictions by definition provide 
average results, and the experience of criminal justice professionals plays an important 
role in highlighting deviations from the mean.  In fact, professional override is the little-
discussed fourth ‘principle of effective intervention’ (Andrews, Bonta, & Hoge, 1990).  
Some critics of statistical models have also pointed out the ethical concerns about 
imposing such impersonal judgments on offenders with individualized needs (see 
Gottfredson & Jarjoura, 1996, for a review of the criticisms of statistical models).  One 
important and much-discussed ethical concern about risk prediction highlighted by 
Gottfredson and Jarjoura is that many risk factors of crime are highly correlated with 
race.  This makes agency staff fearful of taking them into account in decision making.  
However, Gottfredson and Moriarty (2006) defend statistical risk assessment, noting its 
importance at the “nexus of research and practice,” and pointing out that: “Properly 
developed and implemented, risk assessment devices can impose criminal justice 
decision making, properly target and potentially save resources, and potentially increase 
the public safety” (p. 195).  Gottfredson and Jarjoura (ibid.) also set out a solution for 
reducing the bias in risk assessment.  Although the role of professional override cannot 
be discounted, both papers argue that ignoring important predictive variables because of 
ethical concerns, rather than investigating how prediction instruments can empirically 
deal with these difficult issues, severely limits the utility of predictive devices and thus 
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does not contribute to the development of good practice in offender and resource 
management.  Furthermore, clinical decision-making is not immune to these problems 
either.  Bridges and Steen (1998) showed that probation officers’ clinical judgments 
about the causes of offending can be influenced by the client’s race, and may 
subsequently factor into case planning and sentencing recommendations. 
 The Philadelphia APPD and the University of Pennsylvania have developed a 
new risk prediction model that is the focus of the present study.  The following section 
describes the model, its contribution to the existing body of literature on risk assessment, 
and its use in a practical setting. 
 
The Philadelphia APPD Low Risk Model and Supervision Experiment 
 The foundation for the Philadelphia APPD low risk prediction model and 
supervision experiment was laid in 2005, when APPD and the University of Pennsylvania 
began working together to restructure the agency’s probation supervision practice 
according to predicted risk of serious crime.  This approach represented a change from 
the existing standard supervision model for all offenders that was modified on an ad hoc 
basis largely according to officer discretion.  In accordance with the risk principle, 
APPD’s eventual goal was to reallocate the highest risk offenders to more intensive 
supervision, with a small ratio of clients to officers so that more time could be put into 
assessing and addressing those clients’ needs.  In order to do this without spending scarce 
resources on new staff, the lowest risk offenders in the agency needed to be assigned to 
large caseloads with minimal supervision.  The first step in this process was to create a 
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statistical model that would predict the risk of serious reoffending1 so that the whole 
APPD population could be stratified by risk level. 
 
The risk prediction model 
 The statistical model used to forecast the risk of serious offending is described in 
full in Berk et al. (2009).  Random forests methods were applied to a dataset of all 
probation and parole cases in Philadelphia between 2002 and 2004, containing only the 
data available to probation officers at intake,2 to predict the risk of being charged with a 
new serious crime within two years of the probation or parole case start date.  Random 
forests is a statistical learning procedure that forecasts outcomes by aggregating results 
from multiple classification and regression trees.  The model was designed to stratify the 
population according to APPD’s operational needs, with the assumption that the majority 
of the caseload was at low risk of serious recidivism and thus appropriate for low-
intensity supervision. At the agency’s request, 61 per cent of cases were to be deemed 
low risk, with the remainder either high risk (approximately 10 per cent) or neither low 
nor high (approximately 30 per cent) (Fig. 3.1).  APPD also deemed the proportions of 
false positives and false negatives expected in the final model to be operationally 
acceptable.  The proportion of false positives (offenders erroneously identified as low-
risk) was set at 5 per cent, and the proportion of false negatives (offenders erroneously 
identified as high risk) was 20 per cent.  A higher false negative rate was accepted given 
the lesser public safety concerns around this type of error.  The initial 2002-2004 
probation dataset is described as a “training sample,” which is used to ensure the 
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independence of data (i.e., the model parameters were not derived from the same sample 
for which predictions would then be made).  This helps to determine whether the 
relationships found in the initial sample are generalizable to other members of the same 
population.  Once the model has been specified, it may then be used to derive risk 
predictions for probationers in current caseloads. 
 The model assigns each probation case (not each offender) a ‘reliability score’ to 
indicate its risk level.  The reliability score is a value between 0 and 1.  The selected 
threshold for low-risk cases was 0.5, so that cases with a reliability score greater than 0.5 
were designated as low risk and scores equal to or less than 0.5 were not low risk.  A 
specific offender’s risk score is based on the average reliability score across all his or her 
active probation cases.  However, even if the average reliability score exceeded 0.5, an 
offender could not be designated low risk if any one of his or her active cases scored 0.5 
or below. 
 The Philadelphia model meets many of the recommendations set out by Bonta 
(2002) and Gottfredson and Moriarty (2006) for optimal risk prediction.  Bonta suggests 
that risk assessments require predictive validity, direct relevance to criminal behavior and 
the correctional setting, and should adhere to the principle of the least restrictive 
alternative.  The Philadelphia model is validated by its development on a training sample 
of cases for which outcomes were already known and its application to other members of 
the same population.  The present paper attempts to further validate its ability to predict 
who will be low risk.  The model’s focus on serious offending is directly relevant to 
correctional priorities.  Finally, the express purpose of the model is to ensure that the 
most intensive supervision and treatment is only reserved for those who need it most. 
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 The Philadelphia model differs from other risk assessment and prediction 
instruments in several ways.  Its focus on only the most serious offenses is its primary 
distinguishing feature.  Berk et al. (2009) argue that it is not helpful for the purposes of 
effective resource allocation to predict any type of reoffending, as many existing 
prediction instruments do.  There are both operational and political advantages to 
focusing only on the most extreme cases.  Furthermore, the model uses charges rather 
than convictions as the outcome measure.  While all recidivism outcome measures have 
well-documented advantages and disadvantages, charges are appropriate in this context 
because serious crimes are more likely to be pursued, but they do not all result in a 
conviction, often because of issues such as witness intimidation, which is a significant 
problem in Philadelphia (Berk et al., 2009, p. 194).   
 Although the Philadelphia model is clearly statistical, it also respects the clinical 
decision making processes that are used by probation intake officers.  The model uses 
only information routinely available to intake officers (demographic characteristics and 
criminal history) and already used by probation officers when making clinical judgments.  
While this may not fully assuage the ethical concerns about statistical prediction, it 
cannot be said that the model imposes constraints on decision making beyond standard 
practice.  It simply makes these processes more transparent and replicable. 
The Low-Intensity Supervision Experiment 
 The Philadelphia APPD Low Risk Experiment ran from October 2007 to October 
2008.  It tested the hypothesis that low-intensity supervision (LIS) would not cause a 
harmful increase in recidivism for low-risk offenders compared to APPD’s existing 
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supervision model, or ‘supervision as usual’ (SAU).  Under SAU, offenders were 
supervised in regional units based on their residence, unless they were ordered by the 
court or APPD to be supervised in a specialist unit (e.g., sex offender or mental health 
units).  Offenders in APPD’s active caseload who were previously assigned to the West 
or Northeast regional units and were predicted to be low risk according to the prediction 
model described above were randomly assigned to LIS or SAU.  In total, 1,559 offenders 
were randomly assigned: 800 to the LIS (treatment) group (400 from each region), and 
759 to the control group (401 in the West and 358 in the Northeast).3 
 Probation clients assigned to the treatment group were placed in a caseload of 
four hundred.  Two probation officers handled the entire low-intensity caseload.  
Probationers received only one office visit every six months, with telephone reporting 
appointments every six months and approximately halfway between office visits (see 
Appendix E for full details of the LIS model).  They were returned to standard 
supervision if they were arrested for a new crime, because the LIS probation officers’ 
caseloads were too large to handle the extra work required to process these cases.  The 
experiment followed an ‘intention-to-treat’ analysis (Montori & Guyatt, 2001), so those 
offenders who were randomly assigned but could not be supervised in the low-intensity 
caseload due to failure or other operational issues were analyzed in their assigned groups 
rather than according to the type of supervision they actually received.  In order to 
maintain the integrity of the LIS model, LIS officers’ caseloads were kept at 400 by 
topping them up with so-called ‘backfill’ cases: offenders from the existing APPD 
caseload who were also predicted to be low-risk but were not part of the random 
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assignment pool.  Backfill probationers were not included in the analysis of the main 
results of the experiment. 
 SAU for the control group usually consisted of monthly office visits, although the 
frequency could be increased or decreased at the probation officer’s discretion for reasons 
relating to compliance or time left on the probation term.  They continued regular 
appointments with their usual probation officer and no part of their supervision changed 
as a result of their experimental status.  Probationers and probation officers were not 
informed of their status.  Caseloads in this group were still large enough (approximately 
145 clients per officer) that the content of meetings was essentially the same in both the 
treatment and control groups.  However, control group offenders saw their probation 
officers more frequently.   
 Treatment group cases received approximately 45 per cent fewer contacts than 
they had in the year prior to random assignment, while the amount of contact in the 
control group did not change.  Control group offenders received approximately twice as 
many contacts as treatment group offenders.  The experimental protocol called for three 
control group contacts to every one in the treatment group, or six to one in terms of face-
to-face contacts (assuming monthly office-based contacts in the control group), so 
although this standard was not quite achieved, the treatment group still received lower-
intensity supervision.  No significant differences in recidivism were found between the 
treatment and control groups after one year.  Sixteen per cent of the treatment group and 
15 per cent of the control group were charged with a new offense of any type (p ≤ .593).  
Thus, it appeared that LIS did not lead to more crime compared to SAU, and was 
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therefore a safe strategy for restructuring probation supervision according to APPD’s 
plans (Barnes et al., forthcoming). 
 
The Present Study 
 While the results of the Low Risk Experiment are promising, this summary does 
not provide a full picture of the predictive power of the model or the severity of offending 
in our sample.  Despite the compelling evidence in favor of statistical risk prediction, it 
can never be an error-free endeavor.  As Grove and Meehl (1996) note: “[T]he statistics 
furnish us with the probabilities so far as anything can” (p. 306).  Actuarial prediction for 
correctional policy provides neither individualized predictions nor actual outcomes for a 
given person.  The Philadelphia model identifies low-risk offenders in part based on their 
prior history, but it is entirely possible that offenders with a criminal history considered 
to be ‘serious’ on some basis could have been assigned a low-risk prediction, based either 
on the balance of other factors or varying definitions of offending severity.  It is also 
possible that low-intensity supervision could lead to an escalation in offending severity as 
it becomes less likely that probation officers will pick up and act on violations and 
transgressions (and as offenders begin to realize this).  These are the cases that get picked 
up by the public, politicians, and the media, and serve to undermine an otherwise rational 
policy.  To this end, it is important to ensure that the low-risk prediction model and low-
intensity supervision do not have hidden harmful effects.   
 The APPD experiment also raises a broader theoretical question – what is the 
nature of ‘non-serious’ offending, and how does it differ from higher-level offending?  
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Little research has been done on the characteristics of low-level offenders.  While 
focusing on the more serious offenders is logical from a public safety perspective, the 
premise of the Philadelphia model is that the majority of offenders are likely to be low-
risk.  Thus, the population is worth considering for its size alone. 
 The objectives of this paper are to investigate the sensitivity of Philadelphia’s 
prediction model to serious offending at various risk levels, and to examine whether low-
intensity supervision could have the unintended consequence of increasing offending 
severity in a sample that should indicate little history of serious criminal behavior.  In 
doing so, we learn more about the nature and degree of ‘serious’ crime among the 
majority of lower-level offenders.  Our specific research questions are: 
1. How successfully does the model categorize offenders as low or non-low risk? 
2. Does the sensitivity of the model change under different definitions of offending 
severity? 
3. How does the selected threshold for determining low/non-low risk (reliability score > 
0.5) compare in its predictive ability to alternative cut-points? 
4. Does low-intensity probation supervision affect offenders’ propensity for serious 
offending? 
Methodology 
Outcome data 
 A wide range of data collected as part of the experiment and model development 
are available for the present analysis.  In addition to data on charges for offenses pre- and 
post-random assignment for the low-risk offenders who participated in the experiment, 
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we also have crime outcomes for the non-randomized low-risk backfill cases and for a 
group of offenders predicted to be non-low risk by the model.  Data for the latter group of 
probationers were collected for comparison with low-risk cases in a regression 
discontinuity analysis, the outcomes of which were contrasted with the experimental 
results (Berk et al., forthcoming).  The full dataset contains information on 93,540 
charges for 3,207 offenders (2,207 of whom were predicted to be low risk) covering a 
period of 42 years (1967-2009). 
 One significant limitation of the charges database is that it only includes charges 
as an adult for offenses in Philadelphia, as we only had access to local adult criminal 
justice system databases.  While almost all of the participants reside in Philadelphia, the 
city’s proximity and ease of access to surrounding counties and state lines mean that the 
local data almost certainly underestimate the number of charges recorded for these 
offenders.  In addition, we do not have juvenile data available to give a full picture of 
offenders’ lifetime criminal involvement.  While most of the offenders in our sample are 
older (see Table 3.1), we would expect to see the majority of their criminal offending 
taking place during their teenage years, so the lack of data on charges filed under the age 
of eighteen is a substantial omission.  However, data are available where the offender was 
charged as an adult, even if the offense was committed while s/he was under eighteen. 
 
Outcome measures 
 As we noted above, the definition of offending severity may extend beyond the 
substantive nature of the offense itself.  This is particularly true in a sample of offenders 
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already predicted to be at low risk of serious reoffending.  A successful model of low-risk 
prediction should minimize the possibility that these offenders pose a serious threat to 
society by any measure.  This section considers the various ways in which offending 
severity may be conceptualized, and how we operationalize some of these ideas as 
outcome measures for the present study. 
 The assessment of offending severity has been a long-standing concern of 
criminological research.  Blumstein et al. (1986), for example, describe offending 
severity as a “key dimension of individual criminal careers” (p. 76) and note the crucial 
policy interest in focusing on understanding and identifying serious offenders.  Despite 
this interest, there remains little consensus on how best to measure severity.  The 
conventional approach (Ramchand et al., 2009, p. 130) has been to weight different crime 
types based on the perceptual method established by Sellin and Wolfgang (1978).  Sellin 
and Wolfgang asked panels of university students, juvenile court judges, and police 
officers to rate the severity of a range of crimes compared to a trivial baseline offense of 
the theft of $1.  Based on these ratings, they assigned a weight to each offense relative to 
the baseline.  This type of crime severity rating appears to hold across different samples 
and contexts (although some race-based differences have been noted), and remains 
popular despite criticisms that no context is provided to panel participants, leaving them 
free to speculate about unreported details of the offenses (Ramchand et al., 2009). 
 The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also provides an offense severity 
classification that is used by police departments when they report crime data through the 
Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) program.  The classification of offenses into Part I and 
Part II offenses was introduced in 1929 and now contains eight offenses in the Part I 
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category and the remainder in Part II (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2004).  The 
classification is based on offense seriousness, frequency of occurrence, nationwide 
pervasiveness, and likelihood of being reported.  The eight Part I offenses are criminal 
homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, motor 
vehicle theft, and arson.  Thus, they are broader than the offenses considered as ‘serious’ 
in the development of Philadelphia’s low-risk prediction model (although the 
Philadelphia model classifies a broader range of sexual offenses as ‘serious’). 
 An alternative to rating severity according to the substantive offense is to assess 
the economic cost of crime.  Interest in cost-benefit analysis as a part of criminal justice 
program evaluation is beginning to grow (e.g., Marsh, Chalfin, & Roman, 2008), and 
estimates of the cost of each type of crime to society is a key part of the methodology 
entailed by this approach.  The severity of crime is ranked by the extent of its cost to 
society in terms of victimization costs (e.g., stolen property, loss of earnings, medical 
expenses, trauma, and suffering: Cohen, 1988), and criminal justice system costs (police 
investigation, court processing, cost of commensurate sentence: Marsh & Fox, 2008).  
Cohen (2000) and colleagues (2004) also propose that the cost of crime can be quantified 
in terms of the public’s theoretical willingness to pay for crime prevention programs that 
would reduce the prevalence of a particular offense type by 10 per cent. 
 More recently, some sophisticated statistical approaches to assessing offending 
severity have emerged.  One recent example is Ramchand et al.’s (2009) developmental 
model of crime severity.  They hypothesize that offenders will progress to more serious 
crime after engaging in low-level offending.  This approach is appealing because, unlike 
previous classification models, it accounts for offender preference and is culture-specific.  
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It assumes that if offenders consider a particular crime type to be serious, they will only 
be drawn to it as their offending career escalates.  Thus, the sequencing of crime types 
over the life course provides insight into which offenses offenders perceive as more or 
less serious.  We do not examine this approach in our paper because we lack full lifetime 
offending data for our sample, so the utility of the developmental focus is limited.  The 
quality of the data do not justify the complexity of the methods. 
 Our operationalization of substantive severity is straightforward.  We simply 
classify each charge as a serious or non-serious offense according to the definition of 
severity used in the prediction model (see above).  We also compare this definition of 
severity with the standard UCR distinction between serious and less serious offending, 
which includes more offenses than the Philadelphia model’s distinction. 
 We propose a simpler method for analyzing economic severity.  The more 
complex cost models may not be well suited to our data.  Because our sample has already 
been deemed low-risk, in part because of their non-serious offending backgrounds, 
serious offenses will be rare events.  Thus, it makes sense to simply dichotomize 
offending history and outcomes into serious/non-serious rather than attempting to create 
more detailed categories. However, an economic severity rating is more difficult to 
dichotomize, beyond the rudimentary approach of assigning an arbitrary dollar value as a 
threshold between serious and non-serious offending.  The studies that do provide U.S. 
dollar estimates for crime types (e.g., Cohen, 1988; Miller, Cohen, & Wiersema, 1996) 
provide various formulas for assigning costs, and largely focus on the most serious 
crimes, so it is difficult to obtain estimates for the lower-level offenses that are more 
prevalent in our sample.  For example, cost estimates set out in Cohen (2000) contain no 
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specific information for drug offenses, which constitute 16 per cent of all the charges in 
our sample.  Furthermore, the age of these studies and changes in prices and monetary 
value may limit the usefulness of their estimates (although procedures are available for 
converting them into current values). 
 One proxy for dollar value that would also allow a basic distinction to be drawn 
between more or less ‘expensive’ crimes is victim status (crimes with victims, such as 
assault, versus ‘victimless’ crimes like drug and weapon possession).  This approach 
assumes that crimes with victims cost society more because the victims themselves suffer 
both tangible (e.g., loss of earnings) and non-tangible (e.g. fear) costs, in addition to the 
criminal justice system costs of processing the offender, while non-victim crimes 
(crudely) only involve offender-related costs.  Of course, the reality is less clear-cut, but 
victim status remains a useful proxy for cost, and does not fully overlap with substantive 
severity.4 
 We define ‘victim’ crimes as those offenses that were most likely to have 
involved injury or death, psychological distress, loss of earnings, or other costs such as 
loss of or damage to property of a personal (not corporate) victim.  The process of 
applying the definition was somewhat crude, because only limited information about the 
offense was available.  Our criminal history database contained a free-text description of 
each offense and a statute section and subsection reference.5  The offense type was 
initially determined by reference to the relevant statute, as we believed that variable 
would be more accurate than the free-text description.  The description was used for 
confirmation and additional information about the offense.  However, without full crime 
reports for each offense, it was not possible to know for certain whether a victim was 
150 
involved.  Crimes that obviously met our definition included homicide, rape, assaults, and 
residential burglaries.  Arson was also included due to the high probability of costly 
damage, although it was not always possible to determine whether the offense was 
committed against personal or commercial property.  Some other offenses in 
Pennsylvania (e.g., criminal mischief) have specific subsections relating to different types 
of victims and these were classified as victim crimes where it was clear that personal 
victims were involved.  Retail theft and some other acquisitive offenses like theft of 
services, which were most likely to involve corporate victims, were excluded.  We also 
excluded ‘non-permanent theft’ (unauthorized use offenses) against any victim type. 
 
Analytic strategy 
 We use straightforward tests to compare the prevalence (proportion of offenders 
involved in serious offending) and frequency of serious offending across groups.  
Frequencies are compared using a two-sample t-test for the difference between means.  
To assess prevalence, we examine the relative risk (risk ratio) of serious offending 
between groups.  The risk ratio is not often used in criminological research, but it is 
common in epidemiological research for analyzing dichotomous outcomes in cohort 
studies (in which known exposure/non-exposure to a risk factor is cross-tabulated with 
disease/non-disease status).  It is simply a ratio of the probability (risk) of disease given 
exposure status, calculated by dividing the proportion of subjects with the disease at one 
level of exposure by the proportion at the other level.  As such, it is somewhat similar to 
an odds ratio, but has a considerably more intuitive interpretation.6  Like the odds ratio, 
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the risk ratio is bounded by zero at the lower end and has no upper bound.  A risk ratio of 
1 indicates no difference in risk between the groups.  In the present study, a risk ratio of 2 
would indicate that one group (‘exposure’: risk level or treatment status) is twice as likely 
to have a serious offense (‘disease’) than the other. 
 We use another epidemiological tool, sensitivity/specificity analysis, to assess the 
effect of changing the model’s cut-off point for classifying risk.  We examine how many 
offenders were correctly classified as low-risk (having no serious offense two years post-
risk assessment date) at each cut point.  Sensitivity is defined as the proportion of ‘true 
positives’ correctly identified by the model, or the proportion of offenders without a 
future serious offense who had been predicted low risk.  Specificity is defined as the 
proportion of ‘true negatives’ identified: the proportion of serious recidivists who were 
classified as non-low risk.  Sensitivity or specificity of 100 per cent indicate that the 
classification tool is able to identify all the true positives or all the true negatives, 
respectively.  In practice, most classification models require a trade-off between one or 
the other: no model will perfectly classify every case, so users must decide whether it is 
more important to identify mostly true positives, or mostly true negatives.  We also 
present the positive and negative predictive values of the model.  The positive predictive 
value is the proportion of offenders predicted to be low risk who are actually low risk, 
and the negative predictive value is the proportion of offenders predicted non-low risk 
who go on to commit a serious offense.  Formulas for calculating each of these measures 
are presented in Appendix J.  We also define false positives as the proportion of predicted 
low-risk offenders committing serious offenses, and false negatives as the proportion of 
predicted non-low risk offenders not committing serious offenses. 
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 We examine the potential interaction of low-intensity supervision and pre-random 
assignment (RA) serious offending on post-RA serious offending for participants enrolled 
in the Low Risk Experiment using Mantel-Haenszel methods for calculating an adjusted 
risk ratio across different levels of a covariate.  This is also a commonly-used approach in 
epidemiological research.  First, we calculate the unadjusted risk ratio for the prevalence 
of post-RA offending by assigned treatment.  We then stratify by presence or absence of 
pre-RA serious offending, calculating two stratum-specific risk ratios.  The Mantel-
Haenszel method assigns a weight to each stratum and produces an adjusted overall risk 
ratio based on the weighted stratum-specific values.  The accompanying Mantel-Haenszel 
chi-square test of homogeneity is used to consider whether an interaction effect may be 
present.  If χ2 is statistically significant, we reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity of 
the stratum-specific risk ratios.  That is, we consider them sufficiently different to 
constitute evidence that the stratifying variable (serious offending history) interacts with 
the independent variable (assigned treatment) to affect post-RA serious offending 
outcomes.7  All analyses are conducted using the epidemiological methods suite in 
STATA 10. 
Sample characteristics 
 We assess each of our four research questions using one of two separate samples 
(‘full sample’ and ‘experimental sample’) drawn from the complete set of 3,207 
probationers described above.  That dataset comprised 1,559 predicted low-risk 
experimental participants (800 LIS treatment and 759 SAU control), 648 predicted low-
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risk backfill cases who were not randomly assigned but received LIS, and 1,000 predicted 
non-low risk offenders selected as part of a separate study.   
 Our ‘full sample’ is a subset of all the groups that make up the 3,207-offender 
dataset, divided into low and non-low risk cases.  Most of the backfill cases (N = 588) did 
not have a recorded reliability score from the prediction model.  Although we could 
assume that they were low risk because they were in the backfill group, they could not be 
used to examine the questions relating to the cut-off point for a low risk prediction, and 
we decided to exclude them from the analysis completely.  In addition, one treatment 
group case had no recorded reliability score and was excluded from the full sample, but is 
included in the experimental sample.  Finally, fifteen backfill cases had a reliability score 
between 0.49 and 0.5.  We strictly followed the requirement for classifying cases with a 
reliability score of over 0.5 as low risk in this analysis, so those fifteen cases are 
classified as non-low risk in the full sample.  Thus, the full sample comprises 2,618 
offenders in total: 1,603 predicted by the model to be low risk, and 1,015 predicted to be 
non-low risk.  Our ‘experimental sample’ consists of the 1,559 experimental participants, 
analyzed on an intention-to-treat basis (i.e., they remain in their assigned groups 
regardless of whether they actually received the assigned treatment). 
 Tables 3.1 and 3.2 show basic demographic and offending history characteristics 
for the two samples.  Race is presented only as the proportion of white offenders because 
of problems in the recording of race in the original dataset,8 which meant that it was only 
possible to reliably say whether the offender was white or nonwhite.  The mean age is 
calculated according to the offender’s age (based on recorded date of birth) on October 1, 
2007.  This was the date on which experimental participants were randomly assigned, and 
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age is based on this date regardless of whether or not the offender participated in the 
experiment.  The proportions and means of charged offenses are based on the full range 
of offending data from the offender’s first recorded charge until September 30, 2009.  For 
the full sample, data were available on a total of 81,643 charged offenses committed 
between 1967 and 2009.  Our analyses are based only on those offenses committed after 
the date of the risk assessment (July 27, 2007; N = 6,808), because prior offending 
history variables were used in the predictive model.  For the experimental sample we had 
data on 34,777 charged offenses over the same timeframe.  Of this number, around 6 per 
cent (N = 2,147) were committed post-random assignment. 
 As we might expect, the low risk and non-low risk groups in the full sample look 
very different (Table 3.1).  The non-low risk group is much more likely to be male 
(87.4% vs. 66.9%, p < .001), nonwhite (75.6% vs. 60.4%, p < .001), and younger (31 
years old vs. 40.7, p < .001).  The non-low risk group has also been charged with more 
than twice as many offenses overall as the low risk group (45 vs. 22.4, p < .001). 
 The characteristics of the treatment and control groups in the experimental sample 
are very similar, indicating successful random assignment.  66.5 per cent of the treatment 
group and 67.6 per cent of the control group are male.  Slightly more treatment group 
members than control group members are white (41.8% vs. 38.0%, p ≤ .125).  
Participants in both groups were, on average, just under 41 years old on the date of 
random assignment, and members of both groups have been charged with an offense on 
average 22.3 times as adults up to two years post-random assignment. 
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Results 
How successfully does the model categorize offenders as low or non-low risk? 
 The first three rows of Table 3.3 show the prevalence and frequency of post-risk 
assessment serious offending (as defined in the Philadelphia APPD prediction model) for 
probationers predicted to be low or non-low risk.  The differences between the two 
groups are substantial and highly statistically significant on both measures.  Among 
offenders predicted to be low risk, 3.4 per cent were charged with a serious offense such 
as murder, aggravated assault, or a sexual offense over the course of their available 
offending histories.  In the non-low risk group, 10.2 per cent were so charged.  Thus, 
offenders receiving a low risk prediction were 67 per cent less likely to have ever been 
charged with a serious offense than their non-low risk counterparts (risk ratio RR = .33, p 
< .001).  Similarly, the mean number of serious offenses committed by the non-low risk 
group in the available records was almost three times greater than the mean for the low 
risk group (.38 vs. .13, p < .001).  It appears, therefore, that the predictive model was 
successful in classifying offenders into low and non-low risk groups at the 0.5 reliability 
score threshold, when applied to a new set of current probationers. 
 Table 3.4 shows more detail about the types of serious offenses committed by the 
two groups, and provides compelling evidence that the low risk group poses a 
substantially smaller threat to public safety.  Offenders predicted to be non-low risk were 
nearly eight times more likely than those predicted low risk to be charged with homicide 
or attempted homicide after the risk assessment date (1.5% vs. .2%, p < .001).  We see 
similar, highly significant differences for sexual offenses, aggravated assaults, and 
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robberies.  The only crime on which the two groups did not differ statistically is forcible 
rape (a subset of all sexual offenses), but this is most likely due to the very small number 
of events.  Fewer than 1 per cent of each group were charged with rape, but the 
probability is still more than three times greater in the non-low risk group (.39% vs. 
.12%, p ≤ .160). 
 
Does the model’s sensitivity change under different definitions of serious offending? 
 We conducted similar analyses with the low and non-low risk groups using two 
alternative definitions of offending severity, based on UCR Part I offenses and offenses 
deemed to be more likely to involve a victim or serious damage (i.e., involving a greater 
economic cost).  Of course, the Philadelphia model was not designed to predict such 
offenses, so the purpose of this question is not to validate the model, but rather to 
examine the types of offenses committed by probationers deemed to be at low risk of 
serious harm, and whether they could be considered serious under alternative definitions.  
The results of these analyses are presented in the remaining parts of Table 3.3. 
 As we would expect from the preceding analysis, the low and non-low risk groups 
also differ substantially and significantly on these alternative measures of severity.  
However, our alternative definitions slightly inflate the proportion of both groups that 
would be identified as ‘serious’ offenders.  9.1 per cent of low risk offenders had been 
charged post-risk assessment with a UCR Part I offense, which include murder and rape, 
and also burglary and motor vehicle theft.  The proportion of non-low risk offenders 
charged with a UCR Part I offense is 15.7 per cent.  Low risk offenders are 42 per cent 
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less likely to have been charged with a Part I offense than non-low risk offenders (RR = 
.58, p < .001).  Again, the frequency of serious offending is much greater for the non-low 
risk group, with a mean of .62 Part I offenses compared to .34 in the low risk group (p < 
.001).  The proportion of offenses involving a victim or serious damage is comparable to 
the UCR Part I results for both groups (low: 8.2%, non-low: 17.5%; RR = .47, p < .001).  
Again, victim/damage charges appeared much more frequently in the histories of non-low 
risk offenders (.91 vs. .41 on average, p < .001).  Thus, the predictive model is still able 
to distinguish low and non-low risk participants based on either UCR Part I or 
victim/damage offending, but considerably more probationers in both groups would now 
be said to have been involved in ‘serious’ offending. 
 
How does the model’s threshold for determining low risk compare to alternative cut-offs? 
 Tables 3.5 to 3.7 show the sensitivity, specificity, and positive and negative 
predictive values for the model when different thresholds of the reliability score are used 
for classifying offenders as low or non-low risk.  In the present study, offenders with an 
average reliability score of above 0.5 were classified as low risk.  We compare the 
model’s predictive ability at this threshold with alternative cut-off points ranging from 
0.05 (at which all offenders were classified as low risk) to 0.95 (at which all offenders 
were non-low risk). 
 Identifying the most suitable threshold necessarily involves balancing the model’s 
ability to predict low risk cases against its ability to identify who will commit a serious 
offense.  We suggest that the latter concern is more important to the viability of a policy 
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of low-intensity supervision based on risk of serious offending, because there may be 
public and political anxiety about reducing criminal justice intervention to adjudicated 
offenders.  Thus, for low-intensity probation to maintain credibility, it is arguably more 
sensible to demonstrate that few serious offenders slipped through the net than to show 
how many non-serious offenders had their supervision requirements reduced.  From the 
model standpoint, we must ensure a high positive predictive value, which indicates the 
proportion of predicted low-risk offenders who were actually low risk, and high 
specificity (proportion of serious offenders who received a non-low risk prediction).  
Large values for these two measures indicate a low rate of false positives (predicted low-
risk offenders who commit serious crimes).  Conversely, we expect to see lower 
sensitivity and lower negative predictive values, because the sample contains many false 
negatives.  Most non-low risk probationers do not go on to be serious offenders in the 
two-year follow-up.  Serious offenses are rare events in our sample, and non-low risk 
offenders are not necessarily high risk.9  Low values on these two measures are more 
acceptable because there is no harm when an offense is not committed, regardless of the 
risk prediction.  However, we must also keep the purpose of the model in mind: the 
diversion of a majority of offenders in APPD’s caseload to low-intensity supervision.  If 
sensitivity is too low (too few non-serious offenders received low-risk predictions), that 
goal will not be fulfilled. 
 Table 3.5 shows the results of these tests using the model definition of severity.  
The positive predictive values are high at all thresholds, indicating a low rate of false 
positives in general.  This is promising, but will be driven by the very low sample 
prevalence of serious offending post-risk assessment.  The present cut-off point of 0.5 
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appears to be a good classification threshold.  Here, the model’s sensitivity and 
specificity are most balanced compared to other cut-off points (Sn = 63.0%; Sp = 65.8%).  
This means that the probability that a non-serious offender received a low risk prediction 
and the probability that a serious offender received a non-low risk prediction are roughly 
the same.  Of the offenders receiving a low-risk prediction, 96.6 per cent were in fact 
low-risk.  The ‘worst case scenario’ false positive rate (low-risk offenders who 
committed serious offenses) is very low, at 3.4 per cent. 
 Table 3.5 suggests that the cut-off point should not be set below 0.5.  Although 
the positive predictive value remains high at thresholds of 0.45 and below, there is a 
considerable loss of specificity at the expense of the less important sensitivity (Sn = 
71.3%; Sp = 55.1% at 0.45 threshold).  The probability of finding a false positive also 
begins to increase.  On the other hand, there may be a case for increasing the cut-off point 
to 0.55, but no more.  At 0.55, the positive predictive value increases to 97.3 per cent, 
specificity increases to 78.5 per cent, and the likelihood of a false positive drops to 2.7 
per cent.  However, the sensitivity drops to just over 50 per cent, which starts to raise 
questions about the model’s ability to meet its purpose.  Thus, a threshold between 0.5 
and 0.55 appears to provide the best trade-off between all the factors discussed above. 
 Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show the same analyses repeated for UCR Part I and 
victim/damage offenses.  Note that the model is not designed to predict these offense 
types (as the slightly lower positive predictive values in these two tables suggest), so the 
results from Table 3.5 should be taken as the definitive examination of the threshold.  
However, we use these additional outcomes to examine whether the cut-off point allows 
too many offenders who might be considered ‘serious’ by alternative standards to be 
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classified as low risk.  The 0.5 threshold again performed reasonably well.  This cut-point 
gave the best balance of sensitivity and specificity for both measures, but specificity was 
lower than sensitivity (UCR: Sn = 63.0%, Sp = 52.1%; victim/damage: Sn = 63.7%, Sp = 
57.4%).  Again, increasing the cut point to 0.55 improved specificity for both measures, 
at the expense of a reasonable degree of sensitivity (UCR: Sn = 50.6%, Sp = 63.9%; 
victim/damage: Sn = 51.5%, Sp = 70.3%).  At the 0.55 threshold the positive predictive 
values increase slightly and the proportion of false positives is reduced.  We see higher 
rates of false positives in these analyses compared to Table 3.5 because there is a higher 
prevalence of offending in these categories.  
 
Does low-intensity probation supervision alter the propensity for serious offending? 
 This analysis focuses only on the experimental sample: 1,559 predicted low risk 
offenders who participated in the Low Risk Experiment and were randomly assigned to 
low-intensity supervision (LIS) or supervision as usual (SAU).  Regardless of their low-
risk status, we would expect that those offenders who had been involved in serious 
offending prior to random assignment (RA) would be more likely to continue to do so.10  
However, because the ultimate practical purpose of the predictive model is to identify 
low-risk offenders so that they can be diverted to LIS, it is very important to ensure that 
low-risk supervision itself does not increase the likelihood that offenders will engage in 
serious recidivism during or after supervision, over and above the extent to which we 
would expect given their past behavior.  Table 3.8 shows the proportion of the sample 
that were charged with a serious offense post-RA.  Because of the small number of 
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serious offenses in the low risk sample as a whole, this analysis focuses only on 
prevalence, not frequency.  However, we do consider the two alternative definitions of 
severity along with model-defined severity.  Table 3.9 presents a stratified analysis 
according to whether or not the offender had committed a serious offense pre-RA. 
 Table 3.8 shows that control group members were slightly more likely to have 
committed a serious offense post-RA, regardless of the definition, although none of the 
results reaches statistical significance.  The treatment group was 39 per cent less likely 
than the control group to have committed a serious offense as defined by the model (RR 
= .61, p ≤ .079); 17 per cent less likely to have committed a UCR Part I offense (RR = 
.83, p ≤ .259); and 21 per cent less likely to have committed an offense involving a victim 
or damage (RR = .79, p ≤ .179).  It appears, then, that the low-intensity supervision 
model did not lead to any increase in the propensity for serious offending.  However, we 
cannot say this with certainty, nor suggest that LIS helps to reduce serious offending, 
because the analysis does not account for past behavior. 
 We examined whether prior offending interacts with treatment assignment to 
affect future offending by stratifying our analysis according to the prevalence of pre-RA 
serious offending.  Table 3.9 sets out the stratum-specific and Mantel-Haenszel adjusted 
risk ratios for each definition of severity.  The stratum-specific risk ratios tell us if there 
is any difference in the effect of LIS on post-RA offending depending on whether or not 
the offender had previously committed a serious offenses.  We then compare the overall 
Mantel-Haenszel adjusted risk ratios to the unadjusted risk ratios from Table 3.8 to assess 
whether the evidence for an interaction effect is sufficient. 
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 All the risk ratios in Table 3.9 indicate that treatment group participants were less 
likely to commit a serious offense post-RA than the control group, although only one is 
statistically significant.  There is also a notable difference between the risk ratios of 
probationers who had and had not committed a serious offense pre-RA.  For model-
defined severity, treatment group participants who had not committed a prior offense 
were 51 per cent less likely to have been charged post-RA than similarly-situated control 
group members (2.0% vs. 4.0%, stratum-specific RR = .49, p ≤ .042).  However, there 
was little difference between treatment and control group participants who had 
committed a prior serious offense (3.8% vs. 4.2%, stratum-specific RR = .90, p ≤ .816). 
We see the same pattern with UCR and victim/damage crimes.  For UCR offenses, 
treatment group participants without a prior offense were 44 per cent less likely to be 
charged than control group participants without a prior offense, but there was no 
difference between treatment and control group participants with a prior offense (no 
prior: 3.7% vs. 6.5%, RR = .56, p ≤ .136; prior: 10.2% vs. 11.1%, RR = .92, p ≤ .660).  
For victim/damage crimes, the risk ratio was .58 for non-serious prior offenders 
compared to .87 for serious prior offenders (no prior: 3.9% vs. 6.8%, p ≤ ..134; prior: 
8.4% vs. 9.7%, p ≤ .494). 
 Despite the magnitude of some of these results, the Mantel-Haenszel adjusted risk 
ratios show no evidence of an interaction effect between prior serious offending and 
treatment.  For all outcome measures they are identical to the unadjusted risk ratios, and 
we were unable to reject the null hypothesis of homogeneity in any case (model defined: 
p ≤ .294; UCR: p ≤ .248; victim/damage: p ≤ .326), meaning that the stratum-specific risk 
ratios do not differ enough statistically to suggest a strong interaction.  Nonetheless, 
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although we should be cautious about reading too much into the stratum-specific risk 
ratios due to the small number of events, it is clear that low-intensity supervision was 
more effective than treatment as usual for offenders without a prior history of serious 
offending, than it was for offenders who had committed a serious offense. 
 
Discussion 
 Our first three research questions examined the sensitivity of the prediction model 
used by Philadelphia APPD in classifying offenders by risk across several different 
definitions of severity.  The model appears to successfully categorize probationers into 
low and non-low risk.  Overall, the probability that an offender in our sample had been 
charged with a serious offense (according to the model definition: murder, attempted 
murder, aggravated assault, robbery and sexual offenses) was substantially lower if they 
received a low risk prediction than if they did not.  The average ‘reliability score’ 
assigned by the model to each offender across all of his or her probation cases also 
appeared to be linearly related to the offender’s likelihood of serious offending: in 
general, the higher the score (higher scores represent the lowest risk levels), the less 
likely an offender was to have been charged with a serious offense. 
 The threshold used to distinguish predicted low risk offenders from predicted 
non-low risk offenders in the model, an average reliability score of 0.5, largely appears to 
be an appropriate cut-off point in the present sample.  However, the model performs 
slightly better in terms of avoiding the most serious errors – offenders who were 
predicted to be low risk but committed serious offenses – if the threshold is raised to 
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0.55.  Raising the threshold results in a slight loss in the ability to predict who will not 
commit a serious offense, but the trade-off is small and favors increased public safety.  
This alternative threshold is close enough to the original 0.5 cut-off that the results of the 
present study are unlikely to be greatly affected, and as a matter of policy any change 
would depend on the extent to which the probation agency was willing to trade 
considerable resource savings for a small potential decrease in false positives.  Twelve 
per cent of the full sample (323 offenders) had risk scores between 0.5 and 0.55, and 
would not have been eligible for low-intensity supervision at the higher classification 
threshold. 
 One limitation of these diagnostic tests is the very low prevalence of serious 
recidivism post-risk assessment in the sample as a whole, which led to a large number of 
false negatives.  This in turn reduces the ability of the model to predict true positives 
(true low-risk cases), which is the ultimate goal of the risk assessment process.  This is an 
issue that is unlikely to be easily overcome, because serious offenses like homicide and 
rape will always be relatively rare events.  However, the prediction model can be applied 
to any new probationer entering the Philadelphia APPD, so the potential exists for more 
data to be collected on low and non-low risk clients, their serious offending, and the 
performance of low risk offenders under low-intensity supervision.  These data could be 
added to an analysis like those presented here, in order to conduct continuous validation 
and refinement of the model. 
 Our analysis shows that the model is also somewhat successful in ensuring that 
offenders who might not have committed one of the most serious offenses, but could be 
considered serious offenders by other standards, are not channeled into receiving less 
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supervision than they might need.  When we repeated our analyses of the model using 
UCR Part I offenses (those offenses considered by the FBI to be of greater concern to the 
authorities, based on severity among other factors), and offenses with victims that were 
likely to involve a greater economic cost, we saw similar patterns of offending as for 
model-defined severity.  The low risk group were still at lower risk of committing these 
offenses than the non-low risk group, and our findings about the threshold held relatively 
constant.  However, using these alternative definitions may defeat the key object of 
Philadelphia’s prediction model: to better distribute agency resources according to the 
risk of the type of serious offending that poses the greatest threat to public safety and fear 
of crime.  Only 31 per cent of low risk offenders had ever been charged with such an 
offense (3 per cent post-risk assessment), but nearly 70 per cent on average had been 
charged with a UCR Part I or victim/damage offense (nearly 9 per cent post-risk 
assessment).  While these are undoubtedly offenses that contribute substantially to the 
crime problem, their high prevalence in a sample of offenders known not to be causing 
the worst kinds of harm to society suggests that it is less crucial to focus on these crime 
types than homicide, robbery, serious assaults, and sexual crimes.   
 Our choice of alternative definitions of severity was the main limitation of this 
part of the exploration because it was not possible with the available data to create a more 
detailed ranking of severity based on different factors.  Our two proxy measures were 
necessarily too broad because of the difficulties (discussed above) in analyzing limited 
data on rare events.  They tended to overstate serious offending by including offenses that 
might not be considered serious at all when deciding which offenders require more 
intensive criminal justice system intervention.  UCR Part I offenses, as discussed above, 
166 
are partly selected on the basis of substantive severity, but also on other factors such as 
frequency of commission and likelihood of detection.  It is clear, given these additional 
qualities of the UCR Part I offenses, that any offender, regardless of risk, would be much 
more likely to commit some of these offense types.  Since there is some overlap of the 
most severe crimes in the UCR list with the model-defined serious offenses, it is likely 
that the majority of additional UCR Part I offenses committed by the low risk group were 
the less serious, more nationally prevalent crimes like motor vehicle theft.  Similarly, our 
victim proxy for cost likely captured some less serious crimes (substantively or 
economically) simply because we selected them based on victim status only.  The 1993 
dollar estimates provided in Cohen (2000) show that the tangible and quality of life costs 
of victim crimes vary widely, not to mention the costs of some non-victim crimes.  For 
example, the cost per victimization for homicide was thought to be nearly $3 million, 
compared to just $2,000 for an assault without serious injury, but our measure included 
both.  A more refined analysis of economic severity in comparison to the model’s 
definition would require more data, updated cost estimates for a wide range of victim and 
non-victim crimes, and more detail about each charge in order to make more accurate 
judgments about injury and damage, beyond the simple victim/non-victim distinction.  
Additional data on lifetime offending would also allow for some more sophisticated 
developmental analyses of severity and offending escalation like the model proposed in 
Ramchand et al. (2009). 
 In all, it would appear that the Philadelphia model has achieved its purpose with 
this sample of offenders.  Returning to the earlier discussion of the qualities that make the 
model a valuable contribution to the risk prediction literature, we can confirm that the 
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model provides predictive validity; is directly relevant to correctional priorities in its 
focus on the rare but highly harmful crime events of concern to Philadelphia APPD, and 
its role in facilitating the most effective allocation of operational resources; and adheres 
to the principle of the least restrictive alternative by using a measure of offending severity 
that does not overestimate the number of offenders requiring more intensive supervision. 
 The results of our investigation into a possible interaction between supervision 
intensity and serious offending showed no evidence that reducing supervision intensity 
for predicted low-risk offenders might increase the risk of serious offending.  However, 
although the analysis did not indicate a statistically significant interaction effect, we 
found that probationers assigned to low-intensity supervision only reduced their 
offending compared to controls when they had no prior serious offending history.  In 
such cases, the probability of a new offense was halved.  Low-risk probationers with a 
history of serious offending performed no better than their counterparts on traditional 
supervision.  It is possible that this interaction did not reach significance because of the 
very small number of post-RA serious charges during the two-year follow-up period of 
the Low Risk Experiment. 
 This finding provides further evidence that low-intensity supervision can be a 
safe, effective probation strategy.  The idea that some offenders receiving a low-risk 
prediction might have a history of serious offending could be objectionable to 
policymakers and the public.  However, this analysis shows that reduced supervision is, 
at worst, no different from the status quo.  At best, it may reduce reoffending for 
probationers with the lowest-level criminal careers.  This is also an important discovery 
about the nature of low risk offenders in general.  It appears that low-level offenders 
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make up the majority of APPD’s caseload.  Their overall propensity to reoffend at the 
time of risk assessment is extremely low.  Regardless of their past history, offenders 
predicted to be at low-risk of committing a serious crime respond just as well to a less 
restrictive intervention as they do to a more intensive one.  The less severe their history, 
the more likely they are to improve their outcomes, even with minimal involvement from 
the criminal justice system.  Building such knowledge about the cases that make up the 
majority of a probation agency’s caseload could be vital for the planning and allocation 
of resources, and the ability to tailor supervision to clients’ needs and requirements. 
 Our analysis is somewhat limited because of the low prevalence of serious 
offending in the sample.  With more data, it might be possible to shed further light on the 
characteristics of low-level offending to improve probation agency decision-making.  
One useful line of inquiry would be to look at the escalation in serious offending up to 
the point of random assignment, and whether the timing of the serious priors has any 
bearing on their interaction with supervision intensity.  Our basic approach of examining 
the presence or absence of serious prior offending may mask differences between, for 
example, an older offender who was charged with a serious offense twenty-five years ago 
and has only committed a few minor offenses since, and a younger offender whose 
earliest offenses were trivial but whose career had started to escalate shortly before the 
current probation term.  In addition, our measure of serious offending is based on 
charges, and as with any crime outcome measure there are numerous factors in the 
decisions to charge an offender, and to drop a charge or fail to convict, that are unrelated 
to whether or not the offender actually committed the crime.  This is a crucial 
consideration in any discussion of the relationship between past and future behavior.  
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Although it is unlikely that we would be able to learn the full details of the offense and 
subsequent criminal justice decision-making processes, it should be possible to take into 
account the ultimate disposition of the charge in future analyses. 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper examined patterns of offending severity in a sample of probationers in 
order to assess how risk can best be predicted and managed for the effective operation of 
a probation agency.  As the use of probation continues to grow, and especially as 
offenders who pose a significant threat of harm to society are placed under community 
supervision, creative resource allocation is required to manage these offenders 
effectively. 
 Risk prediction techniques have been used in probation and other criminal justice 
agencies for one-hundred years, with varying success.  The Philadelphia Adult Probation 
and Parole Department and the University of Pennsylvania developed a new statistical 
risk prediction model that differs from other instruments in two main ways: it attempts to 
operationalize the clinical, informal decision rules already used by probation officers in 
the department, and it focuses only on predicting a handful of crimes considered to be the 
most detrimental to public safety and confidence in the criminal justice system.  The 
ultimate goal in creating the model was to provide a tool for classifying the entire APPD 
caseload along risk-based lines, and channeling a majority of offenders who posed little 
risk of serious harm into a large caseload receiving reduced intensity supervision.  This 
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strategy allows probation officers to focus their time and resources on the highest-risk 
clients. 
 We explored the ability of the model to correctly classify offenders as low or non-
low risk, using the sample of offenders who participated in the trial of low intensity 
supervision and an additional group of APPD clients who also received low or non-low 
risk predictions according to the model.  We also examined the possibility that 
assignment to low-intensity supervision could interact with prior serious offending to 
increase serious recidivism compared to regular probation.  Our analyses revealed that 
the model is largely successful, perhaps needing just a slight adjustment the threshold for 
defining low-risk.  In the context of the APPD’s goal of classifying the majority of its 
caseload as low risk, we also found that the crimes defined in the model as ‘serious’ 
provided a better indication of who the higher-risk offenders were than did UCR Part I 
offenses or a simple victim/non-victim crime status indicator.  The majority of offenders 
predicted by the model to be low risk had committed a ‘serious’ offense by those 
definitions at some point in their careers, although their risk of an offense in these 
categories remained lower than that of predicted non-low risk offenders.  Thus, we 
conclude that a statistical model of the type developed in Philadelphia would appear to be 
a useful offender and resource management tool. 
 Proceeding from the assumption that a majority of a probation agency’s caseload 
could be classified as low-risk for the most serious recidivism, we discovered that such 
offenders respond just as well, if not better, to reduced supervision as they do to 
traditional probation.  Offenders with no prior history of serious offending appear to 
improve their outcomes regardless of probation’s input.  This is a strong justification for 
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the use of low-intensity supervision with the lowest-level offenders.  These clients need 
no more than the minimum input of resources necessary to ensure that they are not ‘false 
positives’ and have the tools needed to rebuild their lives.  The strength of the 
Philadelphia prediction model allows us to say with some confidence that we can identify 
a large proportion of offenders who fall into this category.  This leaves the agency much 
better equipped to deal with the ‘power few’ highest-risk offenders. 
 Of course, no assessment or validation of a statistical prediction model can bring 
complete peace of mind in terms of guaranteeing the offender management approach that 
best assures public safety, just as the model itself cannot indicate exactly who will turn 
out to be low or high risk.  We conclude that the Philadelphia model is successful in 
classifying offenders by risk, but 30 per cent of the predicted low risk offenders in our 
sample had committed at least one of the most serious offenses at some point in their 
adult offending careers.  Some of that group do not react as well to low-intensity 
supervision as their counterparts with no history of serious offending, and we do not yet 
know why, or if their performance will worsen as more data are collected.  We return to 
consideration of Grove and Meehl’s (1996) comment: “The statistics furnish us with the 
probabilities so far as anything can” (p. 306).  Any attempt to routinize criminal justice 
decision making will necessarily be concerned with averages, but it seems that 
Philadelphia’s probation agency has developed a successful model that can help to 
allocate resources where they are needed most, and can easily be adapted for use 
elsewhere based on the information available to the specific agency. 
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Notes 
 
1 In this study, murder, attempted murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and sexual offenses were deemed 
‘serious’ offenses. 
2 Intake information includes the offender’s personal and residential characteristics, and information about 
the instant offense and prior criminal history. 
3 Full details about the experimental design and how the sample was selected, assessed for eligibility, and 
randomly assigned may be found in Barnes et al. (forthcoming). 
4 An alternative approach could be to use incarceration status as a proxy for cost.  The disadvantage is that 
we must use either actual incarceration data for our sample, or assume the types of offenses that might 
result in a sentence of imprisonment.  Assumptions may be too subjective given the discretion involved in 
sentencing (although state sentencing guidelines could assist), and full incarceration data are not available 
for our sample.  In particular, it is possible that some post-random assignment sentencing decisions are still 
pending given the relatively short period of time since the experiment ended.  While assigning victim status 
to each offense type also involves assumptions, the level of subjectivity is likely considerably lower than it 
would be for incarceration. 
5 Most offenses in the dataset are derived from the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, Section 18 (Crimes 
and Offenses). 
6 The risk ratio is simply pE=1/pE=0 (where p = probability and E = dichotomous exposure status), whereas 
the odds ratio is (p/(1-p)E=1)/(p/(1-p)E=0).  The odds ratio tends to overstate our ‘natural’ interpretation of 
relative outcomes: if the exposed group has a 50% risk of disease and the unexposed group has a 25% risk, 
the risk ratio is clearly 2 (the exposed group is twice as likely to get the disease than the unexposed group), 
but the odds ratio is 3 (the odds of disease in the exposed group are three times those of disease in the 
unexposed group), which seems greater.  The risk ratio also remains stable regardless of the size of the risk; 
the magnitude of the odds ratio is closer to the risk ratio when the probability of disease in each group is 
small, and further away when it is large.  Following the example above, if the risks were reduced to 20% 
and 10% respectively, the risk ratio would still be 2 but the odds ratio would fall to 2.25. 
7 In addition, an adjusted risk ratio that is substantially different from the unadjusted risk ratio (a 10-15% 
difference is a commonly-used rule of thumb) suggests that the stratifying variable is a confounder. 
8 The race indicator variable was populated with data from two different sources, with one source selected 
as the default.  However, serious discrepancies arose because the categories of race in the two original 
sources were substantially different. 
9 On the other hand, it is also possible that non-low risk probationers are in fact more serious offenders, and 
are more likely to be incarcerated as a result. 
10 That past behavior is one of the strongest predictors of future behavior is one of the best documented 
findings in criminological research (e.g., Nagin & Paternoster, 1991; Nagin & Farrington, 1992). 
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Tables 
Table 3.1: Sample Characteristics (Full Sample) 
 
   Low Risk Group 
(N=1,603) 
Non-Low Risk Group 
(N=1,015) 
Offender Characteristics   
% Male 66.9 87.4*** 
% White 39.6 24.4*** 
Mean age 40.71 31.00*** 
All Charges   
% 99.9 99.9*** Lifetime Mean 22.43 45.00*** 
% 22.7 37.5*** Post-Risk 
Assessment Mean 1.46 3.03*** 
Serious Charges   
% 30.8 78.4*** Lifetime Mean 1.08 5.00*** 
% 3.4 10.2*** M
od
el
-
D
ef
in
ed
 
Post-Risk 
Assessment Mean .13 .38*** 
% 68.5 89.7*** Lifetime 
Mean 5.84 11.69*** 
% 9.1 15.7*** U
C
R
 
Pa
rt
 I 
Post-Risk 
Assessment Mean .34 .62*** 
% 67.4 90.1*** Lifetime Mean 5.87 14.34*** 
% 8.2 17.5*** 
V
ic
tim
/ 
D
am
ag
e 
Post-Risk 
Assessment Mean .41 .91*** 
*** p < .001, 2-tailed z (proportion) & 2-tailed t (mean). 
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Table 3.2: Sample Characteristics (Experimental Sample) 
 
   Treatment Group 
(N=800) 
Control Group 
(N=759) 
Offender Characteristics   
% Male 66.5 67.6 
% White 41.8 38.0 
Mean age 40.78 40.58 
All Charges   
% 99.6 99.9 Pre-RA Mean 20.99 20.87 
% 21.5 21.5 Post-RA Mean 1.31 1.44 
Serious Charges   
% 29.5 27.9 Pre-RA Mean 1.02 .89 
% 2.5 4.1 M
od
el
- 
D
ef
in
ed
 
Post-RA Mean .13 .13 
% 65.9 67.7 Pre-RA Mean 5.19 5.73 
% 8.0 9.6 U
C
R
 
Pa
rt
 I 
Post-RA 
Mean .32 .34 
% 65.1 65.4 Pre-RA Mean 5.41 5.51 
% 6.9 8.7 V
ic
tim
/ 
D
am
ag
e 
Post-RA 
Mean .34 .42 
No significant differences. 2-tailed z (proportion) & 2-tailed t (mean). 
 
Table 3.3: Prevalence and Frequency of Post-Risk Assessment Serious Offending by Risk 
Level 
  Low Risk  (N=1,603) 
Non-Low Risk 
(N=1,015) 
% Serious 3.4 10.2 
Risk Ratio .33*** Model-Defined 
Mean .13 .38*** 
% Serious 9.1 15.7 
Risk Ratio .58*** UCR Part I 
Mean .34 .62*** 
% Serious 8.2 17.5 
Risk Ratio .47*** Victim/Damage 
Mean .41 .91*** 
*** p < .001, χ2 (prevalence) & 2-tailed t (frequency). 
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Table 3.4: Types of Post-Risk Assessment Serious Charges by Risk Level 
 
% Charged 
Low Risk Group 
(N=1,603) 
Non-Low Risk Group 
(N=1,015) 
Homicide .2 1.5*** 
     Murder .2 1.4*** 
Sexual Offense .3 .9** 
     Forcible Rape .1 .4 
Aggravated Assault 2.1 7.6*** 
Robbery/Carjacking 1.6 3.5*** 
Includes attempts, except “Murder,” which includes only completed of the first to third degrees. 
** p ≤ .01, *** p < .001, 2-tailed z. 
 
Table 3.5: Predictive Ability at Alternative Thresholds (Model-Defined Severity) 
 
Cut-
point 
Positive 
Predictive 
Value (%) 
Negative 
Predictive 
Value (%) 
Sensitivity 
(%) 
Specificity 
(%) 
False 
Positives 
(%) 
False 
Negatives 
(%) 
0.05 94.0 - 100.0 0.0 6.0 - 
0.1 94.0 - 100.0 0.0 6.0 - 
0.15 94.0 - 100.0 0.0 6.0 - 
0.2 94.1 60.0 99.9 1.9 5.9 40.0 
0.25 94.5 27.6 98.3 10.1 5.5 72.4 
0.3 94.9 18.8 94.2 20.9 5.1 81.3 
0.35 95.1 13.2 86.9 31.0 4.9 86.8 
0.4 95.9 13.2 79.9 47.5 4.1 86.8 
0.45 96.1 11.0 71.3 55.1 3.9 89.0 
0.5 96.6 10.2 63.0 65.8 3.4 89.8 
0.55 97.3 9.3 50.7 78.5 2.7 90.7 
0.6 97.6 8.2 39.1 84.8 2.4 91.8 
0.65 97.4 7.4 29.4 88.0 2.6 92.6 
0.7 97.8 7.0 20.3 93.0 2.2 93.0 
0.75 98.1 6.6 12.7 96.2 1.9 93.4 
0.8 98.9 6.4 7.4 98.7 1.1 93.6 
0.85 98.6 6.2 2.9 99.4 1.4 93.8 
0.9 100.0 6.1 0.9 100.0 0.0 93.9 
0.95 100.0 6.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 94.0 
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Table 3.6: Predictive Ability at Alternative Thresholds (UCR Part I Offenses) 
 
Cut-
point 
Positive 
Predictive 
Value (%) 
Negative 
Predictive 
Value (%) 
Sensitivity 
(%) 
Specificity 
(%) 
False 
Positives 
(%) 
False 
Negatives 
(%) 
0.05 88.3 - 100.0 0.0 11.7 - 
0.1 88.3 - 100.0 0.0 11.7 - 
0.15 88.3 - 100.0 0.0 11.7 - 
0.2 88.4 60.0 99.9 1.0 11.6 40.0 
0.25 88.8 29.3 98.2 5.6 11.3 70.7 
0.3 89.1 22.2 94.1 12.8 10.9 77.8 
0.35 89.5 18.5 86.9 22.6 10.5 81.5 
0.4 90.1 18.1 79.9 33.8 9.9 81.9 
0.45 90.4 16.4 71.3 42.6 9.6 83.6 
0.5 90.9 15.7 63.0 52.1 9.1 84.3 
0.55 91.4 14.6 50.6 63.9 8.6 85.4 
0.6 92.0 13.9 39.3 74.1 8.0 86.1 
0.65 91.5 12.9 29.4 79.3 8.5 87.1 
0.7 92.7 12.7 20.4 87.9 7.3 87.3 
0.75 93.7 12.4 12.9 93.4 6.3 87.6 
0.8 95.7 12.2 7.7 97.4 4.3 87.8 
0.85 93.2 11.8 2.9 98.4 6.8 88.2 
0.9 100.0 11.7 1.0 100.0 0.0 88.3 
0.95 100.0 11.7 0.0 100.0 0.0 88.3 
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Table 3.7: Predictive Ability at Alternative Thresholds (Victim/Damage Offenses) 
 
Cut-
point 
Positive 
Predictive 
Value (%) 
Negative 
Predictive 
Value (%) 
Sensitivity 
(%) 
Specificity 
(%) 
False 
Positives 
(%) 
False 
Negatives 
(%) 
0.05 88.2 - 100.0 0.0 11.8 - 
0.1 88.2 - 100.0 0.0 11.8 - 
0.15 88.2 - 100.0 0.0 11.8 - 
0.2 88.3 60.0 99.9 1.0 11.7 40.0 
0.25 88.6 29.3 98.2 5.5 11.4 70.7 
0.3 89.1 24.4 94.2 13.9 10.9 75.6 
0.35 89.7 21.2 87.3 25.5 10.3 78.8 
0.4 90.6 20.6 80.4 37.7 9.4 79.4 
0.45 91.0 18.3 71.9 46.8 9.0 81.7 
0.5 91.8 17.5 63.7 57.4 8.2 82.5 
0.55 92.8 16.3 51.5 70.3 7.2 83.7 
0.6 93.5 15.1 40.0 79.4 6.5 84.9 
0.65 93.5 14.0 30.1 84.5 6.5 86.0 
0.7 94.9 13.5 21.0 91.6 5.1 86.5 
0.75 95.6 12.9 13.2 95.5 4.4 87.1 
0.8 98.4 12.6 7.9 99.0 1.6 87.4 
0.85 97.3 12.1 3.1 99.4 2.7 87.9 
0.9 100.0 11.9 1.0 100.0 0.0 88.1 
0.95 88.2 0.0 100.0 0.0 11.8 100.0 
 
Table 3.8: Post-Random Assignment Serious Offending in Experimental Sample  
 
  Treatment Group (N=800) 
Control Group 
(N=759) 
% Post 2.5 4.1 Model-Defined 
Risk Ratio .61 
% Post 8.0 9.6 UCR Part I Risk Ratio .83 
% Post 6.9 8.7 Victim/Damage Risk Ratio .79 
No significant differences (χ2). 
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Table 3.9: Post-Random Assignment Offending Severity Stratified by Prior History 
 
  No Serious Offense  Pre-RA 
Serious Offense  
Pre-RA 
  Treatment Control Treatment Control 
N 564 547 236 212 
% Post 2.0 4.0 3.8 4.2 
Stratum Risk Ratio  .49* .90 M
od
el
-
D
ef
in
ed
 
M-H Adjusted RRa .61 
N 273 245 527 514 
% Post 3.7 6.5 10.2 11.1 
Stratum Risk Ratio  .56 .92 
U
C
R
 P
ar
t I
 
M-H Adjusted RR .84 
N 279 263 521 496 
% Post 3.9 6.8 8.4 9.7 
Stratum Risk Ratio  .58 .87 V
ic
tim
/ 
D
am
ag
e 
M-H Adjusted RR .79 
* p ≤ .05, χ2. 
a M-H: Mantel-Haenszel; RR: Risk Ratio. 
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Figures 
Figure 3.1: Philadelphia APPD’s Risk-Based Caseload Stratification 
               (Diagram provided by Lindsay Ahlman, Philadelphia APPD) 
High risk – 10% 
Low risk – 60% 
Respond to and treat all 
offenders the same, 
modify with clinical 
predictions 
Respond to and treat all 
offenders based on actuarial 
risk of a new serious offense
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A: Systematic Review Search Strategy 
List of Online Databases 
1. Australian Criminology Database (CINCH) 
2. Campbell Collaboration Social, Psychological, Educational, and Criminological 
Trials Register (C2-SPECTR) 
3. Criminal Justice Abstracts 
4. Dissertation Abstracts 
5. Google, Google Scholar, Google Books 
6. Government Publications Office Monthly Catalog 
7. International Bibliography of the Social Sciences 
8. ISI Web of Knowledge 
9. JSTOR 
10. National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) Abstracts 
11. PsycINFO 
12. Sage Full Text Collection: Criminology 
13. Sage Full Text Collection: Political Science 
14. Sage Full Text Collection: Sociology 
15. Social Science Citation Index 
16. Social Services Abstracts 
17. Sociological Abstracts 
18. Worldwide Political Science Abstracts 
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List of Research Organizations and Government Department Websites 
1. American Correctional Association 
2. American Probation and Parole Association 
3. Home Office Research, Development, and Statistics (U.K.) 
4. International Community Corrections Association 
5. Ministry of Justice (U.K.) 
6. National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders (U.K.) 
7. National Institute of Corrections (U.S.A.) 
8. National Institute of Justice (U.S.A.) 
9. National Offender Management Service (U.K.) 
10. National Probation Service (U.K.) 
11. Pew Center on the States (U.S.A.) 
12. RAND Corporation (chiefly U.S.A.) 
13. Swedish National Council on Crime Prevention (BRÅ) 
14. Urban Institute (U.S.A.) 
15. Vera Institute of Justice (U.S.A.) 
16. Washington State Institute of Public Policy (U.S.A.) 
 
Keywords 
 The following search strings of key words were used to search the databases and 
websites, adapted as necessary to meet the requirements of the different search engines.  
Where including all the search terms was problematic, we opted for the broadest possible 
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combination.  The search terms were deliberately left broad (they do not include limiting 
terms such as ‘evaluation,’ ‘experiment,’ ‘trial’) so that relevant background literature 
could also be systematically obtained through the searches.  ‘*’ indicates where terms 
were truncated to find all possible variants of the word: 
probation* AND supervis* AND case* AND (intens* OR frequen* OR ratio) 
AND (recidiv* OR *arrest* OR *convict*) 
 
Electronic Search Results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Reports not classed ‘eligible’ or ‘ineligible contained supplementary information on eligible studies or 
relevant background literature. 
** Some of these reports may include information that was obtained from other retrieved documents. 
*** Includes some studies obtained from sources other than the electronic search. 
Total Hits: 30,591 
(Includes duplicates within and across databases) 
Potential Study Reports: 528 
(Includes duplicates) 
Report Title and Abstract Screening: 410 
Reports Retrieved and Coded 
in Full: 194* 
Passed screen but could not be 
obtained: 45** 
Eligible Reports: 21*** Ineligible: 102 
Independent Studies 
(Modules): 47 Quasi-experiments and RCTs 
with high attrition: 9 
Experiments: 38 
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Appendix B: Systematic Review Coding Protocol 
A. STUDY LEVEL CODING SHEET 
 
Instructions: One study level coding sheet to be used per study.  If the study is reported in 
multiple documents, use the primary publication as the study identifier and list other document 
numbers below. 
 
A1. Study ID:          studid 
A2. Cross-ref document ID:        xref1 
A3. Cross-ref document ID:        xref2 
A4. Cross-ref document ID:        xref3 
A5. Coder initials:         coder 
A6. Date coded:         codate 
A7. Title:          title 
A8. Author(s):          author 
A9. Publication type:         pubtype 
 1. Book     4. Government report (federal) 
 2. Book chapter    5. Government report (state/local) 
 3. Peer-reviewed journal article  6. Unpublished (e.g., dissertation, technical 
 8. Other:      report, conference paper 
        
A10. Journal ref. (vol., issue):        jref 
A11. Publication year:         pubyr 
A12. Date range of research:        resdate 
A13. Country of publication:        publoc 
A14. Country of study setting:        resloc 
A15. Number of treatment-comparison contrasts in report:    mods 
Only independent treatment group samples should be counted; see Instructions for Section B. 
If no comparison group, just complete B. ELIGIBILITY CHECKLIST. 
A16. Is the same comparison group used in each contrast?    cxlmod 
 0. No 
 1. Yes 
 8. N/A 
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B. ELIGIBILITY CHECKLIST 
 
B1. First author’s last name:        elname 
B2. Coder initials:         coelig 
B3. Date eligibility determined:        eldate 
 
To be eligible, a study must meet the following criteria.  Answer each question with 1 = Yes, 
0 = No. 
 
B4. The study evaluates an intensive probation or parole program involving increased supervision 
by probation officers in a reduced caseload, or low-intensity probation (increased caseload, less 
supervision).      1. Yes  0. No   evpro 
 
B5. A difference in probation intensity between the treatment and comparison groups, as 
evidenced by a change in caseload size, ratio of clients to officers, or other control measures, is a 
key component of the overall program.  1. Yes  0. No   evsep 
 
B6. The study includes a comparison group receiving ‘standard probation,’ not comprised of 
dropouts from ISP/low intensity, or other supervision by probation officer (not incarcerated 
controls).  Study design may be experimental or quasi-experimental, but not a one-group research 
design.      1. Yes  0. No   evcomp 
 
B7. The study includes a post-program measure of criminal behavior (arrest, conviction) or 
technical violation of probation/parole – may be official or self-reported and dichotomous or 
continuous.     1. Yes  0. No   evoutc 
 
For documents that do not meet the above criteria, answer the following questions: 
 
B8. Document is not a quantitative evaluation (no data regarding effects of ISP/LIP reported). 
       1. Yes  0. No   evndat 
 
B9. Document is a review article relevant to this project (e.g., references to studies, background 
information for write-up).    1. Yes  0. No   evusef 
 
B10. Document status (circle one):       elstat 
 1. Eligible 
 0. Not eligible 
 9. Relevant review 
 
Notes: 
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C. TREATMENT-COMPARISON CODING SHEET 
 
Instructions: If the study reports on multiple treatment-comparison contrasts, or multiple 
treatments compared to a single comparison group, each contrast should be coded on separate 
Treatment-Comparison Coding Sheets.  Only independent evaluations should be included in 
analyses (i.e., multiple treatment groups should not have overlapping participants). 
 
Identifying Information 
 
C1. Study ID:          studid 
C2. Module ID:          modid 
C3. Coder initials:         comod 
 
Program Details 
 
C4. Description of what happens to treatment group:     txdesc 
             
              
C5. Description of what happens to control group:     cxldesc 
             
              
C6. Primary program type:                  progtype 
 1. Increase in probation intensity 
 2. Decrease in probation intensity 
 8. Other:            
C6a. If increased intensity, what was the precise nature of the program?             progdesc 
 1. ‘Front door’ prison diversion (probation instead of prison) 
 2. ‘Backdoor’ prison diversion (early release from prison) 
 3. Enhanced probation 
 4. Enhanced parole 
 5. Enhanced probation and parole 
 8. Other:          
C6b. Primary program components (indicate whether present or not): 
 Program increases ratio of clients to probation officers  1. Yes 0. No progir 
 Program decreases ratio of clients to probation officers  1. Yes 0. No progdr 
 Program increases frequency of contact with probation officer 1. Yes 0. No progif 
 Program decreases frequency of contact with probation officer 1. Yes 0. No progdf 
 Program increases drug testing requirements   1. Yes 0. No progidt 
 Program decreases drug testing requirements   1. Yes 0. No progddt 
 Other:        1. Yes 0. No progoth 
C6c. If Yes for any of the above, state exact numbers if available (999 if not): 
 Control ratio:   / Treatment ratio:    racxl/ratx 
 Control freq:   / Treatment freq:    frcxl/frtx 
 Control drug tests:   / Treatment drug tests:    drcxl/drtx 
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 Other:         txcxloth 
C6d. Additional program components (indicate whether present or not): 
 Curfew      1. Yes 0. No  addcomp_curf 
 Drug treatment     1. Yes 0. No  addcomp_drug 
 Electronic monitoring    1. Yes 0. No  addcomp_em 
 Employment program/assistance   1. Yes 0. No  addcomp_cmpl 
 Halfway house     1. Yes 0. No  addcomp_hh 
 Home visits     1. Yes 0. No  addcomp_hv 
 House arrest     1. Yes 0. No  addcomp_harr 
 Offense-specific treatment    1. Yes 0. No  addcomp_offtx 
  (e.g., sex offender treatment) 
 Other treatment     1. Yes 0. No  addcomp_tx 
 Other:      1. Yes  0. No  addcomp_oth 
C7. What happened to the comparison group?      cxltype 
 1. ‘Supervision as usual’ 
 8. Other:            
C8. Was supervision for treatment group provided by anyone other than probation officer? 
            posup 
 0. No 
 1. Yes (explain):           
 9. Don’t know/can’t tell 
C9. Length of intervention in months (weeks/4.3): 
 Minimum:          txlmin 
 Maximum:         txlmax 
 Mean:          txlmn 
 Fixed (same for all subjects):       txlfix 
C10. Did the intervention follow a set protocol?      txprot 
 0. No 
 1. Yes 
 9. Don’t know/can’t tell 
C11. What supervision philosophy was stated?      txphil 
 1. Control/surveillance   8. Other:     
 2. Treatment          
 3. Hybrid     9. Don’t know/not stated 
C12. Did the intervention remain consistent over time?     txcons 
 0. No 
 1. Yes 
 9. Don’t know/can’t tell 
 
Methodological Rigor 
 
C13. Control variables used in statistical analyses to account for initial group differences? 
 0. No          cxlvars 
 1. Yes 
C14. Subject-level matching?       matched 
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 0. No 
 1. Yes 
C15. Random assignment to conditions?       rassgt 
 0. No 
 1. Yes 
C16. Measurement of prior criminal involvement?     prior 
 0. No 
 1. Yes 
C17. Rating of initial similarity between treatment and control group:   prsim 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
(1 = Nonrandomized; high likelihood of baseline differences between groups or known differences related 
to future recidivism) 
(5 = Nonrandomized design with strong evidence of initial equivalence) 
(7 = Randomized design with large N or small N design with matching) 
C18. Was attrition discussed in the report?      attrep 
 0. No 
 1. Yes 
C19. Is there a potential threat to generalizability from overall attrition?   attgen 
 0. No 
 1. Yes 
C20. Is there a potential threat to internal validity from differential attrition?  attint 
 0. No 
 1. Yes 
C21. Did the statistical analysis attempt to control for differential attrition effects? attstat 
 0. No 
 1. Yes 
 9. Don’t know/can’t tell 
C22. Statistical significance testing used?      sigtest 
 0. No 
 1. Yes 
C23. Overall methodology rating       methrat 
 1. Comparison group lacks demonstrated comparability to treatment group 
 2. Comparison between 2+ groups, one with and one without the intervention 
 3. Comparison between program group and one or more control groups, controlling for other 
  factors, or nonequivalent comparison group is only slightly different from program  
  group, or randomized controlled trial with high attrition 
 4. Random assignment and analysis of comparable program and comparison groups,  
  including controls for attrition 
 
Notes on methodology: 
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D. SAMPLE LEVEL CODING SHEET 
 
Instructions: A study may report results separately for distinct samples (e.g., persons with/without 
prior arrests).  Each distinct sample must have its own coding sheet.  The treatment-comparison 
contrast is the same for the different samples. 
Samples should be independent; i.e., no overlapping participants.  Some studies report the results 
broken down by different subgroups (e.g., by gender).  Only one of these breakouts can be used – 
choose the one with the most information, or the one most relevant to the review. 
 
Identifying Information 
 
D1. Study ID:         studid 
D2. Module ID:         modid 
D3. Sample ID:         sampid 
D4. Coder initials:        cosamp 
 
Sample Description 
 
D5. Description of treatment group sample:     txsamp 
             
              
D6. Description of comparison group sample:     cxlsamp 
             
              
D7. Total N in treatment group at beginning of study:    txn 
D8. Total N in comparison group at beginning of study:    cxln 
Note: D7 + D8 = total sample size prior to attrition.  If multiple samples are being coded, the 
sum across samples must equal the total sample size prior to attrition. 
 
D9. Age range of study participants:      sampage 
 1. Adolescent (12-18)    5. Youth and adult 
 2. Youth (18-21)     6. Adolescent, youth, and adult 
 3. Adult (21+)     8. Other:     
 4. Adolescent and youth    9. Unspecified/can’t tell 
D10. Youngest age included in sample (999 if unknown):   yage 
D11. Oldest age included in sample (999 if unknown):    oage 
D12. Exact proportion of males in sample (if known):    prmale 
D13. Approximate gender description of sample:    sampgen 
 1. All male (>90%)    4. More females than males (60-90%  
 2. More males than females (60-90%    female) 
  male)      5. All female (>90%) 
 3. Roughly equal males and females  9. Can’t tell 
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D14. Race/ethnicity of sample (999 if unknown): 
 % Asian:    rasian % Native American:   rnative 
 % Black:    rblack % White:    rwhite 
 % Hispanic:   rhisp % Other:    rother 
D15. General offender type:       offtype 
 1. Violent and/or person crimes   6. Specialized caseload: mental health 
 2. Nonviolent and/or nonperson crimes  7. Specialized: domestic violence 
 3. Mixed: violent/nonviolent   8. Other:     
 4. Specialized caseload: drugs         
 5. Specialized caseload: sex offenders  9. Don’t know/can’t tell 
D16. Composition of supervised offenders:     offcomp 
 1. All probationers 
 2. All parolees 
 3. Probationers and parolees 
D16a. If combination of probationers and parolees (999 if unknown): 
 % probation:   pcpro % parole:   pcpar 
D17. Probationer/parolee risk level:      offrisk 
 1. Low risk     6. All risk levels 
 2. Medium risk     7. No risk assessment 
 3. High risk     8. Other:     
 4. Low and medium risks          
 5. Medium and high risks    9. Don’t know/can’t tell 
D18. How was risk determined?       riskjmt 
 1. Statistical model    5. Classification instrument 
 2. Prior convictions    7. N/A 
 3. Instant offense     8. Other:     
 4. Judgment of probation officer/intake  9. Don’t know/can’t tell 
D19. Probationer/parolee need level:      offneed 
 1. Low need     6. All need levels 
 2. Medium need     7. No need assessment 
 3. High need      8. Other:     
 4. Low and medium need          
 5. Medium and high need    9. Don’t know/can’t tell 
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E. DEPENDENT VARIABLE CODING SHEET 
 
Instructions: Code each dependent variable reported in the study separately.  The same dependent 
variable measured at multiple times should be coded only once.  For non-crime outcomes, code 
only items E6, E9, and E10. 
 
Identifying Information 
 
E1. Study ID:         studid 
E2. Module ID:         modid 
E3. Sample ID:         sampid 
E4. Outcome ID:        outid 
E5. Coder initials:        coout 
 
Outcome Information 
 
E6. Outcome label (label used in the report):     outlab 
E7. Recidivism construct represented by this measure:    rconst 
 1. Arrest     5. Probation revocation 
 2. Charge     6. Incarceration 
 3. Conviction    8. Other:     
 4. Technical violation         
E8. Offense types included in recidivism measure: 
 All offenses (‘No’ for others)  1. Yes 0. No   oall 
 Drug offenses    1. Yes 0. No   odrug 
 Person offenses, sexual   1. Yes 0. No   opsx 
 Person offenses, nonsexual   1. Yes 0. No   opnsx 
 Person offenses, unspecified  1. Yes 0. No   opuns 
 Property offenses    1. Yes 0. No   oprop 
 Weapons offenses    1. Yes 0. No   oweap 
 Driving offenses    1. Yes 0. No   odriv 
 Technical or status offenses  1. Yes 0. No   otech 
 Other:     1. Yes 0. No   ooth 
E9. Measurement scale:        mscale 
 1. Dichotomous    3. 4-9 discrete ordinal categories 
 2. Trichotomous    4. >9 discrete ordinal categories/continuous 
E10. Source of data:        dsrce 
 1. Self-report    8. Other:     
 2. Other report (e.g., probation officer) 9. Don’t know/can’t tell 
 3. Official records (police, probation, court, etc.) 
E11. Length of follow-up period:      fulng 
 1. < 6 months    4. > 2 years 
 2. 6-12 months    8. No follow-up 
 3. > 1, < 2 years    9. Don’t know/can’t tell 
E12. Is cost/benefit data for the program included in the study? 1. Yes 0. No 
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F. EFFECT SIZE LEVEL CODING SHEET 
 
Instructions: Complete a separate coding sheet for each treatment-comparison contrast for each 
dependent variable. 
 
Identifying Information 
 
F1. Study ID:         studid 
F2. Module ID:         modid 
F3. Sample ID:         sampid 
F4. Outcome ID:        outid 
F5. Effect size ID:        esid 
F6. Coder initials:        coes 
 
Effect Size Information 
 
F7. Effect size type:        estype 
 1. Baseline (pretest; prior to start of intervention) 
 2. Post-test (first measurement point, post-intervention) 
 3. Follow-up (all subsequent measurement points, post-intervention) 
F8. Which group does the raw effect favor (ignoring statistical significance)? esdir 
 1. Treatment group    3. Neither (ES = 0) 
 2. Comparison group   9. Can’t tell (ES cannot be used if selected) 
F9. Does the investigator report the difference as statistically significant?  essig 
 0. No     8. Not tested 
 1. Yes     9. Can’t tell 
F10. If tested, what type of statistical test was used?    estest 
 1. t test     7. N/A 
 2. F test     8. Other:     
 3. χ2     9. Can’t tell 
 4. Regression analysis 
F11. Timeframe in months captured by the measure (weeks/4.3) 
 Minimum:    estmin  Fixed (same for all subjects) 
 Maximum:   estmax      estfix 
 Mean:    estmn 
F12. Timeframe in months from end of program to measurement point (weeks/4.3) 
 Minimum:    esfumin Fixed (same for all subjects) 
 Maximum:   esfumax     esfufix 
 Mean:    esfumn 
 
Effect size data – all effects 
 
F13. Treatment group sample size for this ES:     estxn 
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F14. Comparison group sample size for this ES:     escxl 
 
Effect size data – continuous outcomes 
 
F15. Treatment group mean:       estxmn 
F16. Comparison group mean:       escxlmn 
F17. Are the above means adjusted?  1. Yes 0. No   esmadj 
F18. Treatment group standard deviation:     estxsd 
F19. Comparison group standard deviation:     escxlsd 
F20. Treatment group standard error:      estxse 
F21. Comparison group standard error:      escxlse 
F22. t-value from an independent t-test or square root of F value from a 
 one-way ANOVA with 1 d.f. in the numerator (only 2 groups):  estval 
F23. Exact probability for a t-value from an independent t-test or F-value 
 from a one-way ANOVA with 1 d.f. in the numerator:   estvalp 
F24. Correlation coefficient:       escorr 
 
Effect size data – dichotomous outcomes 
 
F25. Number successful in treatment group:     estxs 
F26. Number successful in comparison group:     escxls 
F27. Proportion successful in treatment group:     estxspr 
F28. Proportion successful in comparison group:     escxlspr 
F29. Are the above proportions adjusted for pre-test variables? 
       1. Yes 0. No   espradj 
F30. Logged odds ratio:        eslogor 
F31. Standard error of logged odds ratio:     eslorse 
F32. Logged odds ratio adjusted? (e.g., from logistic regression)  
       1. Yes 0. No   esloradj 
F33. χ2 value with 1 d.f. (2x2 contingency table):    eschisq 
F34. Correlation coefficient:       esdcorr 
 
Effect size data – hand calculated 
 
F35. Hand calculated d-type effect size:      eshand 
F36. Hand calculated SE of the d-type effect size:    eshandse 
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Appendix C: Meta-Analytic Procedures 
Odds ratio effect size 
The odds ratio (OR) is given by the following formula, based on a 2x2 table: 
 Events Non-Events 
Treatment Group a b 
Control Group c d 
 
    
! 
ESOR =
ad
bc       (1) 
Analyses are performed on the natural log of the OR and converted back for presentation. 
Standard error of the logged OR: 
    
! 
SELOR = 1a + 1b + 1c + 1d     (2) 
Inverse variance weight of the logged OR (fixed effects): 
    
! 
wLOR =
1
SELOR2
      (3) 
Heterogeneity (Q-statistic) 
Q is distributed as a chi-square with k – 1 d.f. 
    
! 
Q ="wi ESi # E S ( )
2
     (4) 
ESi = individual effect size for i = 1 to k (the number of effect sizes). 
! 
E S  = weighted mean effect size over the k effect sizes. 
wi = weight for ESi . 
 
Random effects model 
A second variance component 
! 
"#  is computed, reflecting between-study error.  We use 
the DerSimonian and Laird method of moments estimator of 
! 
"#  (5).  The inverse variance 
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weight 
! 
w  is then recalculated (6), with 
! 
"#  added to the within-study variance component 
(
! 
" i = SELOR2 ) from the denominator of (3) above.  If Q is smaller than k – 1 in (5), 
! 
"#  is set 
to 0 and the random and fixed effects weights are the same. 
    
! 
"# =
Q $ k $1( )
%wi $ %wi2 /%wi( )
    (5) 
    
! 
wRANDOM =
1
"# +" i
     (6) 
Meta-analytic analog to the ANOVA 
The total variability Q is partitioned into two groups: variability within categories of the 
moderator variable (
! 
QW ); i.e., the variability of the effect sizes around the category mean, 
and variability between categories (
! 
QB ). 
     
! 
QW ="wij ESij # E S j( )
2
   (7) 
     
! 
QB = (E S j
j =1
p
" w j )2 #
E S j
j =1
p
" w j
$ 
% 
& & 
' 
( 
) ) 
2
w j
j =1
p
"
  (8) 
j = 1 to c for c categories of the independent (moderator) variable. 
! 
E S j  = weighted mean effect size for each group. 
wj = sum of the weights within each group. 
 
In the mixed effects analog to the ANOVA, the moderator variable is treated as fixed and 
the variability between groups is random.  Thus, the estimator for the random effects 
component is based on 
! 
QW , not Q (formula not shown). 
! 
QW  estimates from the model are 
not interpretable. 
! 
QB is the meta-analytic equivalent to the F-statistic. 
 
References: Lipsey & Wilson (2001), pp. 47-49, 54, 115-116, 121.; Wilson (2010), pp. 195-198. 
195 
Appendix D: Details of Included and Excluded Studies 
Included Studies 
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 a
nd
 so
ci
al
 
si
tu
at
io
ns
, o
ff
en
de
rs
 
vi
si
te
d 
in
 h
om
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
20
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 1
 
ex
pe
rim
en
ta
l o
ff
ic
er
 in
 
ea
ch
 o
f 4
 o
ff
ic
es
, i
nt
en
si
ve
 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
in
 fa
m
ily
, 
w
or
k,
 a
nd
 so
ci
al
 
si
tu
at
io
ns
, o
ff
en
de
rs
 
vi
si
te
d 
in
 h
om
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
A
du
lt 
m
al
e 
in
m
at
es
 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 
el
ig
ib
le
 fo
r 
pa
ro
le
 a
nd
 
re
le
as
ed
. 
Y
ou
th
 a
nd
 
ad
ul
t m
al
e 
pr
ob
at
io
ne
rs
 
on
 a
ll 
ty
pe
s 
of
 p
ro
ba
tio
n 
or
de
rs
. 
Y
ou
th
 a
nd
 
ad
ul
t m
al
e 
pr
ob
at
io
ne
rs
, 
1+
 p
rio
r 
co
nv
ic
tio
n 
si
nc
e 
ag
e 
14
. 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
es
ig
n 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
St
ud
y 
C
al
ifo
rn
ia
 
19
57
 
(R
ei
m
er
 &
 
W
ar
re
n,
 
19
57
) 
D
or
se
t 
19
76
 
(F
ol
ka
rd
, 
Sm
ith
, &
 
Sm
ith
, 
19
76
) 
In
ne
r 
Lo
nd
on
 
19
76
 
(F
ol
ka
rd
, 
Sm
ith
, &
 
Sm
ith
, 
19
76
) 
196 
 
O
ut
co
m
e 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
gr
ou
p 
le
ss
 
lik
el
y 
to
 fa
il 
on
 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
gr
ou
p 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 fa
il 
on
 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
gr
ou
p 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 fa
il 
on
 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
gr
ou
p 
sl
ig
ht
ly
 le
ss
 
lik
el
y 
to
 fa
il 
on
 n
ew
 
ar
re
st
s. 
C
om
pa
ri
so
n 
A
pp
ro
x 
40
-4
5:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
, t
ra
di
tio
na
l 
pr
ob
at
io
n 
se
rv
ic
es
, 
ar
ou
nd
 h
al
f a
s m
an
y 
co
nt
ac
ts
 a
s 
tre
at
m
en
t g
ro
up
. 
A
pp
ro
x 
40
-4
5:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
, t
ra
di
tio
na
l 
pr
ob
at
io
n 
se
rv
ic
es
, 
ar
ou
nd
 h
al
f a
s m
an
y 
co
nt
ac
ts
 a
s 
tre
at
m
en
t g
ro
up
. 
A
pp
ro
x 
40
-4
5:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
, t
ra
di
tio
na
l 
pr
ob
at
io
n 
se
rv
ic
es
, 
ar
ou
nd
 h
al
f a
s m
an
y 
co
nt
ac
ts
 a
s 
tre
at
m
en
t g
ro
up
. 
R
ou
tin
e 
pr
ob
at
io
n.
 
La
rg
er
 c
as
el
oa
ds
, 
m
on
th
ly
 c
on
ta
ct
s, 
le
ss
 o
pp
or
tu
ni
ty
 to
 
bu
ild
 u
nd
er
st
an
di
ng
 
of
 n
ee
ds
. 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n 
20
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 1
 e
xp
er
im
en
ta
l 
of
fic
er
 in
 e
ac
h 
of
 4
 o
ff
ic
es
, 
in
te
ns
iv
e 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
in
 fa
m
ily
, 
w
or
k,
 a
nd
 so
ci
al
 si
tu
at
io
ns
, 
of
fe
nd
er
s v
is
ite
d 
in
 h
om
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
20
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 1
 e
xp
er
im
en
ta
l 
of
fic
er
 in
 e
ac
h 
of
 4
 o
ff
ic
es
, 
in
te
ns
iv
e 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
in
 fa
m
ily
, 
w
or
k,
 a
nd
 so
ci
al
 si
tu
at
io
ns
, 
of
fe
nd
er
s v
is
ite
d 
in
 h
om
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
20
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 1
 e
xp
er
im
en
ta
l 
of
fic
er
 in
 e
ac
h 
of
 4
 o
ff
ic
es
, 
in
te
ns
iv
e 
in
te
rv
en
tio
n 
in
 fa
m
ily
, 
w
or
k,
 a
nd
 so
ci
al
 si
tu
at
io
ns
, 
of
fe
nd
er
s v
is
ite
d 
in
 h
om
e 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
20
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 6
-m
on
th
 p
ro
gr
am
, 
w
ee
kl
y 
co
nt
ac
ts
. O
ff
ic
er
s 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 to
 d
ire
ct
 c
lie
nt
s t
o 
tre
at
m
en
t a
nd
 se
rv
ic
es
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
ne
ed
s. 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
Y
ou
th
 a
nd
 
ad
ul
t m
al
e 
pr
ob
at
io
ne
rs
 
on
 2
-3
 y
ea
r 
or
de
rs
 w
ith
 2
+ 
pr
io
rs
 si
nc
e 
ag
e 
14
. 
Y
ou
th
 a
nd
 
ad
ul
t f
em
al
e 
pr
ob
at
io
ne
rs
 
on
 2
-3
 y
ea
r 
or
de
rs
 w
ith
 1
+ 
pr
io
rs
 si
nc
e 
ag
e 
14
. 
Y
ou
th
 a
nd
 
ad
ul
t m
al
e 
pr
ob
at
io
ne
rs
 
on
 2
-3
 y
ea
r 
or
de
rs
 w
ith
 2
+ 
pr
io
rs
 si
nc
e 
ag
e 
14
. 
Ju
ve
ni
le
 
of
fe
nd
er
s 
ju
dg
ed
 
‘s
er
io
us
’ a
nd
 a
 
ph
ys
ic
al
 th
re
at
 
to
 o
th
er
s. 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
es
ig
n 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
St
ud
y 
Sh
ef
fie
ld
 
(M
al
es
) 1
97
6 
(F
ol
ka
rd
, 
Sm
ith
, &
 
Sm
ith
, 1
97
6)
 
Sh
ef
fie
ld
 
(F
em
al
es
) 
19
76
 
(F
ol
ka
rd
, 
Sm
ith
, &
 
Sm
ith
, 1
97
6)
 
St
af
fo
rd
sh
ire
 
19
76
 
(F
ol
ka
rd
, 
Sm
ith
, &
 
Sm
ith
, 1
97
6)
 
C
on
tra
 C
os
ta
 
SO
P 
19
86
 
(F
ag
an
 &
 
R
ei
na
rm
an
, 
19
86
) 
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O
ut
co
m
e 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
ar
re
st
s. 
N
o 
di
ff
er
en
ce
 fo
r 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
, 
ar
re
st
s, 
an
d 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
, 
ar
re
st
s, 
an
d 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
, 
ar
re
st
s, 
an
d 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. N
o 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
 in
 
co
nt
ro
l g
ro
up
. 
C
om
pa
ri
so
n 
15
0-
20
0:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
, 
in
fr
eq
ue
nt
, 
di
sc
re
tio
na
ry
 
co
nt
ac
t, 
ra
nd
om
 
dr
ug
 te
st
s, 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t 
as
si
st
an
ce
. 
25
0:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
, 1
 
fa
ce
-to
-f
ac
e 
co
nt
ac
t p
er
 
m
on
th
. 
Ex
is
tin
g 
IS
P.
 
50
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 2
 
fa
ce
-to
-f
ac
e 
vi
si
ts
 
an
d 
1 
ph
on
e 
ca
ll 
pe
r m
on
th
, n
o 
vi
ct
im
 a
w
ar
en
es
s. 
Ex
is
tin
g 
IS
P.
 1
2 
fa
ce
-to
-f
ac
e,
 1
0 
ph
on
e 
pe
r m
on
th
, 
ra
nd
om
 d
ru
g 
te
st
s, 
jo
b 
ve
rif
ic
at
io
n 
w
ee
kl
y.
 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n 
40
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 1
 fa
ce
-to
-f
ac
e 
co
nt
ac
t/d
ru
g 
te
st
 a
nd
 2
 p
ho
ne
 
ca
lls
 p
er
 w
ee
k,
 g
ra
du
al
ly
 
re
du
ce
d.
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
as
si
st
an
ce
, c
ou
ns
el
in
g,
 a
nd
 li
nk
s 
w
ith
 la
w
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t. 
33
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 3
-5
 fa
ce
-to
-f
ac
e 
co
nt
ac
ts
 a
nd
 2
 p
ho
ne
 c
al
ls
 p
er
 
w
ee
k,
 g
ra
du
al
ly
 re
du
ci
ng
. 
M
on
ito
rin
g 
ch
ec
ks
. 
19
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 4
 fa
ce
-to
-f
ac
e 
co
nt
ac
ts
, 2
 p
ho
ne
 c
al
ls
, 1
 d
ru
g 
te
st
 p
er
 w
ee
k,
 p
lu
s m
on
ito
rin
g 
ch
ec
ks
, g
ra
du
al
ly
 re
du
ce
d.
 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
ss
is
ta
nc
e,
 v
ic
tim
 
aw
ar
en
es
s, 
lin
ks
 w
ith
 la
w
 
en
fo
rc
em
en
t. 
A
ug
m
en
te
d 
IS
P 
w
ith
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
(p
as
si
ve
 
m
on
ito
rin
g,
 o
ff
ic
er
 c
he
ck
s)
. 4
0:
3 
ca
se
lo
ad
. R
eh
ab
ili
ta
tio
n,
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t, 
dr
ug
 te
st
s, 
m
on
ito
rin
g 
of
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
. S
am
e 
co
nt
ac
t l
ev
el
 a
s c
on
tro
ls
. 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
A
du
lts
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 
of
 fe
lo
ny
 a
nd
 
m
is
de
m
ea
no
r 
dr
ug
 u
se
, d
ru
g 
de
al
in
g,
 a
nd
 n
on
-
vi
ol
en
t d
ru
g-
re
la
te
d 
cr
im
e.
 
A
du
lts
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 
of
 fe
lo
ni
es
 a
nd
 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
as
 h
ig
h 
ris
k.
 
A
du
lts
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 
of
 fe
lo
ni
es
 a
nd
 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
as
 h
ig
h 
ris
k 
or
 c
on
vi
ct
ed
 
of
 se
rio
us
 c
rim
e.
 
Pr
is
on
er
s r
el
ea
se
d 
to
 IS
P 
or
 
pr
ob
at
io
ne
rs
 d
ue
 
to
 b
e 
re
vo
ke
d 
an
d 
re
tu
rn
ed
 to
 
pr
is
on
. D
ru
g 
in
vo
lv
ed
, h
ig
h 
ris
k/
ne
ed
. 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
es
ig
n 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
St
ud
y 
C
on
tra
 
C
os
ta
 C
o 
C
A
 1
99
0 
(P
et
er
si
lia
 
&
 T
ur
ne
r, 
19
90
) 
Lo
s 
A
ng
el
es
 C
o 
C
A
 1
99
0 
(P
et
er
si
lia
 
&
 T
ur
ne
r, 
19
90
) 
V
en
tu
ra
 C
o 
C
A
 1
99
0 
(P
et
er
si
lia
 
&
 T
ur
ne
r, 
19
90
) 
A
tla
nt
a 
G
A
 
19
92
 
(P
et
er
si
lia
, 
Tu
rn
er
, &
 
D
es
ch
en
es
, 
19
92
b)
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O
ut
co
m
e 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
, 
ar
re
st
s, 
an
d 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
, l
es
s 
lik
el
y 
on
 a
rr
es
ts
 
an
d 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
ar
re
st
s, 
bu
t l
es
s 
lik
el
y 
on
 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
, m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
on
 a
rr
es
ts
 
an
d 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
C
om
pa
ri
so
n 
85
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 1
 
of
fic
e 
vi
si
t p
er
 
m
on
th
, o
cc
as
io
na
l 
ho
m
e 
vi
si
ts
, n
o 
dr
ug
 
te
st
in
g 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t. 
70
:1
 m
ix
ed
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 
ro
ut
in
e 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 
ris
k 
de
te
rm
in
es
 
co
nt
ac
t l
ev
el
s. 
M
os
t 
on
 h
ig
he
st
 le
ve
l: 
2 
fa
ce
-to
-f
ac
e 
an
d 
2 
co
lla
te
ra
l/m
on
th
. 
D
is
cr
et
io
na
ry
 te
st
in
g.
 
85
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 1
 
of
fic
e 
vi
si
t p
er
 
m
on
th
, o
cc
as
io
na
l 
ho
m
e 
vi
si
ts
, n
o 
dr
ug
 
te
st
in
g 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t. 
60
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 
ro
ut
in
e 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 
2 
fa
ce
-to
-f
ac
e 
an
d 
1 
of
fic
e 
vi
si
t p
er
 
m
on
th
, d
is
cr
et
io
na
ry
 
te
st
in
g 
an
d 
tre
at
m
en
t 
re
fe
rr
al
. 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n 
25
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d 
w
ith
 1
0 
co
nt
ac
ts
 
pe
r m
on
th
 –
 m
ix
 o
f i
n-
pe
rs
on
 
of
fic
e/
ho
m
e 
vi
si
ts
 &
 te
le
ph
on
e.
 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
ss
is
ta
nc
e,
 
di
sc
re
tio
na
ry
 d
ru
g 
te
st
in
g.
 
35
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d.
 In
iti
al
ly
 1
6 
fa
ce
-
to
-f
ac
e,
 4
 p
ho
ne
 c
on
ta
ct
s a
nd
 8
 
dr
ug
 te
st
s p
er
 m
on
th
, g
ra
du
al
ly
 
de
cr
ea
si
ng
. C
ur
fe
w
. E
m
ph
as
is
 
on
 u
rin
al
ys
is
, u
na
nn
ou
nc
ed
 
vi
si
ts
 a
nd
 c
ol
la
te
ra
l c
on
ta
ct
 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t a
nd
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
m
an
da
te
d.
  
25
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d 
w
ith
 1
0 
co
nt
ac
ts
 
pe
r m
on
th
 –
 m
ix
 o
f i
n-
pe
rs
on
 
of
fic
e/
ho
m
e 
vi
si
ts
 &
 te
le
ph
on
e.
 
Em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
ss
is
ta
nc
e,
 
di
sc
re
tio
na
ry
 d
ru
g 
te
st
in
g.
 
35
:2
 c
as
el
oa
d.
 In
iti
al
ly
 1
2 
fa
ce
-
to
-f
ac
e 
co
nt
ac
ts
, 8
 u
na
nn
ou
nc
ed
 
ho
m
e 
vi
si
ts
, 4
 d
ru
g 
te
st
s p
er
 
m
on
th
. T
he
ra
pe
ut
ic
 a
pp
ro
ac
h:
 
co
un
se
lin
g,
 jo
b 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t, 
gr
ou
p 
th
er
ap
y.
 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
A
du
lt 
pr
op
er
ty
 
of
fe
nd
er
s (
m
os
tly
 
m
al
e)
, i
ni
tia
lly
 in
 
pr
is
on
 a
nd
 h
ig
h 
ris
k 
of
 re
ci
di
vi
sm
 
on
 p
ar
ol
e.
 
Pr
ob
at
io
ne
rs
 a
nd
 
pa
ro
le
es
 
co
nv
ic
te
d 
of
 d
ru
g 
of
fe
ns
e 
or
 
bu
rg
la
ry
 w
ith
 
dr
ug
 a
bu
se
 
hi
st
or
y.
 
A
du
lt 
pr
op
er
ty
 
of
fe
nd
er
s (
m
os
tly
 
m
al
e)
, i
ni
tia
lly
 in
 
pr
is
on
 a
nd
 h
ig
h 
ris
k 
of
 re
ci
di
vi
sm
 
on
 p
ar
ol
e.
 
Pr
ob
at
io
ne
rs
 a
nd
 
pa
ro
le
es
 w
ith
 
hi
gh
 ri
sk
 a
nd
 
ne
ed
. 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
es
ig
n 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
St
ud
y 
D
al
la
s T
X
 
19
92
 
(T
ur
ne
r &
 
Pe
te
rs
ili
a,
 
19
92
) 
D
es
 M
oi
ne
s 
IA
 1
99
2 
(P
et
er
si
lia
, 
Tu
rn
er
, &
 
D
es
ch
en
es
, 
19
92
b)
 
H
ou
st
on
 
TX
 1
99
2 
(T
ur
ne
r &
 
Pe
te
rs
ili
a,
 
19
92
) 
Sa
nt
a 
Fe
 
N
M
 1
99
2 
(P
et
er
si
lia
, 
Tu
rn
er
, &
 
D
es
ch
en
es
, 
19
92
b)
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O
ut
co
m
e 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
fa
il 
on
 a
rr
es
ts
, 
te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
, 
sl
ig
ht
ly
 le
ss
 o
n 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
, l
es
s 
lik
el
y 
on
 a
rr
es
ts
. 
N
o 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
 
in
 e
ith
er
 g
ro
up
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
, 
ar
re
st
s, 
an
d 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 fa
il 
on
 n
ew
 a
rr
es
ts
. 
C
om
pa
ri
so
n 
R
ou
tin
e 
pr
ob
at
io
n 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n.
 8
5:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
, 4
 fa
ce
-to
-
fa
ce
 c
on
ta
ct
s p
er
 
m
on
th
, a
dd
iti
on
al
 
co
nt
ac
ts
/te
st
s 
di
sc
re
tio
na
ry
. 
Ex
is
tin
g 
IS
P.
 
C
on
ta
ct
 le
ve
l s
am
e 
in
 b
ot
h 
gr
ou
ps
: 1
2 
fa
ce
-to
-f
ac
e 
an
d 
10
 
ph
on
e 
co
nt
ac
ts
 p
er
 
m
on
th
, r
an
do
m
 
dr
ug
 te
st
s, 
jo
b 
ve
rif
ic
at
io
n 
w
ee
kl
y.
 
R
ou
tin
e 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n:
 8
0:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
. 2
 fa
ce
-to
-
fa
ce
 a
nd
 2
 p
ho
ne
 
co
nt
ac
ts
 p
er
 m
on
th
. 
O
th
er
 c
on
ta
ct
 a
nd
 
te
st
in
g 
di
sc
re
tio
na
ry
. 
70
-1
00
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 
m
on
th
ly
 v
is
its
, 
lim
ite
d 
ac
ce
ss
 to
 
se
rv
ic
es
. 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n 
20
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d.
 F
oc
us
 o
n 
tre
at
m
en
t p
ar
tic
ip
at
io
n,
 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t a
nd
 d
ru
g 
te
st
in
g.
 In
iti
al
ly
 1
2 
fa
ce
-to
-
fa
ce
 c
on
ta
ct
s a
nd
 8
 d
ru
g 
te
st
s 
pe
r m
on
th
, g
ra
du
al
ly
 
de
cr
ea
si
ng
. 
A
ug
m
en
te
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
of
 
ex
is
tin
g 
IS
P 
w
ith
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
su
rv
ei
lla
nc
e 
(in
cr
ea
se
d 
dr
ug
 
te
st
in
g)
. 4
0:
3 
ca
se
lo
ad
. 
R
eh
ab
ili
ta
tio
n,
 e
m
pl
oy
m
en
t, 
dr
ug
 te
st
in
g,
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
of
 
ac
tiv
iti
es
. 
24
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d.
 In
iti
al
ly
 1
2 
fa
ce
-to
-f
ac
e 
co
nt
ac
ts
, 4
 
ph
on
e 
co
nt
ac
ts
, 4
 m
on
ito
rin
g 
ch
ec
ks
 p
er
 m
on
th
. 
D
is
cr
et
io
na
ry
 d
ru
g 
te
st
in
g.
 
C
ou
ns
el
in
g.
 H
al
fw
ay
 h
ou
se
 
an
d 
de
to
x.
 
12
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 w
ee
kl
y 
co
nt
ac
t w
ith
 c
ol
la
te
ra
l a
nd
 
ou
t o
f h
ou
rs
 c
on
ta
ct
s 
m
an
da
te
d.
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
as
si
st
an
ce
 a
nd
 e
du
ca
tio
n.
 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
Fe
lo
ny
 d
ru
g 
of
fe
nd
er
s l
ik
el
y 
to
 h
av
e 
hi
gh
 
re
ci
di
vi
sm
 a
nd
 
dr
ug
 d
ep
en
de
nt
. 
Pr
is
on
er
s r
el
ea
se
d 
to
 IS
P 
or
 
pr
ob
at
io
ne
rs
 d
ue
 
to
 b
e 
re
vo
ke
d 
an
d 
re
tu
rn
ed
 to
 
pr
is
on
. D
ru
g 
in
vo
lv
ed
, h
ig
h 
ris
k/
ne
ed
. 
H
ig
h 
ris
k 
pr
ob
at
io
ne
rs
 a
nd
 
pa
ro
le
es
 w
ith
 
dr
ug
 o
ff
en
se
s a
nd
 
hi
st
or
y 
of
 a
bu
se
. 
Se
rio
us
 ju
ve
ni
le
 
of
fe
nd
er
s 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
es
ig
n 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
St
ud
y 
Se
at
tle
 W
A
 
19
92
 
(P
et
er
si
lia
, 
Tu
rn
er
, &
 
D
es
ch
en
es
, 
19
92
b)
 
W
ay
cr
os
s 
G
A
 1
99
2 
(P
et
er
si
lia
, 
Tu
rn
er
, &
 
D
es
ch
en
es
, 
19
92
b)
 
W
in
ch
es
te
r 
V
A
 1
99
2 
(P
et
er
si
lia
, 
Tu
rn
er
, &
 
D
es
ch
en
es
, 
19
92
b)
 
Ph
ila
de
lp
hi
a 
PA
 1
99
3 
(S
on
th
ei
m
er
 
&
 
G
oo
ds
te
in
, 
19
93
) 
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O
ut
co
m
e 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 
ar
re
st
s;
 sl
ig
ht
ly
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
on
 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
 b
ut
 
le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 fa
il 
on
 a
rr
es
ts
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
fa
il 
on
 te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
 b
ut
 
le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 to
 fa
il 
on
 a
rr
es
ts
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t g
ro
up
 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 
fa
il 
on
 n
ew
 
ar
re
st
s. 
C
om
pa
ri
so
n 
R
eg
ul
ar
 p
ar
ol
e 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n.
 
La
rg
er
 
ca
se
lo
ad
s, 
fe
w
er
 c
on
ta
ct
s 
(a
pp
ro
x.
 3
 p
er
 
m
on
th
). 
10
0-
20
0:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
, l
es
s 
fr
eq
ue
nt
 c
on
ta
ct
 
(a
bo
ut
 h
al
f t
ha
t 
in
 tr
ea
tm
en
t 
gr
ou
p)
, n
o 
se
rv
ic
es
. 
20
0:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
, 
le
ss
 fr
eq
ue
nt
 
co
nt
ac
ts
 (a
bo
ut
 
ha
lf 
th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
in
 th
e 
tre
at
m
en
t 
gr
ou
p,
 n
o 
se
rv
ic
es
). 
R
ou
tin
e 
pa
ro
le
 
w
ith
 d
ru
g 
te
st
in
g 
on
ly
 
af
te
r a
rr
es
t. 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n 
12
-1
5:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
, 4
 
co
nt
ac
ts
/m
on
th
 re
du
ce
d 
ov
er
 
tim
e,
 p
er
io
d 
of
 h
ou
se
 a
rr
es
t 
fo
llo
w
ed
 b
y 
cu
rf
ew
, m
an
da
to
ry
 
40
 h
ou
rs
/w
ee
k 
of
 w
or
k,
 d
ru
g 
tre
at
m
en
t o
r e
du
ca
tio
n,
 ra
nd
om
 
w
ee
kl
y 
dr
ug
 te
st
s. 
20
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 a
bo
ut
 1
0 
co
nt
ac
ts
 a
 m
on
th
, d
ru
g 
te
st
in
g,
 
tre
at
m
en
t r
ef
er
ra
ls
, p
ro
ba
tio
n 
of
fic
er
s t
ra
in
ed
 in
 C
B
T.
 
25
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 1
-2
 c
on
ta
ct
s p
er
 
w
ee
k,
 d
ru
g 
te
st
in
g/
tre
at
m
en
t, 
ho
m
e 
an
d 
of
fic
e 
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si
ts
, 
br
ok
er
ag
e 
fo
r n
ee
ds
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t 
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d 
se
rv
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es
. 
Pa
ro
le
 w
ith
 e
nh
an
ce
d 
ro
ut
in
e 
un
sc
he
du
le
d 
dr
ug
 te
st
in
g 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
: 1
 e
ve
ry
 w
ee
k 
in
 
fir
st
 9
0 
da
ys
 o
f p
ar
ol
e 
th
en
 
bi
w
ee
kl
y.
 
Po
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la
tio
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ro
le
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id
er
ed
 a
 
“p
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 ri
sk
 
m
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ito
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g 
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” 
(h
ig
h 
ris
k)
. 
R
ur
al
 p
op
ul
at
io
n,
 
m
os
tly
 w
hi
te
 
m
al
es
 (y
ou
th
 a
nd
 
ad
ul
t),
 h
ig
he
r r
is
k 
an
d 
ne
ed
 le
ve
ls
. 
U
rb
an
 
po
pu
la
tio
n,
 
m
os
tly
 m
al
es
, 
yo
ut
h 
an
d 
ad
ul
t, 
hi
gh
er
 ri
sk
 a
nd
 
ne
ed
 le
ve
ls
. 
Y
ou
th
fu
l 
pa
ro
le
es
. 
G
en
er
al
ly
 se
rio
us
 
of
fe
nd
er
s w
ith
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ta
nc
e 
ab
us
e 
an
d 
ot
he
r 
pr
ob
le
m
s. 
R
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an
do
m
iz
ed
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nt
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d 
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R
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do
m
iz
ed
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R
an
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iz
ed
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nt
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al
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iz
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co
nt
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St
ud
y 
M
in
ne
so
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IS
R
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5 
(D
es
ch
en
es
, 
Tu
rn
er
, &
 
Pe
te
rs
ili
a,
 
19
95
) 
M
id
w
es
t 
19
98
 
(L
at
es
sa
 e
t 
al
., 
19
98
) 
N
or
th
ea
st
 
19
98
 
(L
at
es
sa
 e
t 
al
., 
19
98
) 
C
A
 D
ru
g 
Te
st
 2
00
2 
(H
aa
pa
ne
n 
&
 B
rit
to
n,
 
20
02
) 
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O
ut
co
m
e 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
gr
ou
p 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 fa
il 
on
 
ar
re
st
s a
nd
 
te
ch
ni
ca
l 
vi
ol
at
io
ns
 a
fte
r 
6 
m
on
th
s. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
gr
ou
p 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 fa
il 
on
 
fe
lo
ny
 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
gr
ou
p 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 fa
il 
on
 
fe
lo
ny
 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
gr
ou
p 
le
ss
 
lik
el
y 
to
 fa
il 
on
 
fe
lo
ny
 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
C
om
pa
ri
so
n 
40
-5
0:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
, 1
 
co
nt
ac
t p
er
 
m
on
th
. 
R
eg
ul
ar
 
pr
ob
at
io
n 
or
 
an
ti-
ga
ng
 u
ni
t. 
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
 
pr
ob
at
io
n 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 
30
-1
00
:1
 
ca
se
lo
ad
 
(v
ar
ie
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
si
te
s)
. 
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
 
pr
ob
at
io
n 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 
30
-1
00
:1
 
ca
se
lo
ad
 
(v
ar
ie
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
si
te
s)
. 
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
 
pr
ob
at
io
n 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 
30
-1
00
:1
 
ca
se
lo
ad
 
(v
ar
ie
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
si
te
s)
. 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n 
15
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d.
 In
te
ns
iv
e 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
, w
ho
le
 
fa
m
ily
 in
te
rv
en
tio
ns
, m
ul
ti-
ag
en
cy
 
w
or
ki
ng
, o
ff
ic
er
s a
nd
 se
rv
ic
e 
pr
ov
id
er
s. 
Ed
uc
at
io
n,
 h
om
e 
vi
si
ts
, 
tre
at
m
en
t, 
ed
uc
at
io
n,
 c
ur
fe
w
. 
25
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 te
am
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
to
 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 in
di
vi
du
al
iz
ed
 c
as
e 
pl
an
s f
or
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 a
nd
 
se
rv
ic
es
. P
ro
gr
am
s v
ar
ie
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
si
te
s. 
25
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 te
am
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
to
 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 in
di
vi
du
al
iz
ed
 c
as
e 
pl
an
s f
or
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 a
nd
 
se
rv
ic
es
. P
ro
gr
am
s v
ar
ie
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
si
te
s. 
25
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 te
am
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
to
 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 in
di
vi
du
al
iz
ed
 c
as
e 
pl
an
s f
or
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 a
nd
 
se
rv
ic
es
. P
ro
gr
am
s v
ar
ie
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
si
te
s. 
Po
pu
la
tio
n 
Y
ou
th
s a
ge
 1
5 
½
 
an
d 
un
de
r, 
w
ar
ds
 o
f 
co
ur
t, 
hi
gh
 ri
sk
, 
sc
ho
ol
 b
eh
av
io
r 
is
su
es
 a
nd
 fa
m
ily
 
pr
ob
le
m
s. 
H
ig
h 
ris
k,
 fi
rs
t t
im
e 
ju
ve
ni
le
 o
ff
en
de
rs
. 
H
ig
h 
ris
k,
 fi
rs
t t
im
e 
ju
ve
ni
le
 o
ff
en
de
rs
. 
H
ig
h 
ris
k,
 fi
rs
t t
im
e 
ju
ve
ni
le
 o
ff
en
de
rs
. 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
D
es
ig
n 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
tri
al
 
R
an
do
m
iz
ed
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
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al
 
St
ud
y 
Sa
n 
D
ie
go
 
C
A
 2
00
2 
(H
ow
ar
d 
et
 a
l.,
 
20
02
) 
B
en
to
n/
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an
kl
in
 
W
A
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00
3 
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ar
no
sk
i, 
20
03
) 
C
he
la
n/
 
D
ou
gl
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W
A
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00
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no
sk
i, 
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W
A
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00
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(B
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sk
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O
ut
co
m
e 
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ea
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en
t 
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p 
le
ss
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ke
ly
 
to
 fa
il 
on
 fe
lo
ny
 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
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Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
gr
ou
p 
le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 
to
 fa
il 
on
 fe
lo
ny
 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
gr
ou
p 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 fa
il 
on
 
fe
lo
ny
 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
Tr
ea
tm
en
t 
gr
ou
p 
le
ss
 li
ke
ly
 
to
 fa
il 
on
 fe
lo
ny
 
co
nv
ic
tio
ns
. 
C
om
pa
ri
so
n 
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
 
pr
ob
at
io
n 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 3
0-
10
0:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
 
(v
ar
ie
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
si
te
s)
. 
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
 
pr
ob
at
io
n 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 3
0-
10
0:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
 
(v
ar
ie
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
si
te
s)
. 
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
 
pr
ob
at
io
n 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 3
0-
10
0:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
 
(v
ar
ie
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
si
te
s)
. 
Tr
ad
iti
on
al
 
pr
ob
at
io
n 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 3
0-
10
0:
1 
ca
se
lo
ad
 
(v
ar
ie
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
si
te
s)
. 
In
te
rv
en
tio
n 
25
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 te
am
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
to
 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 in
di
vi
du
al
iz
ed
 c
as
e 
pl
an
s f
or
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 a
nd
 
se
rv
ic
es
. P
ro
gr
am
s v
ar
ie
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
si
te
s. 
25
:1
 c
as
el
oa
d,
 te
am
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
to
 
su
pe
rv
is
io
n,
 in
di
vi
du
al
iz
ed
 c
as
e 
pl
an
s f
or
 a
cc
ou
nt
ab
ili
ty
 a
nd
 
se
rv
ic
es
. P
ro
gr
am
s v
ar
ie
d 
ac
ro
ss
 
si
te
s. 
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:1
 c
as
el
oa
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 te
am
 a
pp
ro
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pe
rv
is
io
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 in
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 c
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pl
an
s f
or
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ou
nt
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ili
ty
 a
nd
 
se
rv
ic
es
. P
ro
gr
am
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ie
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ss
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te
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 c
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 c
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nt
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se
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ro
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s v
ar
ie
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te
s. 
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ad
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ad
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offenders. Crime & Delinq., 38, 539-556. 
 
Petersilia & Turner (1993). Evaluating Intensive 
Supervision Probation/Parole: results of a nationwide 
experiment. NIJ Research in Brief. 
Sontheimer & 
Goodstein (1993) 
Goodstein & Sontheimer (1997). The implementation of 
an intensive aftercare program for serious juvenile 
offenders: a case study. Crim. Just. Behav., 24, 332-59. 
Taxman, Yancey, & 
Bilanin (2006) 
Sachwald, Eley, & Taxman (2006). An ounce of 
prevention: proactive community supervision reduces 
violation behavior. Topics in Community Corrections, 31-8. 
 
Taxman (2006). A behavioral management approach to 
supervision: preliminary findings from Maryland’s 
Proactive Community Supervision (PCS) pilot program. 
Committee on Law & Just./Nat. Res. Council. 
 
Taxman (2006). The role of community supervision in 
addressing reentry from jails. Urban Institute/John Jay 
College/Montgomery Co., MD Reentry Roundtable. 
Taxman (2007). Reentry and supervision: one is impossible 
without the other. Corrections Today (April), 98-105. 
 
Taxman (2008). No illusions: offender and organizational 
change in Maryland’s Proactive Community Supervision 
efforts. Crim. Pub. Pol., 7, 275-302. 
Wiebush et al. (2005) Wiebush, McNulty, & Le (2000). Implementation of the 
Intensive community-based Aftercare Program. OJJDP 
Juvenile Justice Bulletin. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of 
Justice Programs. 
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Excluded Studies 
Study Reference Reason for Exclusion 
Adams (2001) 
Specialized sex offender probation in Cook 
County links supervision, treatment. 
IL Criminal Justice Information Auth. 
“On Good Authority,” 4(7), March. 
Unmatched controls. 
Adams & Vetter (1971) 
Probation caseload size and recidivism rate. 
Brit. J. Criminol., 11, 390-3. 
Unmatched controls. 
Agopian (1990) 
The impact of intensive supervision probation 
on gang-drug offenders. 
Criminal Justice Policy Rev., 4, 214-22. 
Outcomes are only reported for the 
treatment group. 
Altschuler & Armstrong (1994) 
Intensive aftercare for high-risk juveniles: 
policies and procedures. Program summary. 
US Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile 
Justice & Delinquency Prevention. 
No evaluation data reported. 
Austin, Quigley, & Cuvelier (1989) 
Evaluating the impact of Ohio’s community 
corrections programs: public safety and costs. 
National Council on Crime & Delinquency. 
Unmatched controls. 
Barnoski (2000) 
Intensive parole model for high risk juvenile 
offenders: interim outcomes for the first 
cohort of youth. 
Washington State Inst. for Public Policy  
Unmatched controls. 
Barton & Butts (1990) 
Viable options: intensive supervision 
programs for juvenile delinquents. 
Crime & Delinquency, 36,  238-256. 
 
Barton & Butts (1991) 
Intensive supervision alternatives for 
adjudicated juveniles. 
In Armstrong (ed.): Intensive interventions 
with high-risk youths: promising approaches 
in juvenile probation and parole, 317-340. 
Control group did not receive regular 
probation supervision (90% 
incarcerated). 
Bayens, Manske & Smykla (1998) 
The impact of the ‘new penology’ on ISP 
Criminal Justice Rev., 23, 51-62. 
Unmatched controls. 
No crime outcomes. 
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Study Reference Reason for Exclusion 
Benekos & Sonnenberg (1998) 
An evaluation of Erie County intermediate 
punishment programs. 
PA Commission on Crime & Delinquency. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
Bennett (1987) 
A reassessment of intensive service probation. 
In McCarthy (ed.): Intermediate punishments: 
intensive supervision, home confinement and 
electronic supervision, 113-132. 
Treatment and control conditions not 
sufficiently different in terms of 
contact/caseload size changes. More a 
test of a case planning strategy. 
Bonta, Wallace-Capretta, & Rooney (2000) 
A quasi-experimental evaluation of an 
intensive rehabilitation supervision program. 
Crim. Justice & Behavior, 27, 312-329. 
Primarily a test of electronic 
monitoring. 
Boudouris & Turnbull (1985) 
Shock probation in Iowa. 
J. Off. Counseling Services & Rehab., 9(4), 
53-67. 
Unmatched controls consisting of 
mixed corrections population 
(prisoners, parolees, probationers etc.) 
Brownlee & Joanes (1993) 
Intensive probation for young adult offenders: 
evaluating the impact of a non-custodial 
sentence. 
Brit. J. Criminol., 33, 216-230. 
No comparison group. 
Burkhart (1969) 
The parole work unit programme: an 
evaluation report. 
Brit. J. Criminol., 9, 125-147. 
Unmatched controls. 
Clear & Shapiro (1986) 
Identifying high risk probationers for 
supervision in the community: the Oregon 
model. 
Fed. Prob., 50, 134-141. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity (tests the validity of a 
classification model). 
Cochran, Corbett, & Byrne (1986) 
Intensive probation supervision in 
Massachusetts: a case study in change. 
Fed. Prob., 50, 124-133. 
Not a matched design at the subject 
level. 
Cox, Bantley, & Roscoe (2005) 
Evaluation of the Court Support Services 
Division’s Probation Transition Program and 
Technical Violation Unit. 
Central CT State Univ. 
Unmatched controls. 
Dawson & Cuppleditch (2007) 
An impact assessment of the Prolific and 
other Priority Offender programme. 
Home Office Online Report 08/07. 
Insufficient data to calculate effect 
size. 
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Study Reference Reason for Exclusion 
Deschenes, Turner, & Petersilia (1995) 
Minnesota ICS program (ICR is eligible) 
See reference in Bibliography. 
Incarcerated controls. 
Diskind & Klonsky (1964) 
A second look at the New York State parole 
drug experiment. 
Fed. Prob., 28, 34-40. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
No comparison group. 
Drake & Barnoski (2006) 
The effects of parole on recidivism: juvenile 
offenders released from Washington State 
institutions: final report. 
Washington State Inst. for Public Policy  
Control group did not receive regular 
probation/parole supervision 
(unsupervised release). 
England (1955) 
A study of postprobation recidivism among 
five hundred federal offenders. 
Fed. Prob., 19, 10-15. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
No comparison group. 
English, Chadwick, & Pullen (1994) 
Colorado’s intensive supervision probation: 
report of findings. 
CO Dept of Public Safety. 
 
English, Pullen, & Colling-Chadwick 
(1996) 
Comparison of intensive supervision 
probation and community corrections 
clientele. 
CO Dept of Public Safety. 
Unmatched controls. 
Control group did not receive regular 
probation supervision (halfway 
house). 
Erwin (1987) 
Evaluation of intensive probation supervision 
in Georgia. 
Georgia Dept. of Corrections. 
Unmatched controls. 
Feinberg (1991) 
Juvenile intensive supervision: a longitudinal 
evaluation of program effectiveness. 
In Armstrong (ed.): Intensive interventions 
with high-risk youths: promising approaches 
in juvenile probation and parole, 423-447. 
Unmatched controls. 
Compared programs did not differ 
substantially in intensity. 
GAO (1993) 
Intensive Probation Supervision: mixed 
effectiveness in controlling crime. 
U.S. General Accounting Office, Report to the 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime & 
Criminal Justice, Committee on the Judiciary, 
House of Representatives. 
Unmatched controls. 
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Study Reference Reason for Exclusion 
Giblin (2002) 
Using police officers to enhance the 
supervision of juvenile probationers: an 
evaluation of the Anchorage CAN program. 
Crime & Delinquency, 48, 116-137. 
Intensive supervision component 
provided entirely by police officers 
rather than probation officers. 
Gilbert (1977) 
Alternate routes: a diversion project in the 
juvenile justice system. 
Evaluation Quarterly, 1(2), 301-318. 
No comparison group. 
Pretrial program. 
Gray et al. (2005) 
Intensive Supervision and Surveillance 
Program: the final report. 
Youth Justice Board, U.K. 
Program was not consistently 
delivered by probation: not possible to 
distinguish outcomes. Program more 
of an addition to supervision. 
Green & Phillips (1990) 
An examination of an intensive probation for 
alcohol offenders: five-year follow-up. 
Int. J. Off. Ther. Comp. Criminol., 34, 31-42. 
No comparison group. 
Haas & Latessa (1995) 
Intensive supervision in a rural county: 
diversion and outcome. 
In Smykla & Selke (eds.): Intermediate 
sanctions: sentencing in the 1990s, 153-169.  
Unmatched controls. 
Haghighi (1999) 
A survey of juvenile intensive supervision 
probation (ISP) programs in Texas. 
TX Juvenile Probation Commission.` 
No evaluation data reported. 
Hanley (2002) 
Risk differentiation and intensive supervision: 
a meaningful union? 
Ph.D. Diss., Univ. of Cincinnati 
 
Hanley (2006) 
Appropriate services: examining the case 
classification principle. 
J. Off. Rehab., 42, 1-22. 
Secondary data analysis of a 
randomized controlled trial, but 
random assignment is not maintained. 
Hanlon et al. (1998) 
The response of drug abuser parolees to a 
combination of treatment and intensive 
supervision. 
Prison J., 78, 31-44. 
No comparison group. 
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Study Reference Reason for Exclusion 
Hanlon et al. (1999) 
The relative effects of three approaches to the 
parole supervision of narcotic addicts and 
cocaine abusers. 
Prison J., 79, 163-181. 
Primarily a test of a treatment program 
not delivered by probation/parole 
officers. 
Harrell, Adams, & Gouvis (1994) 
Evaluation of the impact of systemwide drug 
testing in Multnomah County, Oregon 
Urban Institute 
Unmatched controls. 
No offender-level outcomes for post-
trial probation experiment. 
Harrell et al. (2003) 
The impact evaluation of the Maryland Break 
the Cycle initiative. 
Urban Institute. 
Unmatched controls. 
Harris, Gingerich, & Whittaker (2004) 
The ‘effectiveness’ of differential supervision. 
Crime & Delinquency, 50, 235-271. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity (more risk classification). 
Unmatched controls. 
Irish (1990) 
Crime, criminal justice and probation: 
preliminary analysis of selected programs in 
the Criminal Division for 1989. 
Nassau Co. Probation Dept. 
Review of programs with unmatched 
comparisons. 
Jernigan & Kronick (1992) 
Intensive parole: the more you watch, the 
more you catch. 
J. Off. Rehab., 17(3/4), 65-76. 
Unmatched controls. 
Johnson, Austin, & Davies (2003) 
Banking low-risk offenders: is it a good 
investment? 
Inst. on Crime, Justice & Corrections, George 
Washington Univ. 
Unmatched controls. 
Kurtz & Linnemann (2006) 
Improving probation through client strengths: 
evaluating strength based treatments for at 
risk youth. 
Western Criminol. Rev., 7, 9-19. 
Unmatched controls. 
Some outcomes reported for treatment 
group only. 
Land, McCall & Williams (1990) 
Something that works in juvenile justice: an 
evaluation of the North Carolina court 
counselors’ intensive protective supervision 
randomized experimental project 1987-1989. 
Evaluation Review 14, 574-606. 
Supervision provided by juvenile 
court to mostly non-criminal juvenile 
status offenders (runaways, truants 
etc.) 
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Study Reference Reason for Exclusion 
Lasater et al. (n.d.) 
School-based probation intervention results 
with high-risk youth in Montana. 
Character Development Systems, LLC. 
Primarily a test of cognitive-
behavioral therapy. 
Unmatched controls. 
Latessa & Travis (1988) 
The effects of intensive supervision with 
alcoholic probationers. 
J. Off. Counseling, Services & Rehab., 12(2), 
175-190. 
Limited matching of controls. Higher 
risk and need offenders selected into 
treatment group. 
Latessa & Vito (1988) 
The effects of intensive supervision on shock 
probationers.  
J. Crim. Just., 16, 319-330 
Not independent of larger study in 
Latessa (1987). 
Lattimore et al. (2005) 
Evaluation of the juvenile Breaking the Cycle 
program 
RTI International/NIJ 
Probation component is not a key part 
of the program.  Increased supervision 
and drug testing are outcomes rather 
than part of the process. 
Martin & Inciardi (1997) 
Case management outcomes for drug-
involved offenders. 
Prison J., 77, 168-183. 
Primarily a test of a treatment program 
not delivered by probation officers. 
No crime outcomes. 
Maupin (1993) 
Risk classification systems and the provision 
of juvenile aftercare. 
Crime & Delinquency, 39, 90-105. 
No comparison group or crime 
outcomes.  Investigates how 
supervision intensity differs by risk 
level. 
Meisel (2001) 
Relationships and juvenile offenders: the 
effects of Intensive Aftercare Supervision. 
Prison J., 81, 206-245. 
No crime outcomes. 
MI Dept of Corrections (2002) 
530 probationers use automated reporting 
kiosks (Jan. 17). 
MI Dept of Corrections Staff News Bulletin. 
No evaluation data reported. No 
indication that an evaluation was 
conducted. 
MN Office of the Legislative Auditor 
(2005) 
Community supervision of sex offenders: 
evaluation report. 
No evaluation data or crime outcomes 
reported. 
Nath (1974) 
Intensive Supervision Program: final report. 
Florida Parole Commission. 
Insufficient data to calculate effect 
sizes: sample sizes not provided for 
recidivism outcomes. 
National Council on Crime & Delinquency 
(2001) 
Evaluation of the RYSE program: Alameda 
County Probation Department. 
Pre-trial program examining 
placement into treatment and services. 
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Study Reference Reason for Exclusion 
Otoyo (1983) 
A study of the relationship of increased 
supervisory contacts to recidivism. 
Ed.D. Diss., Pepperdine Univ. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity (looked at type of contact 
rather than frequency). 
No comparison group. 
Petersilia (1989) 
Probation and felony offenders. 
Fed. Prob., 49, 4-9. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
Petersilia & Turner (1990) 
Los Angeles Electronic Supervision 
(other programs, including Los Angeles non-
EM, are eligible). 
See reference in Bibliography. 
Electronic monitoring is the only 
difference between treatment and 
control programs. 
Petersilia & Turner (1990) 
Diverting prisoners to intensive probation: 
results of an experiment in Oregon. 
RAND Corp. 
 
Petersilia & Turner (1993) 
Evaluating Intensive Supervision 
Probation/Parole: results of a national 
experiment. 
[Marion Co., OR & Milwaukee, WI only. 
Other studies eligible.] 
NIJ Research in Brief 
Incarcerated controls. 
Petersilia, Turner, & Deschenes (1992b) 
Macon, GA program (others are eligible) 
See reference in Bibliography. 
Electronic monitoring is the only 
difference between treatment and 
control programs. 
Reichel & Sudbrack (1994) 
Differences among eligibles: who gets an ISP 
sentence? 
Fed. Prob., 58, 51-58. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
Rengifo & Scott-Hayward (2008) 
Assessing the effectiveness of intermediate 
sanctions: Multnomah County, Oregon. 
Vera Inst. of Justice Report Summary. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
Rhyne & Hamblin (2008) 
What works with the DV offender? Services, 
sanctions and supervision. 
Multnomah Co. Dept of Community Justice, 
Portland, OR. 
No comparison group. 
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Robertson (2000) 
Comparison of community-based models for 
youth offenders. Part 1: Program 
effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. 
Soc. Sci. Res. Cen., MS State Univ./NIDA 
Unmatched controls. 
Robertson & Blackburn (1984) 
An assessment of treatment effectiveness by 
case classification. 
Fed. Prob., 48, 34-38. 
Primarily a test of treatment 
conditions in probation sentences. 
Unmatched controls. 
Romero & Williams (1983) 
Group psychotherapy and intensive probation 
supervision with sex offenders. 
Fed. Prob., 47, 36-41. 
Primarily a test of group 
psychotherapy. 
Rossman et al. (1999) 
Confronting relapse and recidivism: case 
management and aftercare services in the 
OPTS program. 
Urban Institute. 
Insufficient data to calculate effect 
size. 
Rubin & Dodge (2009) 
Probation in Maine: setting the baseline. 
Univ. of Southern ME Muskie School of 
Public Service/NIC 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
Sawyer (1975) 
The effects of community probation unit 
services versus conventional probation 
services on recidivism by juvenile 
probationers. 
Ph.D. Diss., Brigham Young Univ. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
Seng et al. (2000) 
A comparison of evaluation findings on sex 
offender probation projects in six Illinois 
counties. 
IL Criminal Justice Information Auth. 
No systematic change in intensity. 
No regular probation comparison 
group. 
See also Stalans, Seng, & Yarnold 
(2002). 
Serin, Vuong, & Briggs (2003) 
Intensive supervision practices: a preliminary 
examination. 
Correctional Service of Canada. 
Unmatched controls/control group 
consists of ISP exclusions. 
Simon (2008) 
Effectiveness of the Probation and Parole 
Service Delivery Model (PPSDM) in reducing 
recidivism. 
M.A. Thesis, Univ. of Saskatchewan 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
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Smith (1984) 
Alabama prison option: supervised intensive 
restitution program. 
Fed. Prob., 48, 32-35. 
No comparison group. 
No crime outcomes. 
Solomon, Kachnowski, & Bhati (2005) 
Does parole work? Analyzing the impact of 
postprison supervision on rearrest outcomes. 
Urban Institute. 
Control group did not receive regular 
probation supervision (compares 
parolees to prisoners released without 
parole). 
Stalans, Seng, & Yarnold (2002) 
Long-term impact evaluation of specialized 
sex offender probation programs in Lake, 
DuPage, & Winnebago Counties. 
IL Criminal Justice Information Auth. 
Stalans et al. (n.d.) 
Process and initial impact evaluation of the 
Cook County Adult Probation Department’s 
sex offender program. 
No publication details. 
Unmatched controls. 
See also Seng et al. (2000) 
Taxman & Thanner (2006) 
Risk, need, and responsivity (RNR): it all 
depends. 
Crime & Delinquency, 52, 28-51. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity: experiment tests seamless 
treatment delivery (sometimes via 
probation, but not always). 
Texas Adult Probation Commission (1988) 
Recidivism study on intensive supervision, 
specialized caseloads, and restitution centers 
for 1985-1987. 
Not an evaluation. Outcome 
comparisons for different types of 
disposals. 
Travis County (n.d.) 
The probation experiment. 
No publication details. 
Limited information on experiment, 
but does not appear to be a test of 
probation supervision intensity. 
No comparison group. 
Trotter (1993 & 1995) 
The supervision of offenders – what works? 
Australian Criminol. Res. Council. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity (evaluates a probation officer 
training program). 
Trusty & Arrigona (2001) 
Project Spotlight: first year implementation 
overview and recommendations for 
improvement. 
TX Criminal Justice Policy Council. 
Trusty & Arrigona (2001) 
Project Spotlight: program overview, early 
implementation issues and outcome measures. 
TX Criminal Justice Policy Council. 
No comparison group. 
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Turner & Greene (1999) 
The FARE probation experiment: 
implementation and outcomes of day fines for 
felony offenders in Maricopa County. 
Justice Sys. J., 21, 1-21. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity (tests fine payment condition 
with no probation supervision). 
Turner & Jannetta (2007) 
Implementation and early outcomes for the 
San Diego High Risk Sex Offender (HRSO) 
GPS pilot program 
Cen. for Evidence-Based Corrections, UC 
Irvine. 
Unmatched controls (subjects who 
score highly on an instrument are 
assigned to treatment). 
Turner, Petersilia, Deschenes (1992) 
Evaluating Intensive Supervision 
Probation/Parole (ISP) for drug offenders. 
Crime & Delinquency, 38, 539-556. 
Insufficient data to calculate effect 
sizes. 
See also Petersilia & Turner (1993). 
Turner et al. (2002) 
Evaluation of the South Oxnard Challenge 
Project 1997-2001. 
RAND Corporation. 
Supervision for the treatment group 
not always provided by probation 
officers. 
Ulmer & van Asten (2004) 
Restrictive Intermediate Punishments and 
recidivism in Pennsylvania. 
Fed. Sent. Rep., 16, 182-187. 
Unmatched controls. 
Van Vleet et al. (2002) 
Evaluation of Utah’s Early Intervention 
Mandate: the juvenile sentencing guidelines 
and intermediate sanctions. 
National Institute of Justice. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
Virginia Department of Corrections (1988) 
Intensive Supervision Program (ISP) final 
evaluation report: client characteristics and 
supervision outcomes: a caseload comparison. 
Unmatched incarcerated or probation 
violator controls. 
Vito (1986) 
Felony probation and recidivism: replication 
and response. 
Fed. Prob., 50, 17-25. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
Wagner & Baird (1993) 
Evaluation of the Florida Community Control 
Program. 
National Institute of Justice. 
Incarcerated controls. 
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Weatherburn & Trimboli (2008) 
Community supervision and rehabilitation: 
two studies of offenders on supervised bonds. 
New South Wales Bureau of Crime Statistics 
& Research: Crime & Justice Bulletin. 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
Wiebush (1993) 
Juvenile intensive supervision: the impact on 
felony offenders diverted from institutional 
placement. 
Crime & Delinquency, 39, 68-89. 
Unmatched controls. 
Sample may overlap with another 
eligible study (Latessa & Vito, 1988). 
Wilson, Denton, & Williams (1987) 
Intensive Supervision Program evaluation: 
year two. 
Kentucky Corrections Cabinet. 
 
Wilson (1987) 
Intensive supervision in Kentucky: program 
procedures and evaluation. 
National Institute of Justice. 
No comparison group. 
Wilson, Naro, & Austin (2007) 
Innovations in probation: assessing New York 
City’s automated reporting system. 
JFA Institute. 
No comparison group. 
Wisconsin Dept of Health & Social Services 
(1989) 
Reducing criminal risk: an evaluation of the 
high risk offender intensive supervision 
project. 
Unmatched controls. 
Wodahl (2007) 
The efficacy of graduated sanctions in 
reducing technical violations among 
probationers and parolees: an evaluation of 
the Wyoming Department of Corrections’ 
intensive supervision program. 
Ph.D. Diss., University of NE at Omaha 
Not a test of probation supervision 
intensity. 
No comparison group. 
Worrall et al. (2003) 
Intensive supervision and monitoring projects. 
Home Office Online Report 42/03. 
No evaluation data reported. 
Worrall et al. (2004) 
An analysis of the relationship between 
probation caseloads and property crime rates 
in California counties. 
J. Crim. Justice 32, 231-241. 
No comparison group (macro-level 
analysis of the relationship of 
statewide crime rates to statewide 
natural increases in caseload size). 
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Appendix E: Philadelphia APPD Low-Intensity Supervision Protocol 
 
 Office reporting: Scheduled office visit once every six months.  Contact focused on 
probation officer review of residence, employment, payments on 
fines/costs/restitution, and compliance with other conditions. 
 Telephone reporting: Scheduled telephone report every six months, occurring 
approximately midway between office visits.  Contact focused on confirmation of 
details described above.  Clients not restricted from initiating telephone contact. 
 Drug testing: Only administered if required by court order.  Probation officer will 
order a FIR evaluation after no more than three positive urine tests, and is free to refer 
offender to drug treatment if the offender requests it. 
 Missed contacts: Arrest warrants issued if no case contact for six months.  If the 
offender surrenders positively, the warrant may be removed with no criminal 
sanction. 
 
(Adapted from Ahlman & Kurtz, 2008). 
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Appendix F: Logistic, Zero-Inflated Negative Binomial, and Two-Stage 
Least Squares Regression Models Without Jail Time Controls 
 
Prevalence of Recidivism (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up, Original Table 2.2) 
 
Logistic Regression Number of observations = 1,559 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 47.14 
 Pr > χ2 = .000 
Log likelihood = -787.658 Pseudo R2 = .029 
Term Odds Ratio S.E. z p 
Treatment group 1.03 .129 .20 .844 
West probation region .73 .109 -2.12 .034 
Male 1.35 .186 2.20 .028 
White 1.06 .167 .34 .733 
Age at RA .98 .006 -3.88 .000 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .72 .164 -1.43 .153 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .57 .138 -2.32 .020 
Income $40,000 or more .29 .081 -4.41 .000 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (any charged offense) .79 .138 -1.36 .174 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 for goodness-of-fit (8 d.f., 10 groups) = 5.53, p ≤ .699 
 
Prevalence of Recidivism (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up, Original Table 2.7) 
 
Logistic Regression Number of observations = 1,559 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 37.48 
 Pr > χ2 = .000 
Log likelihood = -287.943 Pseudo R2 = .061 
Term Odds Ratio S.E. z p 
Treatment group .86 .205 -.63 .527 
West probation region .68 .193 -1.36 .173 
Male 3.82 1.323 3.87 .000 
White 1.03 .305 .12 .905 
Age at RA .97 .012 -2.89 .004 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .63 .253 -1.14 .254 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .41 .179 -2.04 .042 
Income $40,000 or more .21 .113 -2.92 .004 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged violent off.) 2.03 .921 1.55 .121 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 for goodness-of-fit (8 d.f., 10 groups) = 9.63, p ≤ .292
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Prevalence of Recidivism (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow Up, Original Table 2.13) 
 
Logistic Regression Number of observations = 1,559 
 Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 34.79 
 Pr > χ2 = .000 
Log likelihood = -471.825 Pseudo R2 = .036 
Term Odds Ratio S.E. z p 
Treatment group .89 .157 -.65 .517 
West probation region .98 .207 -.08 .939 
Male 2.08 .437 3.48 .001 
White 1.22 .270 .92 .359 
Age at RA .97 .009 -3.85 .000 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .62 .187 -1.59 .113 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .49 .160 -2.19 .029 
Income $40,000 or more .29 .111 -3.24 .001 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged drug off.) .96 .503 -.08 .937 
Hosmer-Lemeshow χ2 for goodness-of-fit (8 d.f., 10 groups) = 14.46, p ≤ .071 
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Frequency of Recidivism (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up, Original Table 2.3) 
 
Zero-Inflated Negative Number of observations = 1,559 
Binomial Regression Nonzero observations = 335 
 Zero observations = 1,224 
Inflation model = logit Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 27.43 
Log likelihood= -1692.398 Pr > χ2 = .001 
Full Model Incidence Rate Ratio S.E. z p 
Treatment group .93 .142 -.44 .658 
West probation region 1.17 .220 .83 .408 
Male 1.98 .330 4.11 .000 
White 1.13 .203 .68 .495 
Age at RA .98 .008 -2.12 .034 
Income $20,000-$29,999 1.53 .425 1.55 .122 
Income $30,000-$39,999 1.38 .432 1.02 .310 
Income $40,000 or more 1.10 .391 .27 .789 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (any charged offense) 1.24 .249 1.09 .277 
Inflated Model b S.E. z p 
Treatment group -.060 .154 -.39 .696 
West probation region .432 .189 2.28 .022 
Male -.097 .176 -.55 .582 
White -.018 .193 .09 .925 
Age at RA .023 .008 2.91 .004 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .612 .332 1.84 .065 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .858 .356 2.41 .016 
Income $40,000 or more 1.554 .397 3.91 .000 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (any charged offense) .340 .195 1.59 .112 
Constant -1.080 .561 -1.93 .054 
Ln(Alpha) .588 .207 2.84 .005 
Alpha 1.800 .373   
Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 4.03, p < .001 
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Frequency of Recidivism (Violent Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up, Original Table 2.8) 
 
Zero-Inflated Negative Number of observations = 1,559 
Binomial Regression Nonzero observations = 77 
 Zero observations = 1,482 
Inflation model = logit Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 5.20 
Log likelihood = -509.488 Pr > χ2 = .817 
Full Model Incidence Rate Ratio S.E. z p 
Treatment group .93 .218 -.32 .748 
West probation region .95 .288 -.18 .858 
Male 1.05 .373 .13 .894 
White 1.03 .326 .09 .928 
Age at RA .99 .015 -.75 .452 
Income $20,000-$29,999 1.64 .725 1.12 .263 
Income $30,000-$39,999 1.18 .681 .28 .779 
Income $40,000 or more 1.02 .642 .04 .969 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged violent off.) .48 .263 -1.34 .181 
Inflated Model b S.E. z p 
Treatment group .133 .243 .55 .584 
West probation region .396 .292 1.36 .175 
Male -1.340 .351 -3.82 .000 
White -.034 .300 -.11 .909 
Age at RA .034 .013 2.69 .007 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .517 .418 1.24 .216 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .918 .461 1.99 .047 
Income $40,000 or more 1.533 .553 2.77 .006 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged violent off.) -1.198 .871 -1.38 .169 
Constant 1.577 .734 2.15 .032 
Ln(Alpha) -.216 .283 -.76 .445 
Alpha .806 .228   
Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 3.95, p < .001. 
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Frequency of Recidivism (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow-Up, Original Table 2.14) 
 
Zero-Inflated Negative  Number of observations = 1,559 
Binomial Regression Nonzero observations = 148 
 Zero observations = 1,411 
Inflation model = logit Likelihood Ratio χ2 (9 d.f.) = 14.38 
Log likelihood = -737.786 Pr > χ2 = .109 
Full Model Incidence Rate Ratio S.E. z p 
Treatment group .83 .134 -1.18 .237 
West probation region 1.20 .231 .97 .334 
Male 1.47 .323 1.75 .080 
White .86 .175 -.76 .447 
Age at RA .98 .008 -1.97 .049 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .96 .261 -.16 .876 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .89 .276 -.36 .717 
Income $40,000 or more .59 .223 -1.38 .166 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged drug off.) 1.81 .902 1.19 .234 
Inflated Model b S.E. z p 
Treatment group .049 .190 .26 .797 
West probation region .084 .228 .37 .712 
Male -.607 .235 -2.58 .010 
White -.268 .241 -1.11 .266 
Age at RA .030 .010 .307 .002 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .482 .324 1.49 .137 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .699 .354 1.98 .048 
Income $40,000 or more 1.064 .425 2.51 .012 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (charged drug off.) .168 .544 .03 .757 
Constant .662 .557 1.19 .235 
Ln(Alpha) -.990 .403 -2.46 .014 
Alpha .372 .150   
Vuong test of zero-inflated vs. standard negative binomial: z = 3.57, p < .001 
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Instrumental Variables Model: Prevalence of Recidivism (All Offenses, 2-Year Follow-
Up, Original Table 2.5) 
 
 First Stage Treatment Take-Up 
Reduced Form (ITT) 
Post-RA Any Off. 
 Observations = 1,559 Observations = 1,559 
 R2 = .655 R2 = .031 
 Adjusted R2 = .651 Adjusted R2 = .020 
Instruments b (S.E.) b (S.E.) 
Assigned LIS .823 (.089)*** -.092 (.123) 
Assigned LIS*West -.084 (.035)* .027 (.049) 
Assigned LIS*Male .015 (.032) -.009 (.044) 
Assigned LIS*White -.025 (.038) .036 (.052) 
Assigned LIS*Age -.000 (.001) -.000 (.002) 
Assigned LIS*Income20 .034 (.058) .080 (.080) 
Assigned LIS*Income30 .087 (.061) .091 (.084) 
Assigned LIS*Income40 .041 (.067) .071 (.093) 
Assigned LIS*Prior offending -.034 (.027) .048 (.038) 
Exogenous   
West probation region .055 (.025)* -.066 (.035) 
Male .004 (.023) .052 (.032) 
White .007 (.027) -.009 (.037) 
Age at RA .001 (.001) -.004 (.001)** 
Income $20,000-$29,999 -.007 (.040) -.094 (.055) 
Income $30,000-$39,999 -.013 (.042) -.139 (.059)* 
Income $40,000 or more -.005 (.047) -.232 (.065)*** 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (any offense) -.004 (.022) -.055 (.031) 
Constant -.052 (.064) .509 (.089)*** 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Second-Stage Instrumental Number of observations = 1,559 
Variables Regression Wald χ2 (9 d.f.) = 46.13 
 Pr > χ2 = .000 
Any New Charged Offense R2 = .028 
Term b S. E. Z p 
Predicted Treatment Take-up .006 .026 .22 .827 
Constant .459 .062 7.45 .000 
Controlling for region, gender, race, age, SES and offending history. 
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Instrumental Variables Model: Prevalence of Recidivism (Violent Offenses, 2-Year 
Follow-Up, Original Table 2.11) 
 
 First Stage 
Treatment Take-Up 
Reduced Form (ITT) 
Post-RA Violent Off. 
 Observations = 1,559 Observations = 1,559 
 R2 = .654 R2 = .028 
 Adjusted R2 = .650 Adjusted R2 = .017 
Instruments b (S.E.) b (S.E.) 
Assigned LIS .818 (.089)*** -.089 (.065) 
Assigned LIS*West -.083 (.035)* .018 (.026) 
Assigned LIS*Male .014 (.032) .007 (.023) 
Assigned LIS*White -.022 (.038) .051 (.028) 
Assigned LIS*Age -.001 (.001) -.000 (.001) 
Assigned LIS*Income20 .034 (.058) .065 (.042) 
Assigned LIS*Income30 .085 (.061) .058 (.045) 
Assigned LIS*Income40 .036 (.067) .031 (.049) 
Assigned LIS*Prior offending -.011 (.100) -.093 (.073) 
Exogenous   
West probation region .055 (.025)* -.027 (.018) 
Male .004 (.023) .045 (.017)** 
White .007 (.027) -.025 (.020) 
Age at RA .001 (.001) -.002 (.001)* 
Income $20,000-$29,999 -.007 (.040) -.053 (.029) 
Income $30,000-$39,999 -.014 (.042) -.070 (.031)* 
Income $40,000 or more -.006 (.047) -.079 (.034)* 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (violent offense) -.055 (.083) .111 (.061) 
Constant -.053 (.064) .167 (.047)*** 
* p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001. 
 
Second-Stage Instrumental Number of observations = 1,559 
Variables Regression Wald χ2 (9 d.f.) = 35.44 
 Pr > χ2 = .000 
New Charged Violent Off. R2 = .023 
Term b S. E z p 
Predicted treatment take-up -.008 .014 -.61 .541 
Constant .128 .033 3.91 .000 
Controlling for region, gender, race, age, SES and offending history. 
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Instrumental Variables Model: Prevalence of Recidivism (Drug Offenses, 2-Year Follow-
Up, Original Table 2.16) 
 
 First Stage 
Treatment Take-Up 
Reduced Form (ITT) 
Post-RA Drug Off. 
 Observations = 1,559 Observations = 1,559 
 R2 = .665 R2 = .023 
 Adjusted R2 = .651 Adjusted R2 = .012 
Instruments b (S.E.) b (S.E.) 
Assigned LIS .812 (.089)*** -.054 (.088) 
Assigned LIS*West -.086 (.035)* .027 (.035) 
Assigned LIS*Male .012 (.032) .034 (.032) 
Assigned LIS*White -.023 (.038) .018 (.038) 
Assigned LIS*Age -.000 (.001) .000 (.001) 
Assigned LIS*Income20 .032 (.058) .004 (.057) 
Assigned LIS*Income30 .083 (.061) -.010 (.060) 
Assigned LIS*Income40 .033 (.067) -.013 (.066) 
Assigned LIS*Prior offending .200 (.093)* .006 (.092) 
Exogenous   
West probation region .055 (.025)* -.016 (.025) 
Male .004 (.023) .039 (.023) 
White .007 (.027) .009 (.027) 
Age at RA .001 (.001) -.003 (.001)** 
Income $20,000-$29,999 -.007 (.040) -.046 (.040) 
Income $30,000-$39,999 -.013 (.042) -.060 (.042) 
Income $40,000 or more -.005 (.047) -.098 (.047)* 
Monthly offending rate 1 year 
pre-RA (drug offense) -.010 (.055) .006 (.055) 
Constant -.052 (.064) .254 (.064)*** 
 
Second-Stage Instrumental Number of observations = 1,559 
Variables Regression Wald χ2 (9 d.f.) = 34.39 
 Pr > χ2 = .000 
New Charged Drug Offense R2 = .102 
Term b S. E z p 
Predicted treatment take-up -.013 .018 -.71 .475 
Constant .230 .044 5.21 .000 
Controlling for region, gender, race, age, SES and offending history. 
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Appendix G: Conditional Distributions of Selected Model Covariates 
and Outcome 
Age at RA and Probability of a New Charge 
Age Charged (%) 
Not 
Charged 
(%) 
Total (%) Age Charged (%) 
Not 
Charged 
(%) 
Total 
(%) 
19 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 2 (100) 46 14 (24.1) 44 (75.9) 58 (100) 
20 0 (0.0) 2 (100.0) 2 (100) 47 13 (17.3) 62 (82.7) 75 (100) 
21 4 (23.5) 13 (76.5) 17 (100) 48 9 (17.0) 44 (83.0) 53 (100) 
22 8 (42.1) 11 (57.9) 19 (100) 49 7 (14.9) 40 (85.1) 47 (100) 
23 8 (33.3) 16 (66.7) 24 (100) 50 16 (25.8) 46 (74.2) 62 (100) 
24 5 (20.8) 19 (79.2) 24 (100) 51 6 (17.6) 28 (82.4) 34 (100) 
25 10 (23.3) 33 (76.7) 43 (100) 52 11 (26.2) 31 (73.8) 42 (100) 
26 6 (19.4) 25 (80.6) 31 (100) 53 4 (12.5) 28 (87.5) 32 (100) 
27 20 (35.7) 36 (64.3) 56 (100) 54 6 (15.0) 34 (85.0) 40 (100) 
28 8 (20.0) 32 (80.0) 40 (100) 55 6 (22.2) 21 (77.8) 27 (100) 
29 13 (28.3) 33 (71.7) 46 (100) 56 3 (20.0) 12 (80.0) 15 (100) 
30 9 (25.7) 26 (74.3) 35 (100) 57 2 (12.5) 14 (87.5) 16 (100) 
31 8 (21.1) 30 (78.9) 38 (100) 58 3 (21.4) 11 (78.6) 14 (100) 
32 9 (27.3) 24 (72.7) 33 (100) 59 0 (0.0) 15 (100.0) 15 (100) 
33 10 (24.4) 31 (75.6) 41 (100) 60 0 (0.0) 7 (100.0) 7 (100) 
34 8 (26.7) 22 (73.3) 30 (100) 61 0 (0.0) 7 (100.0) 7 (100) 
35 7 (14.3) 42 (85.7) 49 (100) 62 0 (0.0) 5 (100.0) 5 (100) 
36 8 (21.6) 29 (78.4) 37 (100) 63 0 (0.0) 7 (100.0) 7 (100) 
37 10 (21.7) 36 (78.3) 46 (100) 64 0 (0.0) 3 (100.0) 3 (100) 
38 9 (19.1) 38 (80.9) 47 (100) 65 1 (25.0) 3 (75.0) 4 (100) 
39 13 (29.5) 31 (70.5) 44 (100) 66 2 (50.0) 2 (50.0) 4 (100) 
40 12 (27.3) 32 (72.7) 44 (100) 67 0 (0.0) 5 (100.0) 5 (100) 
41 9 (18.4) 40 (81.6) 49 (100) 68 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 2 (100) 
42 10 (20.4) 39 (79.6) 49 (100) 69 0 (0.0) 2 (100.0) 2 (100) 
43 6 (12.8) 41 (87.2) 47 (100) 70 1 (50.0) 1 (50.0) 2 (100) 
44 5 (13.5) 32 (86.5) 37 (100) 71 1 (100.0) 0 (0.0) 1 (100) 
45 13 (26.0) 37 (74.0) 50 (100) Total 335 (21.5) 
1,224 
(78.5) 
1,559 
(100) 
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Post-RA Months in Jail and Probability of a New Charge 
Months in jail Charged N (%) 
Not Charged 
N (%) 
Total 
N (%) 
0 210 (15.4) 1,156 (84.6) 1,366 (100) 
1 4 (44.4) 5 (55.6) 9 (100) 
2 2 (28.6) 5 (71.4) 7 (100) 
3 1 (33.3) 2 (66.7) 3 (100) 
4 5 (36.5) 8 (61.5) 13 (100) 
5 1 (20.0) 4 (80.0) 5 (100) 
6 4 (44.4) 5 (55.6) 9 (100) 
7 12 (75.0) 4 (25.0) 16 (100) 
8 7 (63.6) 4 (36.4) 11 (100) 
9 7 (70.0) 3 (30.0) 10 (100) 
10 14 (87.5) 2 (12.5) 16 (100) 
11 12 (70.6) 5 (29.4) 17 (100) 
12 56 (72.7) 21 (27.3) 77 (100) 
Total 335 (21.5) 1,224 (78.5) 1,559 (100) 
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Appendix H: Diagnostics for Proportional Hazards Models 
Scaled Schoenfeld Residuals Time = time 
All Charged Offenses d.f. = 1 for all covariates 
Covariate Rho χ2 p 
Treatment group -.011 .04 .836 
West probation region -.008 .02 .880 
Male -.044 .70 .401 
White -.043 .71 .400 
Age at RA -.026 .23 .632 
Income $20,000-$29,999 -.009 .03 .874 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .025 .21 .646 
Income $40,000 or more .015 .07 .789 
Monthly offending rate 1 year pre-RA 
(any charged offense) .045 .38 .537 
In jail Oct 2007 -.021 .15 .701 
In jail Nov 2007 -.027 .26 .613 
In jail Dec 2007 .105 3.70 .054 
In jail Jan 2008 -.119 4.75 .029 
In jail Feb 2008 -.010 .03 .861 
In jail Mar 2008 -.019 .13 .721 
In jail Apr 2008 .072 1.82 .177 
In jail May 2008 -.019 .12 .731 
In jail Jun 2008 -.008 .02 .878 
In jail Jul 2008 .081 2.26 .132 
In jail Aug 2008 -.050 .89 .345 
In jail Sep 2008 .004 .01 .941 
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Scaled Schoenfeld Residuals Time = time 
Charged Violent Offenses d.f. = 1 for all covariates 
Covariate Rho χ2 p 
Treatment group .051 .21 .650 
West probation region .201 3.01 .083 
Male -.031 .08 .782 
White .196 3.46 .063 
Age at RA -.063 .33 .569 
Income $20,000-$29,999 -.054 .23 .629 
Income $30,000-$39,999 -.051 .17 .680 
Income $40,000 or more -.219 3.75 .053 
Monthly offending rate 1 year pre-RA 
(charged violent offense) .139 .81 .367 
In jail 1 year post-RA -.276 6.31 .012 
 
Scaled Schoenfeld Residuals Time = time 
Charged Drug Offenses d.f. = 1 for all covariates 
Covariate Rho χ2 p 
Treatment group -.032 .17 .679 
West probation region .043 .30 .584 
Male -.107 1.82 .177 
White -.024 .10 .756 
Age at RA -.025 .11 .739 
Income $20,000-$29,999 .032 .16 .687 
Income $30,000-$39,999 .059 .54 .464 
Income $40,000 or more .133 2.64 .104 
Monthly offending rate 1 year pre-RA 
(charged drug offense) .076 .41 .522 
In jail Oct 2007 -.100 1.48 .225 
In jail Nov 2007 -.026 .10 .747 
In jail Dec 2007 .185 5.09 .024 
In jail Jan 2008 -.169 4.26 .039 
In jail Feb 2008 .019 .06 .810 
In jail Mar 2008 -.020 .06 .800 
In jail Apr 2008 .050 .38 .537 
In jail May 2008 -.002 .00 .981 
In jail Jun 2008 .057 .48 .488 
In jail Jul 2008 .036 .19 .666 
In jail Aug 2008 -.113 1.99 .158 
In jail Sep 2008 .004 .00 .957 
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Appendix J: Sensitivity, Specificity, and Predictive Value 
 Outcome  
 No Serious Offense Serious Offense  
Predicted Low Risk True Positive (TP) False Positive (FP) Positive Predictive Value (PPV) 
Predicted Non-Low Risk False Negative (FN) True Negative (TN) Negative Predictive Value (NPV) 
 Sensitivity (Sn) Specificity (Sp)  
Sensitivity 
The proportion of true positives (predicted/actual low-risk) identified by the model. 
! 
Sn = #TP#TP+#FN  
Specificity 
The proportion of true negatives (predicted/actual non-low risk) identified by the model. 
! 
Sp = #TN#TN+#FP  
Positive predictive value 
The proportion of predicted low-risk cases that are actually low risk (no serious offense). 
! 
PPV = #TP#TP+#FP  
Negative predictive value 
The proportion of predicted non-low risk cases that are actually non-low risk (commit 
serious offense). 
! 
NPV = #TN#TN+#FN  
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